for which reason those of family, independency, and
fortune, with great propriety, contend with each other
for them; for these are the fit persons to fill them:
for a city can no more consist of all poor men than
it can of all slaves But if such persons are requisite,
it is evident that those also who are just and valiant
are equally so; for without justice and valour no
state can be supported, the former being necessary
for its existence, the latter for its happiness.
CHAPTER XIII
It seems, then, requisite for the establishment of
a state, that all, or at least many of these particulars
should be well canvassed and inquired into; and that
virtue and education may most justly claim the right
of being considered as the necessary means of making
the citizens happy, as we have already said.
As those who are equal in one particular are not therefore
equal in all, and those who are unequal in one particular
are not therefore unequal in all, it follows that
all those governments which are established upon a
principle which supposes they are, are erroneous.
We have already said, that all the members of the
community will dispute with each other for the offices
of the state; and in some particulars justly, but
not so in general; the rich, for instance, because
they have the greatest landed property, and the ultimate
right to the soil is vested in the community; and
also because their fidelity is in general most to
be depended on. The freemen and men of family
will dispute the point with each other, as nearly on
an equality; for these latter have a right to a higher
regard as citizens than obscure persons, for honourable
descent is everywhere of great esteem: nor is
it an improper conclusion, that the descendants of
men of worth will be men of worth themselves; for
noble birth is the fountain of virtue to men of family:
for the same reason also we justly say, that virtue
has a right to put in her pretensions. Justice,
for instance, is a virtue, and so necessary to society,
that all others must yield her the precedence.
Let us now see what the many have to urge on their
side against the few; and they may say, that if, when
collectively taken, they are compared with them, they
are stronger, richer, and better than they are.
But should it ever happen that all these should inhabit
the [1283b] same city, I mean the good, the rich,
the noble, as well as the many, such as usually make
up the community, I ask, will there then be any reason
to dispute concerning who shall govern, or will there
not? for in every community which we have mentioned
there is no dispute where the supreme power should
be placed; for as these differ from each other, so
do those in whom that is placed; for in one state
the rich enjoy it, in others the meritorious, and thus
each according to their separate manners. Let
us however consider what is to be done when all these
happen at the same time to inhabit the same city.
If the virtuous should be very few in number, how
then shall we act? shall we prefer the virtuous on
account of their abilities, if they are capable of
governing the city? or should they be so many as almost
entirely to compose the state?
Copyrights
Politics: A Treatise on Government from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.
