abilities acquire the supreme power; for this is what
they call an oligarchy; it should seem then that our
definition of the different states was not correct:
nay, moreover, could any one suppose that the majority
of the people were poor, and the minority rich, and
then describe the state in this manner, that an oligarchy
was a government in which the rich, being few in number,
possessed the supreme power, and that a democracy
was a state in which the poor, being many in number,
possessed it, still there will be another difficulty;
for what name shall we give to those states we have
been describing? I mean, that b which the greater
number are rich, and that in which the lesser number
are poor (where each of these possess the supreme
power), if there are no other states than those we
have described. It seems therefore evident to
reason, that whether the supreme power is vested in
the hands of many or few may be a matter of accident;
but that it is clear enough, that when it is in the
hands of the few, it will be a government of the rich;
when in the hands of the many, it will be a government
of the poor; since in all countries there are many
poor and few rich: it is not therefore the cause
that has been already assigned (namely, the number
of people in power) that makes the difference between
the two governments; but an oligarchy and democracy
differ in this from each other, in the poverty of those
who govern in the one, and the riches I28oa of those
who govern in the other; for when the government is
in the hands of the rich, be they few or be they more,
it is an oligarchy; when it is in the hands of the
poor, it is a democracy: but, as we have already
said, the one will be always few, the other numerous,
but both will enjoy liberty; and from the claims of
wealth and liberty will arise continual disputes with
each other for the lead in public affairs.
Let us first determine what are the proper limits
of an oligarchy and a democracy, and what is just
in each of these states; for all men have some natural
inclination to justice; but they proceed therein only
to a certain degree; nor can they universally point
out what is absolutely just; as, for instance, what
is equal appears just, and is so; but not to all;
only among those who are equals: and what is
unequal appears just, and is so; but not to all, only
amongst those who are unequals; which circumstance
some people neglect, and therefore judge ill; the
reason for which is, they judge for themselves, and
every one almost is the worst judge in his own cause.
Since then justice has reference to persons, the same
distinctions must be made with respect to persons
which are made with respect to things, in the manner
that I have already described in my Ethics.
