to the supreme power generally preserved it; but those
who received it from them have, to speak truth, almost
immediately all of them lost it; for, falling into
an effeminate way of life, they soon grew despicable,
and generally fell victims to conspiracies. Part
of their hatred may be very fitly ascribed to anger;
for in some cases this is their motive to action:
for it is often a cause which impels them to act more
powerfully than hatred, and they proceed with greater
obstinacy against those whom they attack, as this passion
is not under the direction of reason. Many persons
also indulge this passion through contempt; which
occasioned the fall of the Pisistratidae and many
others. But hatred is more powerful than anger;
for anger is accompanied with grief, which prevents
the entrance of reason; but hatred is free from it.
In short, whatever causes may be assigned as the destruction
of a pure oligarchy unmixed with any other government
and an extreme democracy, the same may be applied to
a tyranny; for these are divided tyrannies.
Kingdoms are seldom destroyed by any outward attack;
for which reason they are generally very stable; but
they have many causes of subversion within; of which
two are the principal; one is when those who are in
power [1313a] excite a sedition, the other when they
endeavour to establish a tyranny by assuming greater
power than the law gives them. A kingdom, indeed,
is not what we ever see erected in our times, but
rather monarchies and tyrannies; for a kingly government
is one that is voluntarily submitted to, and its supreme
power admitted upon great occasions: but where
many are equal, and there are none in any respect
so much better than another as to be qualified for
the greatness and dignity of government over them,
then these equals will not willingly submit to be
commanded; but if any one assumes the government,
either by force or fraud, this is a tyranny.
To what we have already said we shall add, the causes
of revolutions in an hereditary kingdom. One
of these is, that many of those who enjoy it are naturally
proper objects of contempt only: another is,
that they are insolent while their power is not despotic;
but they possess kingly honours only. Such a
state is soon destroyed; for a king exists but while
the people are willing to obey, as their submission
to him is voluntary, but to a tyrant involuntary.
These and such-like are the causes of the destruction
of monarchies.
Monarchies, in a word, are preserved by means contrary
to what I have already mentioned as the cause of their
destruction; but to speak to each separately:
the stability of a kingdom will depend upon the power
of the king’s being kept within moderate bounds;
for by how much the less extensive his power is, by
so much the longer will his government continue; for
he will be less despotic and more upon an equality
of condition with those he governs; who, on that account,
will envy him the less.
