latter it may arise from two causes, for either the
few in power may conspire against each other or against
the people; but in a democracy only one; namely, against
the few who aim at exclusive power; but there is no
instance worth speaking of, of a sedition of the people
against themselves. Moreover, a government composed
of men of moderate fortunes comes much nearer to a
democracy than an oligarchy, and is the safest of
all such states.
CHAPTER II
Since we are inquiring into the causes of seditions
and revolutions in governments, we must begin entirely
with the first principles from whence they arise.
Now these, so to speak, are nearly three in number;
which we must first distinguish in general from each
other, and endeavour to show in what situation people
are who begin a sedition; and for what causes; and
thirdly, what are the beginnings of political troubles
and mutual quarrels with each other. Now that
cause which of all others most universally inclines
men to desire to bring about a change in government
is that which I have already mentioned; for those
who aim at equality will be ever ready for sedition,
if they see those whom they esteem their equals possess
more than they do, as well as those also who are not
content with equality but aim at superiority, if they
think that while they deserve more than, they have
only equal with, or less than, their inferiors.
Now, what they aim at may be either just or unjust;
just, when those who are inferior are seditious, that
they may be equal; unjust, when those who are equal
are so, that they may be superior. These, then,
are the situations in which men will be seditious:
the causes for which they will be so are profit and
honour; and their contrary: for, to avoid dishonour
or loss of fortune by mulcts, either on their own
account or their friends, they will raise a commotion
in the state. The original causes which dispose
men to the things which I have mentioned are, taken
in one manner, seven in number, in another they are
more; two of which are the same with those that have
been already mentioned: but influencing in a
different manner; for profit and honour sharpen men
against each other; not to get the possession of them
for themselves (which was what I just now supposed),
but when they see others, some justly, others [1302b]
unjustly, engrossing them. The other causes are
haughtiness, fear, eminence, contempt, disproportionate
increase in some part of the state. There are
also other things which in a different manner will
occasion revolutions in governments; as election intrigues,
neglect, want of numbers, a too great dissimilarity
of circumstances.
CHAPTER III
Copyrights
Politics: A Treatise on Government from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.
