purpose, or if both the votes and the lots are open
to all, such a state is partly an aristocracy, partly
a free government itself. These are the different
methods in which the deliberative power is vested in
different states, all of whom follow some regulation
here laid down. It is advantageous to a democracy,
in the present sense of the word, by which I mean a
state wherein the people at large have a supreme power,
even over the laws, to hold frequent public assemblies;
and it will be best in this particular to imitate
the example of oligarchies in their courts of justice;
for they fine those who are appointed to try causes
if they do not attend, so should they reward the poor
for coming to the public assemblies: and their
counsels will be best when all advise with each other,
the citizens with the nobles, the nobles with the citizens.
It is also advisable when the council is to be composed
of part of the citizens, to elect, either by vote
or lot, an equal number of both ranks. It is
also proper, if the common people in the state are
very numerous, either not to pay every one for his
attendance, but such a number only as will make them
equal to the nobles, or to reject many of them by
lot.
In an oligarchy they should either call up some of
the common people to the council, or else establish
a court, as is done in some other states, whom they
call pre-advisers or guardians of the laws, whose
business should be to propose first what they should
afterwards enact. By this means the people would
have a place in the administration of public affairs,
without having it in their power to occasion any disorder
in the government. Moreover, the people may be
allowed to have a vote in whatever bill is proposed,
but may not themselves propose anything contrary thereto;
or they may give their advice, while the power of
determining may be with the magistrates only.
It is also necessary to follow a contrary practice
to what is established in democracies, for the people
should be allowed the power of pardoning, but not
of condemning, for the cause should be referred back
again to the magistrates: whereas the contrary
takes place in republics; for the power of pardoning
is with the few, but not of condemning, which is always
referred [1299a] to the people at large. And thus
we determine concerning the deliberative power in
any state, and in whose hands it shall be.
We now proceed to consider the choice of magistrates;
for this branch of public business contains many different
Parts, as how many there shall be, what shall be their
particular office, and with respect to time how long
each of them shall continue in place; for some make
it six months, others shorter, others for a year,
others for a much longer time; or whether they should
be perpetual or for a long time, or neither; for the
same person may fill the same office several times,
or he may not be allowed to enjoy it even twice, but
only once: and also with respect to the appointment
of magistrates, who are to be eligible, who is to
choose them, and in what manner; for in all these
particulars we ought properly to distinguish the different
ways which may be followed; and then to show which
of these is best suited to such and such governments.
