(2) In recognizing the social will as something deeper
and broader than the will of the individual, as having
its roots in the remote past and as reaching into
the distant future, it admits the futility of devising
utopian schemes which would bless humanity in defiance
of the actual expressions of the social will revealed
in the development of human societies. The whim
of the individual cannot well be substituted for the
settled purpose of the community—a purpose
ripened by generations of experience, and adjusted
to what is possible under existing conditions.
(3) On the other hand, it distinguishes between lower
and higher ethical codes, or codes lower or higher
in certain of their aspects. It sets a standard
of comparison; it recognizes progress towards a goal.
(4) And, in all this, it does not appear to decide
arbitrarily either what is the goal of man’s
moral efforts or what means must be adopted to attain
to it. It rests upon a study of man; man as he
has been, man as he is, in all the manifold relations
in which he stands to his environment, physical and
social.
There are other ethical theories in the field, of
course. Some of them are advocated by men of
original genius and of no little learning. Some
deserve more attention than others, but all should
have a hearing, at least. A close scrutiny will
often reveal that advocates of different theories
are by no means so far apart as a hasty reading of
their works would suggest. Writers the most diverse
may assist one to a comprehension of one’s own
theory. Its implications may be developed, objections
to it may be suggested, its strong points may stand
revealed. By no means the least important part
of a work on ethics is its treatment of the schools
of the moralists. If it be written with any degree
of fairness, it may contain what will serve the reader
with an antidote to erroneous opinions on the part
of the writer. To a study of the most important
schools of the moralists I shall now turn.
THE SCHOOLS OF THE MORALISTS
INTUITIONISM
90. WHAT IS IT?—“We come into
the world,” said Epictetus, “with no natural
notion of a right-angled triangle, or of a quarter-tone,
or of a half-tone; but we learn each of these things
by a certain transmission according to art; and for
this reason those who do not know them do not think
that they know them. But as to good and evil,
and beautiful and ugly, and becoming and unbecoming,
and happiness and misfortune, and proper and improper,
and what we ought to do and what we ought not to do,
who ever came into the world without having an innate
idea of them?” [Footnote: Discourses,
Book II, chapter xi, translation by GEORGE LONG.]
Seneca adds his testimony to the self-luminous character
of moral truth: “Whatever things tend to
make us better or happier are either obvious or easily
discovered.” [Footnote: On Benefits,
Book VII, chapter i.]
