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A Handbook of Ethical Theory eBook

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George Stuart Fullerton

To decide that any of his capacities shall be allowed to remain dormant may threaten future development.  To cut off certain arts and sciences as not palpably serving the interests of man is a dangerous thing.  To ignore the actual history of man’s efforts to become a rational being, and to place, hence, all wills upon the one level, is to frustrate the desired end.  It is not thus that the reign of reason can be established.

CHAPTER XXII

THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE SOCIAL WILL

87.  MAN’S MULTIPLE ALLEGIANCE.—­We have seen that each man has his place in a social order.  This order is the expression and the embodiment of the social will, which accepts him, protects him, gives him a share in the goods the community has so far attained, recognizes his individual will in that it accords to him rights, and prescribes his course of conduct, that is, defines his duties or obligations.

The social will is authoritative; it issues commands and enforces obedience.  With its commands the individual may be in sympathy or he may not.  But upon obedience the social will insists, and it compasses its ends by the bestowal of rewards or the infliction of punishment.  The moral law to which man thus finds himself subject is something not wholly foreign to the nature of the individual.  It has come into being as an expression of the nature of man.  That nature the individual shares with his fellows.

Obedience to the social will would be a relatively simple matter were that will always unequivocally and unmistakably expressed, and did all the members of a community feel the pressure of the social will in the same manner and to the same degree.  But the whole matter is indefinitely complicated by what may be called man’s multiple allegiance.

Organized societies do not consist of undifferentiated units.  They are not mere aggregates, both are highly complex in their internal constitution.  A conscientious man may feel that he owes duties to himself, to his immediate family, to his kindred, to his neighborhood, to his social class, to his political party, to his church, to his country, to its allies, to humanity.  The social will does not bring its pressure to bear upon the man who holds one place in the social order just as it does upon him who holds another.

Nor are the injunctions laid upon a man always in harmony.  The demands of family may seem to conflict with those of neighborhood or of profession; duties to the church may seem to conflict with duties to the state; patriotism may appear to be more or less in conflict with an interest in humanity taken broadly.  That the individual should often approach in doubt and hesitation the decision as to what it is, on the whole, his duty to do, is not surprising.  Nor is it surprising that individuals the most conscientious should find it impossible to be at one on the subject of rights and duties.  Two men may agree perfectly that it is right to “do good,” and be quite unable to agree just what good it is right to do now, or with whom one should make a beginning.

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A Handbook of Ethical Theory from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.

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