the way for law; and all states, whatever be their
real aims, now attempt to justify their actions by
an appeal to the more or less nebulous tribunal of
international public opinion. In this they recognize
its claim to act as arbiter. Within the jurisdiction
of a state, the motto, “my family, right or
wrong,” would not be a maxim approved in a court
of justice. International law is made a mock
of by the frank enunciation of the maxim, “my
country, right or wrong.” Hence, such frankness
is, in international relations, not encouraged.
The more or less skillfully made appeal to the moral
sense of mankind—to the broader social
will as public opinion—implies a certain
recognition of its authority, or, at least, of its
influence. Whether this is a definite step toward
the granting of a real authority to the broader social
will, an authority which will curb impartially the
selfishness of individual states, it remains for the
future to decide.
THE REAL SOCIAL WILL
THE IMPERFECT SOCIAL WILL
76. THE APPARENT AND THE REAL SOCIAL WILL.—It
is important to distinguish between the apparent and
the real social will. We may begin by pointing
out that the question “apparent to whom?”
is a pertinent one.
The social will is brought to bear upon the individual
through a variety of agencies. The family, the
neighborhood, the church, the trade or profession,
the political party, the social class—all
these have their habits and maxims. They tend
to mold to their type those whom they count among
their members. The pressure which they bring to
bear is felt as a sense of moral obligation.
Naturally, individuals with different affiliations
will be sensible of the pressure in different ways,
and may differ widely in their conceptions of the
obligations actually laid upon the individual by the
will of the greater organism of which he is a part.
But even he who rises above minor distinctions and
takes a broad view of society is forced to recognize
that the distinction between the apparent and the
real social will may be a most significant one.
We have found the expression of the social will in
custom, law and public opinion. This is just;
but the statement must be accepted with reservations.
There are instances in which neither the organization
of the state, nor the laws according to which it is
governed, can be considered as in any sense an expression
of the social will. An autocracy, established
by force, and ruling without the free consent of the
governed, is an external and overruling power.
It may be obeyed, but it is not consented to.
Nor is any body of law or system of government imposed
upon a subject people by an alien and dominant race
a fair exponent of the social will of the people thus
governed. Custom and public opinion are at variance
with law. However just and enlightened the government,
as judged from the standpoint of some other race or
nation, its control must be felt as oppressive by
those upon whom it is imposed. Traditions felt
to be the most sacred may be violated; moral laws,
as understood by those thus under dictation, may be
transgressed by obedience to the law of the land.
