set upon the enlightenment of mankind, the alleviation
of suffering, the service of a state, the attainment
of a noble character? Were Socrates, St. Francis,
Abraham Lincoln, Wilberforce, Thomas Hill Green, the
slaves of their passions? Yet these men were
moved by certain dominant desires, and their unswerving
pursuit of their goal was made possible only by the
reason that harmonized their lives and substituted
deliberate purpose for random impulse.
The doctrine, then, that the reason is to be likened
rather to the presiding officer of a deliberative
assembly, concerned only to give every voice a fair
hearing, than to a legislator issuing commands independently,
may be so stated as not to shock the sober-minded.
And the doctrine recommends itself in showing that
reason and inclination or desire are not enemies.
The possession of reason must lead to the suppression
of some desires—those incompatible with
a comprehensive purpose deliberately embraced; but
the desires and the reason or intelligence work together
to a common end. On this view, it is not the
rational man who is divided against himself; it is
the short-sighted, the impulsive, the inconsistent,
the irrational man. He is the prey of warring
desires whose strife leads to no permanent peace under
the guidance of reason.
60. ANOTHER VIEW OF REASON.—To certain
minds this view of reason as the arbiter and reconciler
of man’s impulses and desires does not appeal.
Thus, Kant, whose doctrine will be more fully considered
later, [Footnote: Chapter xxix.] holds that man’s
reason promulgates a law which takes no account of
the impulses and desires of man. Thus, also, Henry
Sidgwick, who differs from Kant in making the attainment
of happiness the goal of human endeavor, and who,
consequently, is not tempted to disregard the desires
of man, yet refers to the reason independently certain
maxims, which he regards as self-evident, touching
our own good and the good of our neighbor. [Footnote:
The Methods of Ethics, chapter iii.]
There are certain considerations which appear to favor
the view that the reason is a faculty which may be
regarded as an independent law-giver. A man may
be possessed of great intelligence; he may be well-informed,
acute in his reasonings, and consistent in his strivings
to attain some comprehensive end, which, on the whole,
appears congruous to his nature, such as it is.
Yet we may regard him as highly unreasonable.
Judged by some higher standard which we look upon
as approved by reason, he is found to fall short.
Is reason, then, synonymous with intelligence?
Or is it something more—the source of an
ultimate standard of action, intuitively known, and
by which all man’s actions must be judged?
Upon this question light will be thrown in the pages
following.
THE SOCIAL WILL
