A presumption against this arbitrary assumption that
we have the one and only desirable code is suggested
the unthinking acceptance of the traditional by those
who are lacking in enlightenment and in the capacity
reflection. Is it not significant that a contact
with new ways of thinking has a tendency, at least,
to make men broaden their horizon and to revise some
of their views?
In other fields, we hope to attain to a capacity for
self-criticism. We expect to learn from other
men. Why should we, in the sphere of morals,
lay claim to the possession of the truth, the whole
truth, and nothing but the truth? Why should
we refuse to learn from anyone? Such a position
seems unreasoning. It puts moral judgments beyond
the pale of argument and intelligent discussion.
It is an assumption of infallibility little in harmony
with the spirit of science. The fact that a given
standard of conduct is in harmony with our traditions,
habits of thought, and emotional responses, does not
prove to other men that it is, not one of a number
of accepted codes, but in a quite peculiar sense acceptable,
a thing to put in a class by itself—the
class into which each mother puts her own child, as
over against other children.
Moreover, such an unreasoned assumption of superiority
must make one little sympathetic in one’s attitude
toward the moral life of other peoples. Into
the significance of their social organization, of their
customs, their laws, one can gain no insight.
Their hopes, their fears, their strivings, their successes
and their failures, their approval and disapproval
of their fellows, their peace of conscience and their
remorse, must leave us cold and aloof.
It is not profitable for us to assume at the outset
that the differences exhibited in the moral judgments
of individuals or of peoples are of minor significance.
They are facts to be dealt with in the light of some
theory. An ethical theory which ignores them must
rest upon a narrow and insecure foundation. It
is exposed to assault from many quarters. It may,
in default of better means of defence, be compelled
to take refuge behind the blind wall of dogmatic assertion.
On the other hand, a theory which gives them frank
recognition, and strives to exhibit their real significance
in the life of the individual and of the race, may
be able to show lying among them the golden cord of
reason which saves them from the charge of being incoherent
facts. It may even lead us back to a conservatism
no longer unreasoning, but rationally defensible and
conscious of its proper limits. The blindly conservative
man seems to be faced with the alternative of stagnation
or revolution. The rationally conservative may
regard the development of the moral life as a Pilgrim’s
Progress, not without its untoward accidents, but,
in spite of them, a gradual advance toward a desirable
goal.
