Furthermore, not only do individuals set their affections
upon different objects, but the same person at different
stages of his development desires widely different
things. What is a temptation to the boy has no
attraction for the man. What fills the savage
with longings may inspire in the product of a high
civilization no other feeling than repulsion.
And what is true of the individual is true of men
in the mass. The objects of desire and of endeavor
are not the same in communities of all orders.
Each kind of man has its own nature, which differs
in some respects from that of each other kind, and
dictates what shall be, for this or that man, an object
of desire and will. No two men desire precisely
the same thing in all particulars. Yet each is
a man, and is endowed with the usual complement of
human instincts.
The process of abstraction and generalization which
resulted in the above-mentioned list of the elements
which enter into the constitution of human nature
is, nevertheless, not without its uses. It serves
to order, to some extent, at least, the bewildering
variety of the phenomena presented to us when we view
the broad field of the desires and volitions of all
sorts and conditions of men. Men’s choices
fall into kinds; there is similiarity in difference.
We do not approach an unknown man with the feeling
that he is a wholly unknown quantity. He is, at
least, a man, and we know something of men. We
have some notion how to go at him.
But the ordering of the motley multiplicity of men’s
desires by a reference to the fundamental instincts
of man stops far short of a complete unification.
We are left with a number of distinct and apparently
irreducible impulses and tendencies on our hands.
If it is useful to go so far, may it not be much more
useful to go still farther?
Aristotle divided things eligible into those eligible
in themselves and those eligible for the sake of something
else. How it would illuminate the field of action,
if it were discovered that men ultimately desire but
one thing, and choose all other things on account of
it! Would the discovery not facilitate immensely
our dealings with our fellows, suggesting new possibilities
of control? A notorious instance of the attempt
to conjure away the bewildering diversity in men’s
desires and choices lies in the selection of pleasure
as the one thing eligible in itself, the unique ultimate
object of human action. Of this object we have,
so far, taken no account.
INTENTION AND MOTIVE
45. COMPLEX ENDS.—I may desire to
clear my throat and may do so. The action is
a trivial one, is over in a moment, and is forgotten.
On the other hand, I may desire to spend my summer
on the sea-coast, to grow rich in business, to attain
to high social position, or to satisfy political ambition.
When the object is of this complicated description,
there may easily be elements in it which, considered
alone, I should not desire at all.
