No man always thinks of the permanent ends which he
has selected as controls to his actions. They
are selected, they pass from his mind, and, when they
recur to it again, the selection is reaffirmed.
But, whether he is actually thinking about the ends
in question or not, the settled trend of his will
is expressed in them.
This settled trend of the will, even when scarcely
recognized by the man himself, may be vastly more
significant than the passing individual decision,
although the latter be accompanied by clear consciousness.
In certain cases the latter is a true exponent of
character, but not infrequently it is not. It
may be the result of a whim, of an irrational impulse
little congruous with a man’s nature. It
may be the outcome of some misconception and in contradiction
with what the man would will, if enlightened.
The individual volition appears only to disappear;
it may leave no apparent trace. The permanent
will indicates a habit of mind, a way of acting, which
may be expected to make its influence felt with the
persistency of that which exerts a steady pressure.
To refuse it the name of will seems arbitrary and
unjustifiable.
In the permanent will is expressed the character
of the man. This character is reflected in his
ideals. Sometimes ideals are clearly recognized
and deliberately chosen. Sometimes a man is little
aware of the nature of the ideals which control his
strivings. He may be said to choose, but to choose
more or less blindly. But, whether he chooses
with clear vision or without it, he may choose well
or ill.
CHAPTER XIII
THE OBJECT IN DESIRE AND WILL
40. THE OBJECT AS END TO BE REALIZED.—The
expression “the object before the mind in desiring
and willing” is not free from ambiguity.
It may be used in referring to the idea, the psychic
fact, which is present when one desires or wills.
Or it may be used to indicate the future fact which
is the realization of the idea, that which the idea
points to as its end.
The idea and the end are, of course, not identical,
but they are related. The idea mirrors the end,
foreshadows it. In the attempt to explain a voluntary
act we may turn either to the one or to the other;
we may regard the idea as the efficient cause which
has resulted in the act, or we may account for the
act by pointing out the end it was purposed to attain.
There is no reason why we should not recognize both
the efficient cause and the final cause, or end.
The latter has been the subject of more or less mystification.
How, it has been asked, can an end, which does not,
as yet, exist, be a cause which sets in motion the
apparatus that brings about its own existence? [Footnote:
See JANET, Les Causes Finales, Paris, 1901,
p. 1, ff.]
The difficulty is a gratuitous one. It lies in
the confusion of the final cause or end, with the
efficient cause. When we realize that the expression
“final cause” means simply that which is
purposed, or accepted as an end, objections to it
fall away. That, in desire and will, in all their
higher manifestations, at least, there is consciousness
of an end, there can be no question.
