A Handbook of Ethical Theory eBook

For ethical science it is of no little importance to apprehend clearly the relation of decision to desire.  Moral rules aim to control human conduct, and conduct is the expression of the whole man.  If we have no clear conception of the desires which struggle for the mastery within him, and of the relation of his decisions to those desires, in vain will we endeavor to influence him in the direction in which we wish him to move.

36.  THE WILL AND DEFERRED ACTION.—­It remains to speak briefly of one point touching the nature of will.  It has been suggested that the decision is the psychic fact corresponding to the release of nervous energy which relieves the tension of desire.  It is the beginning of action, of realization.  But what shall we say of resolves which cannot at once be carried out in action?  Of decisions the realization of which is deferred?  I may long debate the matter and then determine to pay a bill when it comes due next month.  The decision is made; but, for a time, at least, nothing happens.  How can I here speak of the beginning of action?

The action does not at once begin, yet it is, in a sense, initiated.  The struggle of conflicting considerations has ceased; the man is “set” for action in a certain direction.  For the time being the matter is settled, and only an external circumstance prevents the resolve from being carried out.  The psychic factor is widely different from that of mere desire, and is not recognized to be different from that present in volition which at once issues in action.

CHAPTER XII

THE PERMANENT WILL

37.  CONSCIOUSLY CHOSEN ENDS.—­Our volitions, deliberate, less deliberate, and those verging upon what scarcely deserves the name of volition, weave themselves into complicated patterns, which find their expression in long series of the most varied activities.  The nature of the pattern as a whole may be determined by the deliberate selection of an end, and to that the other choices which enter into the complex may be subordinate.

Thus, a man may decide that he can afford to give himself the pleasure of a long walk through the country before taking the train at the next town.  During the course of the ramble he may make a number of more or less conscious decisions not incompatible with the purpose he originally embraced—­to take this bit of road or that, to loiter in the shade, to climb a hill that he may enjoy a view, to hasten lest he find himself too late in arriving at his destination.  These decisions may require little deliberation; they spring into being at the call of the moment, are not preceded by deliberation, and leave little trace in the memory.  They may be made semi-consciously, and while the mind is largely occupied with other things, with thoughts of the past or the future, with other scenes suggested by the landscape, or with the flowers which skirt the road.  Nevertheless, we would not hesitate to call them decisions.