(3) Finally, the mere fact that ethics has for so
many centuries been regarded as one of the disciplines
falling within the domain of the philosopher is not
without its significance. One may deplore the
tendency to base ethics upon this or that metaphysical
doctrine, and desire to see it made an independent
science; and yet one may be compelled to admit that
it is not easy to comprehend and to estimate the value
of many of the ethical theories which have been evolved
in the past, without having rather an intimate acquaintance
with the history of philosophy. The ethical teachings
of Plato, of Aristotle, of St. Thomas, of Kant, of
Hegel, of Green, lose much of their meaning when taken
out of their setting. The history of ethical
theory is blind when divorced from the history of
philosophy, and with the history of ethical theory
the moralist should be acquainted.
The philosopher has no prescriptive right to preempt
the field of ethics. Many men may cultivate it
with profit. Nevertheless, he, too, should cultivate
it, not independently and with a disregard of what
has been done by others, but in a spirit of hearty
cooperation, thankfully accepting such help as is
offered him by his neighbors.
CHAPTER VII
THE AIM OF ETHICS AS SCIENCE
19. THE APPEAL TO REASON.—The proper
aim of the scientific study of ethics appears to be
suggested with sufficient clearness by what has been
said in the chapters on the accepted content of morals.
Where individuals take up unreflectively the maxims
which are to control their conduct, human life can
scarcely be said to be under the guidance of reason.
Where, moreover, the codes of individuals clash with
each other or with the social conscience of their
community, and where the codes of different communities
are disconcertingly diverse, planful concerted action
with a view to the control of conduct appears to be
impracticable. Historical accident, blind impulse
and caprice, cannot serve as guides for a rational
creature seeking to live, along with others, a rational
life.
“The aim of ethics,” says Sidgwick, [Footnote:
The Methods of Ethics, Book I, chapter vi,
Sec 1.] “is to render scientific—i.e.,
true, and as far as possible systematic—the
apparent cognitions that most men have of the rightness
or reasonableness of conduct, whether the conduct
be considered as right in itself, or as the means to
some end conceived as ultimately reasonable.”
The use here of the word “cognitions”
calls our attention to the fact that, when men say,
“this is right, that is wrong,” they mean
no more than, “this I like, that I do not like”;
and the use of the word “apparent” indicates
that the judgments expressed may be approved by the
man who makes them, and yet be erroneous. The
appeal is to an objective standard; there is a demand
for proof.
That most men recognize, in some cases dimly, in some
cases clearly and explicitly, that the appeal to such
a standard is justifiable, can scarcely be denied.
Between “I choose” and “I ought to
choose,” between “the community demands,”
and “the community ought to demand,” men
generally recognize a distinction when they have attained
to a capacity for reflection.
