12. THE REFLECTIVE MIND AND THE MORAL CODES.—Even
the cursory glance we have given above to the moral
codes of different communities and those proposed
by individual moralists must suffice to bring any thoughtful
man to the consciousness that they differ widely among
themselves, and that the differences can scarcely
be dismissed as insignificant. A little reflection
will suffice to convince him, furthermore, that to
treat all other codes as if they were mere pathological
variations from his own is indefensibly dogmatic.
On the other hand, the differences between codes should
not be unduly emphasized. The core of identity
is there, and, although in its bald abstractness it
is not enough to live by, it is vastly significant,
nevertheless. If there were not some congruity
in the materials, they would never be brought together
as the subject of one science. Unless “good,”
“right,” “obligation,” “approval,”
etc., or the rudimentary conceptions which foreshadow
them in the mind of the most primitive human beings,
had a core of identity which could be traced in societies
the most diverse, there would be no significance in
speaking of the enlightened morality of one people
and the degraded and undeveloped morality of another.
There could be no history of the development of the
moral ideas. Collections of disparate and disconnected
facts do not constitute a science, nor are they the
proper subject of a history.
As a matter of fact, we all do speak of degraded moral
conceptions, of a perverted conscience, of a lofty
morality, of a fine sense of duty; we do not hesitate
to compare, i. e., to treat as similar and yet dissimilar,
the customs, laws and ethical maxims of different ages
and of different races. This means that we have
in our minds some standard, perhaps consciously formulated,
perhaps dimly apprehended, according to which we rate
them. The unreflective man is in danger of taking
as this standard his own actual code, such as it is;
of accepting, together with such elements of reason
as it may contain, the whole mass of his inherited
or acquired prejudices; the more reflective man will
strive to be more rationally critical.
PART II
ETHICS AS SCIENCE
CHAPTER IV
THE AWAKENING TO REFLECTION
13. THE DOGMATISM OF THE NATURAL MAN.—In
morals and in politics it seems natural for man to
be dogmatic, to take a position without hesitation,
to defend it vehemently, to maintain that others are
in the wrong.
This is not surprising. We are born into a moral
environment as into an all-embracing atmosphere.
From the cradle to the grave, we walk with our heads
in a cloud of exhortations and prohibitions. From
our earliest years we have been urged to make decisions
and to act, and we have been furnished with general
maxims to guide our action. When, therefore, we
approach the solution of a moral problem, we do not,
as a rule, acutely feel our fitness to solve it, even
though we may be judged quite unfit by others.
