(6) It is, perhaps, worth while to point out that
there is nothing to prevent a given pessimist from
being an intuitionist, an egoist, a utilitarian (of
a sort), or an adherent of one of the other schools
above discussed. He may assume intuitively that
life is undesirable; in view of its undesirability
he may act, either taking himself alone into consideration,
or including his neighbor; he may invoke the doctrine
of evolution; he may even, if he chooses, call it
self-realization to annihilate himself, for he may
argue that a will that comes to clear consciousness
must see that it must be its own undoing. It is
hardly necessary to point out, however, that the pessimist,
as such, should not be in any wise confounded with
the moralists discussed in the five chapters preceding.
KANT, HEGEL AND NIETZSCHE
136. KANT.—–It is impossible,
in any brief compass, to treat of the many individual
moralists, some of them men of genius and well worthy
of our study, who offer us ethical systems characterized
by differences of more or less importance. When
we refer a man to this or that school and do no more,
we say comparatively little about him, as has become
evident in the preceding chapters. As we have
seen, it has been necessary to class together those
who differ rather widely in many of their opinions.
Here, I shall devote a few pages to three men only,
partly because of their prominence, and partly because
it is instructive to call attention to the contrast
between them in their fundamental positions. I
shall begin with Kant.
Kant held that the human reason issues “categorial
imperatives,” that is to say, unconditional
commands to act in certain ways. The motive for
moral action must not be the desire for pleasure, but
solely the desire to do right.
He makes his fundamental rule abstract and formal:
“So act that you could wish your maxim to be
universal law.” As no man could wish to
be himself neglected when in distress, this law compels
him to be benevolent, and a new form of the fundamental
rule is developed: “Treat humanity, in
yourself or any other, as an end always, and never
as a means.” [Footnote: Fundamental
Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, Sec 2.]
Now Kant, although he maintains that it is not a man’s
duty to seek his own happiness—a thing
which natural inclination would prompt him to do—
by no means overlooks happiness altogether. He
thinks that virtue and happiness together constitute
the whole and perfect good desired by rational beings.
The attainment of this good must be the supreme end
of a will morally determined. [Footnote: Dialectic
of the Pure Practical Reason, chapter ii.] We
are morally bound to strive to be virtuous ourselves
and to make others happy.
Still, each man’s happiness means much to him;
and Kant, convinced that virtue ought to be
rewarded with happiness, holds that our world is a
moral world, where God will reward the virtuous.
If we do not assume such a world, he claims, moral
laws are reduced to idle dreams. [Footnote: Ibid.]
