Thus, Darwin, whose study of the lower animals led
him to believe that the social instincts have been
developed for the general good rather than for the
general happiness of the species, defines the “good”
as “the rearing of the greatest number of individuals
in full vigor and health, with all their faculties
perfect, under the conditions to which they have been
subjected.” The “greatest happiness
principle” he regards as an important secondary
guide to conduct, while making social instinct and
sympathy primary guides. [Footnote: The Descent
of Man, chapter iv, concluding remarks. ]
Spencer maintains that the evolution of conduct becomes
the highest possible when the conduct “simultaneously
achieves the greatest totality of life in self, in
offspring, and in fellow-men.” “The
conduct called good,” he writes, “rises
to the conduct conceived as best, when it fulfills
all three classes of ends at the same time.”
But life he does not regard as necessarily a good.
He judges it to be good or bad “according as
it has or has not a surplus of agreeable feeling.”
Hence, “conduct is good or bad according as
its total effects are pleasurable or painful.”
[Footnote: The Data of Ethics, chapter
in, Sec Sec 8 and 10. ]
To be sure, Spencer criticises the utilitarians, and
thinks little of the Benthamic calculus of pleasures.
He believes that we should substitute for it something
more scientific, a study of the processes of life.
In his earlier writings he appears to be largely in
accord with the intuitionists in judging of conduct,
regarding intuitions as having their origin in the
experiences of the race. Nor does he ever seem
inclined to break with intuitionism completely.
But, as we have seen above (Sec 108), there appears
to be nothing to prevent a utilitarian from being an
intuitionist of some sort, as well.
Stephen, in his clear and beautifully written work
on morals, also accepts the general happiness as the
ultimate end of reasonable conduct; and he, too, criticizes
the current utilitarianism. He writes: “This,
as it seems to me, represents the real difference
between the utilitarian and the evolutionist criterion.
The one lays down as a criterion the happiness, the
other the health of society.” [Footnote:
The Science of Ethics, London, 1882, chapter
ix, 12.] By which, of course, he does not mean merely
physical health, but such a condition of vigor and
efficiency as carries with it a promise of continued
existence and well-being in the future.
It is not necessary to multiply instances. It
can readily be seen that all three of the writers
cited are utilitarians, and the last two are what
have been characterized as hedonistic utilitarians.
That they suggest this or that means of best attaining
to the desired goal does not put them outside of a
school which embraces men of many shades of opinion.
