A Handbook of Ethical Theory eBook

Thus, Darwin, whose study of the lower animals led him to believe that the social instincts have been developed for the general good rather than for the general happiness of the species, defines the “good” as “the rearing of the greatest number of individuals in full vigor and health, with all their faculties perfect, under the conditions to which they have been subjected.”  The “greatest happiness principle” he regards as an important secondary guide to conduct, while making social instinct and sympathy primary guides. [Footnote:  The Descent of Man, chapter iv, concluding remarks. ]

Spencer maintains that the evolution of conduct becomes the highest possible when the conduct “simultaneously achieves the greatest totality of life in self, in offspring, and in fellow-men.”  “The conduct called good,” he writes, “rises to the conduct conceived as best, when it fulfills all three classes of ends at the same time.”  But life he does not regard as necessarily a good.  He judges it to be good or bad “according as it has or has not a surplus of agreeable feeling.”  Hence, “conduct is good or bad according as its total effects are pleasurable or painful.” [Footnote:  The Data of Ethics, chapter in, Sec Sec 8 and 10. ]

To be sure, Spencer criticises the utilitarians, and thinks little of the Benthamic calculus of pleasures.  He believes that we should substitute for it something more scientific, a study of the processes of life.  In his earlier writings he appears to be largely in accord with the intuitionists in judging of conduct, regarding intuitions as having their origin in the experiences of the race.  Nor does he ever seem inclined to break with intuitionism completely.  But, as we have seen above (Sec 108), there appears to be nothing to prevent a utilitarian from being an intuitionist of some sort, as well.

Stephen, in his clear and beautifully written work on morals, also accepts the general happiness as the ultimate end of reasonable conduct; and he, too, criticizes the current utilitarianism.  He writes:  “This, as it seems to me, represents the real difference between the utilitarian and the evolutionist criterion.  The one lays down as a criterion the happiness, the other the health of society.” [Footnote:  The Science of Ethics, London, 1882, chapter ix, 12.] By which, of course, he does not mean merely physical health, but such a condition of vigor and efficiency as carries with it a promise of continued existence and well-being in the future.

It is not necessary to multiply instances.  It can readily be seen that all three of the writers cited are utilitarians, and the last two are what have been characterized as hedonistic utilitarians.  That they suggest this or that means of best attaining to the desired goal does not put them outside of a school which embraces men of many shades of opinion.

CHAPTER XXVIII