This leads to his laying much stress upon the gradual
development of systems of rights and duties as they
emerge under the actual conditions to which human
societies are subjected in the course of their evolution.
He reads history with comprehending eyes, and reverences
the human reason as crystallized in social institutions.
Hence, the divergence of the moral standards which
obtain in different ages and among different peoples
does not seem to him a baffling mystery. He can
find a relative justification for each, and yet hold
to an ideal in the light of which each must be judged.
It may be questioned, however, whether the edifice
which he erects can be based wholly upon the appeal
to the self which ostensibly furnishes the groundwork
of the doctrine. We may ask whether such an appeal
can:
(1) Prescribe to the individual in what measure his
various capacities should be realized.
(2) Show that it is reasonable to awaken dormant capacities,
and thus multiply desires.
(3) Justify social acts which certainly appear to
be self-sacrificing, and which the moral judgments
of men generally do not hesitate to approve.
THE ETHICS OF EVOLUTION
131. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE TITLE.—The
title, “The Ethics of Evolution,” seems
to assume that the evolutionist, frankly accepting
himself as such, must be prepared to join some school
of the moralists different from other schools, and
basing itself upon evolutionary doctrine.
That the ethical views of individuals and of communities
of men may undergo a process of evolution or development
is palpable. The ethical notions of the child
are not those of the man, nor are the moral ideas of
primitive races identical with those of races more
advanced intellectually and morally.
But it is one thing to maintain that morals may be
in evolution in individuals and in communities, and
quite another to hold that the acceptance of the doctrine
of evolution, broadly taken, forces upon one some
new norm by which human actions may be judged.
It was possible for as ardent an evolutionist as Huxley
to hold that evolution and ethics are not merely independent,
but are actually at war with one another, the competitive
struggle for existence characteristic of the one giving
place in the other to a new principle in which the
rights of the weak and the helpless attain express
recognition. [Footnote: HUXLEY, Evolution and
Ethics, New York, 1894. See, especially, the
Prolegomena.] And Sidgwick, that clearest of
thinkers, maintains [Footnote: The Methods
of Ethics, Book I, chapter vi, Sec 2.] that we
have no reason to assume that it is our duty as moral
beings simply to accelerate the pace in the direction
already marked out by evolution.
