114. TRANSFIGURED UTILITARIANISM.—It
is possible to hold to a utilitarianism more circumspect
and less startling than Bentham’s. It is
possible, while maintaining that pleasure is the only
thing that an experienced and reasonable being can
regard as ultimately desirable, to maintain at the
same time that it is rash for any man to attempt to
seek his own happiness, or to strive to promote the
general happiness, without taking into very careful
consideration the instincts and impulses of man and
the nature of the social organization which has resulted
from man’s being what he is. One may argue
that the experience of the race is, as a rule, a safer
guide than the independent judgment of the individual;
and that, in the secular endeavor to compass the general
happiness, it has discovered the paths to that goal
which may most successfully be followed. Thus,
one may distrust Utopian schemes, recognizing the
significance of custom, law, traditional moral maxims,
and public opinion, and yet remain a utilitarian.
But he who does this must still answer the preceding
objections. He must prove: (1) That pleasure
is the only thing ultimately desirable; (2) that each
is under obligation to promote the pleasure of all;
(3) that its mere conduciveness to the production
of a preponderance of pleasure makes an action right,
even though the pleasure be a malicious one, as in
the illustration above given.
Still, his doctrine has become less startling, and
he has moved in the direction of a greater harmony
with the moral judgments of men generally. The
conduct he recommends need not, as a rule, differ greatly
from that recognized as right by moralists of quite
different schools.
Such a utilitarian may easily pass over to a form
of doctrine which is not utilitarian at all.
Thus, Sidgwick asks whether there is a measurable
quality of feeling expressed by the word “pleasure,”
which is independent of its relation to volition,
and strictly undefinable from its simplicity—“like
the quality of feeling expressed by ‘sweet,’
of which also we are conscious in varying degrees
of intensity;” and he answers: “For
my own part, when the term (pleasure) is used in the
more extended sense which I have adopted, to include
the most refined and subtle intellectual and emotional
gratifications, no less than the coarser and more
definite sensual enjoyments, I can find no common quality
in the feelings so designated except some relation
to desire or volition.” [Footnote: The
Methods of Ethics, Book II, chapter ii, Sec 2,
4th Edition. SIDGWICK never appreciably modified
this opinion, which is most clearly expressed in the
Edition quoted.]
When we seek, then, to “give pleasure,”
are we doing nothing else than giving recognition
to the desire and will of our neighbor? What has
become of the Greatest Happiness Principle? Has
it not dissolved into the doctrine of the Real Social
Will?
