He who has rejected as unworthy of serious consideration
the naive egoism of an Aristippus or an Epicurus is
not on that account done with egoism, by any means.
[Footnote: The question of self-sacrifice recurs
again in chapter xxvi, 3.]
UTILITARIANISM
105. WHAT IS UTILITARIANISM?—The division
of things desirable into those desirable in themselves,
and those desirable for the sake of something else,
is two thousand years old. Those things which
we recognize as desirable for the sake of something
else, we call useful.
What we shall regard as useful depends in each case
upon the nature of the end at which we aim. If
our aim is the attainment of pleasure, the preservation
of life, the harmonious development of our faculties,
or any other, we may term useful whatever makes for
the realization of that end.
Hence, we can, by stretching the application of the
word, call utilitarian any ethical doctrine which
sets an ultimate end to human endeavor and judges
actions as moral or the reverse, according to their
tendency to realize that end, or to frustrate its realization.
As the ends thus chosen may be very diverse, it is
obvious that widely different forms of utilitarian
doctrine may come into being.
It is, however, inconvenient to stretch the term,
“utilitarianism” in this fashion.
Certain forms of doctrine which, in its wider sense,
it would include, have come to be known under names
of their own; and, besides, the especial type of utilitarianism
advocated by Bentham and John Stuart Mill appears
to have a claim upon the appellation which they set
in circulation. Common usage has thus limited
the significance of the word, and we naturally think
of the doctrine of these men when we hear it uttered.
It is in this sense that I shall use it.
“The creed which accepts as the foundation of
morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle,”
writes Mill, “holds that actions are right in
proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong
as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness.
By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence
of pain; by unhappiness, pain and the privation of
pleasure.” This means, he adds, “that
pleasure, and freedom from pain, are the only things
desirable as ends; and that all desirable things ...
are desirable either for the pleasure inherent in
themselves, or as means to the promotion of pleasure
and the prevention of pain.” [Footnote:
Utilitarianism, chapter ii. In the pages
following, when I leave out a reference to pain in
discussing the utilitarian doctrine, it will be for
convenience and for the sake of brevity. The intelligent
reader can supply the omissions. ]
The pleasure here intended is not the selfish pleasure
of the individual. Utilitarianism is not Cyrenaicism.
The goal of the utilitarian’s endeavors is the
general happiness, in which many individuals participate.
The moral rules which control and direct the strivings
of the individual derive their authority from their
tendency to serve this end.
