Even where the avowed aim is the common good of all,
states have assumed that some must be sacrificed for
others. Certain individuals are selected to die
in the trenches in the face of the enemy, that others
may be guaranteed liberty and the pursuit of happiness.
Grotius, the famous jurist of the seventeenth century,
has been criticized for holding that a beleaguered
town might justly deliver up to the enemy a small number
of its citizens in order to purchase immunity for
the rest. How far do the cases differ in principle?
“Among persons variously endowed,” wrote
Hegel, “inequality must occur, and equality would
be wrong.” [Footnote: Hegel, The Philosophy
of Right, translated by Dyde, London, 1896, p.
56.] Commonwealths of many degrees of development have
recognized inequalities of many sorts, and have treated
their subjects accordingly.
“For diet,” said Bentham with repellent
frankness, “nothing but self-regarding affection
will serve.” Benevolence he considered a
valuable addition “for a dessert.”
He had in mind the individual, and he did injustice
to individuals in certain of their relations.
But how do things look when we turn our attention
to the relations between states? Does any state
actually make it a practice to treat its neighbor as
itself? Would its citizens approve of its doing
so?
The Roman was compelled to formulate a jus gentium,
a law of nations, to deal with those who held, to
him, a place beyond the pale of law as he knew it.
[Footnote: See SIR HENRY MAINE, Ancient Law,
chapter iii.] Many centuries have elapsed since pagan
philosophers taught the brotherhood of man, and since
Christian divines began to preach it with passionate
fervor. Yet civilized nations today are still
seeking to find a modus vivendi, which may
put an end to strife and enable them to live together.
The jus gentium, or its modern equivalent,
is, alas! still in its rudiments.
To obviate misunderstanding at this point, it is well
to state that, in adducing all the above facts, I
do not mean to argue that it is abnormal and an undesirable
thing that the scales of justice should, at times,
be weighted in divers ways. I am not maintaining
that the distribution of common good should proceed
upon the principle of strict impartiality. What
is possible and is desirable in this field is not something
to be decided off-hand. But the facts suffice
to illustrate the truth that the discrepancies to
be found in the codes of different communities can
scarcely be dismissed as unimportant details.
They are something far too significant for that.
CHAPTER III
THE CODES OF THE MORALISTS
7. THE MORALISTS.—If, from the codes,
or the more or less vague bodies of opinion, which
have characterized different communities, we turn to
the moralists, we find similar food for thought.
Copyrights
A Handbook of Ethical Theory from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.
