The Memoirs of General Ulysses S. Grant, Part 4. eBook

The Memoirs of General Ulysses S. Grant, Part 4. by Ulysses S. Grant

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Table of Contents

Table of Contents
Section Page

Start of eBook1
CHAPTER LX.  THE BATTLE OF FRANKLIN—­THE BATTLE OF NASHVILLE1
CONCLUSION2
APPENDIX2
CHAPTER XL.2
CHAPTER XLI.8
CHAPTER XLII.13
CHAPTER XLIII.20
CHAPTER XLIV.25
CHAPTER XLV.31
CHAPTER XLVI.39
CHAPTER XLVII.46
CHAPTER XLVIII.54
CHAPTER XLIX.58
CHAPTER L.65
CHAPTER LI.74

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CHAPTER LX.  THE BATTLE OF FRANKLIN—­THE BATTLE OF NASHVILLE

Chapter LXI.  Expedition against Fort Fisher—­attack on the Fort—­failure
of the expedition—­second expedition against the Fort—­capture of Fort
Fisher.

Chapter LXII.  Sherman’s march north—­Sheridan ordered to Lynchburg
—­Canby ordered to move against Mobile—­movements of Schofield and Thomas
—­capture of Columbia, south Carolina—­Sherman in the Carolinas.

Chapter LXIII.  Arrival of the Peace commissioners—­Lincoln and the Peace
commissioners—­an anecdote of Lincoln—­the winter before Petersburg
—­Sheridan destroys the railroad—­Gordon carries the picket line—­Parke
recaptures the line—­the battle of white Oak road.

Chapter LXIV.  Interview with Sheridan—­grand movement of the army of the
Potomac—­Sheridan’s advance on five forks—­battle of five forks—­Parke
and Wright storm the enemy’s line—­battles before Petersburg.

Chapter LXV.  The capture of Petersburg—­meeting President Lincoln in
Petersburg—­the capture of Richmond—­pursuing the enemy—­visit to
Sheridan and Meade.

Chapter LXVI.  Battle of SAILOR’S creek—­engagement at Farmville
—­correspondence with general Lee—­Sheridan intercepts the enemy.

Chapter LXVII.  Negotiations at Appomattox—­interview with Lee at
MCLEAN’S house—­the terms of surrender—­Lee’s surrender—­interview with
Lee after the surrender.

Chapter LXVIII.  Morale of the two armies—­relative conditions of the
north and south—­President Lincoln visits Richmond—­arrival at
Washington—­President LINCOLN’S assassination—­President Johnson’s
policy.

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Chapter LXIX.  Sherman and Johnston—­Johnston’s surrender to Sherman
—­capture of Mobile—­Wilson’s expedition—­capture of Jefferson Davis
—­general Thomas’s qualities—­estimate of general Canby.

Chapter LXX.  The end of the war—­the march to Washington—­one of
LINCOLN’S anecdotes—­grand review at Washington—­characteristics of
Lincoln and Stanton—­estimate of the different corps commanders.

CONCLUSION

APPENDIX

CHAPTER XL.

First meeting with secretary Stanton—­general Rosecrans—­commanding military division of Mississippi—­Andrew Johnson’s address—­arrival at Chattanooga.

The reply (to my telegram of October 16, 1863, from Cairo, announcing my arrival at that point) came on the morning of the 17th, directing me to proceed immediately to the Galt House, Louisville, where I would meet an officer of the War Department with my instructions.  I left Cairo within an hour or two after the receipt of this dispatch, going by rail via Indianapolis.  Just as the train I was on was starting out of the depot at Indianapolis a messenger came running up to stop it, saying the Secretary of War was coming into the station and wanted to see me.

I had never met Mr. Stanton up to that time, though we had held frequent conversations over the wires the year before, when I was in Tennessee.  Occasionally at night he would order the wires between the War Department and my headquarters to be connected, and we would hold a conversation for an hour or two.  On this occasion the Secretary was accompanied by Governor Brough of Ohio, whom I had never met, though he and my father had been old acquaintances.  Mr. Stanton dismissed the special train that had brought him to Indianapolis, and accompanied me to Louisville.

Up to this time no hint had been given me of what was wanted after I left Vicksburg, except the suggestion in one of Halleck’s dispatches that I had better go to Nashville and superintend the operation of troops sent to relieve Rosecrans.  Soon after we started the Secretary handed me two orders, saying that I might take my choice of them.  The two were identical in all but one particular.  Both created the “Military Division of Mississippi,” (giving me the command) composed of the Departments of the Ohio, the Cumberland, and the Tennessee, and all the territory from the Alleghanies to the Mississippi River

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north of Banks’s command in the south-west.  One order left the department commanders as they were, while the other relieved Rosecrans and assigned Thomas to his place.  I accepted the latter.  We reached Louisville after night and, if I remember rightly, in a cold, drizzling rain.  The Secretary of War told me afterwards that he caught a cold on that occasion from which he never expected to recover.  He never did.

A day was spent in Louisville, the Secretary giving me the military news at the capital and talking about the disappointment at the results of some of the campaigns.  By the evening of the day after our arrival all matters of discussion seemed exhausted, and I left the hotel to spend the evening away, both Mrs. Grant (who was with me) and myself having relatives living in Louisville.  In the course of the evening Mr. Stanton received a dispatch from Mr. C. A. Dana, then in Chattanooga, informing him that unless prevented Rosecrans would retreat, and advising peremptory orders against his doing so.

As stated before, after the fall of Vicksburg I urged strongly upon the government the propriety of a movement against Mobile.  General Rosecrans had been at Murfreesboro’, Tennessee, with a large and well-equipped army from early in the year 1863, with Bragg confronting him with a force quite equal to his own at first, considering it was on the defensive.  But after the investment of Vicksburg Bragg’s army was largely depleted to strengthen Johnston, in Mississippi, who was being reinforced to raise the siege.  I frequently wrote General Halleck suggesting that Rosecrans should move against Bragg.  By so doing he would either detain the latter’s troops where they were or lay Chattanooga open to capture.  General Halleck strongly approved the suggestion, and finally wrote me that he had repeatedly ordered Rosecrans to advance, but that the latter had constantly failed to comply with the order, and at last, after having held a council of war, had replied in effect that it was a military maxim “not to fight two decisive battles at the same time.”  If true, the maxim was not applicable in this case.  It would be bad to be defeated in two decisive battles fought the same day, but it would not be bad to win them.  I, however, was fighting no battle, and the siege of Vicksburg had drawn from Rosecrans’ front so many of the enemy that his chances of victory were much greater than they would be if he waited until the siege was over, when these troops could be returned.  Rosecrans was ordered to move against the army that was detaching troops to raise the siege.  Finally he did move, on the 24th of June, but ten days afterwards Vicksburg surrendered, and the troops sent from Bragg were free to return.

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It was at this time that I recommended to the general-in-chief the movement against Mobile.  I knew the peril the Army of the Cumberland was in, being depleted continually, not only by ordinary casualties, but also by having to detach troops to hold its constantly extending line over which to draw supplies, while the enemy in front was as constantly being strengthened.  Mobile was important to the enemy, and in the absence of a threatening force was guarded by little else than artillery.  If threatened by land and from the water at the same time the prize would fall easily, or troops would have to be sent to its defence.  Those troops would necessarily come from Bragg.  My judgment was overruled, and the troops under my command were dissipated over other parts of the country where it was thought they could render the most service.

Soon it was discovered in Washington that Rosecrans was in trouble and required assistance.  The emergency was now too immediate to allow us to give this assistance by making an attack in rear of Bragg upon Mobile.  It was therefore necessary to reinforce directly, and troops were sent from every available point.

Rosecrans had very skilfully manoeuvred Bragg south of the Tennessee River, and through and beyond Chattanooga.  If he had stopped and intrenched, and made himself strong there, all would have been right and the mistake of not moving earlier partially compensated.  But he pushed on, with his forces very much scattered, until Bragg’s troops from Mississippi began to join him.  Then Bragg took the initiative.  Rosecrans had to fall back in turn, and was able to get his army together at Chickamauga, some miles south-east of Chattanooga, before the main battle was brought on.  The battle was fought on the 19th and 20th of September, and Rosecrans was badly defeated, with a heavy loss in artillery and some sixteen thousand men killed, wounded and captured.  The corps under Major-General George H. Thomas stood its ground, while Rosecrans, with Crittenden and McCook, returned to Chattanooga.  Thomas returned also, but later, and with his troops in good order.  Bragg followed and took possession of Missionary Ridge, overlooking Chattanooga.  He also occupied Lookout Mountain, west of the town, which Rosecrans had abandoned, and with it his control of the river and the river road as far back as Bridgeport.  The National troops were now strongly intrenched in Chattanooga Valley, with the Tennessee River behind them and the enemy occupying commanding heights to the east and west, with a strong line across the valley from mountain to mountain, and with Chattanooga Creek, for a large part of the way, in front of their line.

On the 29th Halleck telegraphed me the above results, and directed all the forces that could be spared from my department to be sent to Rosecrans.  Long before this dispatch was received Sherman was on his way, and McPherson was moving east with most of the garrison of Vicksburg.

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A retreat at that time would have been a terrible disaster.  It would not only have been the loss of a most important strategic position to us, but it would have been attended with the loss of all the artillery still left with the Army of the Cumberland and the annihilation of that army itself, either by capture or demoralization.

All supplies for Rosecrans had to be brought from Nashville.  The railroad between this base and the army was in possession of the government up to Bridgeport, the point at which the road crosses to the south side of the Tennessee River; but Bragg, holding Lookout and Raccoon mountains west of Chattanooga, commanded the railroad, the river and the shortest and best wagon-roads, both south and north of the Tennessee, between Chattanooga and Bridgeport.  The distance between these two places is but twenty-six miles by rail, but owing to the position of Bragg, all supplies for Rosecrans had to be hauled by a circuitous route north of the river and over a mountainous country, increasing the distance to over sixty miles.

This country afforded but little food for his animals, nearly ten thousand of which had already starved, and not enough were left to draw a single piece of artillery or even the ambulances to convey the sick.  The men had been on half rations of hard bread for a considerable time, with but few other supplies except beef driven from Nashville across the country.  The region along the road became so exhausted of food for the cattle that by the time they reached Chattanooga they were much in the condition of the few animals left alive there—­“on the lift.”  Indeed, the beef was so poor that the soldiers were in the habit of saying, with a faint facetiousness, that they were living on “half rations of hard bread and beef dried on the Hoof.”

Nothing could be transported but food, and the troops were without sufficient shoes or other clothing suitable for the advancing season.  What they had was well worn.  The fuel within the Federal lines was exhausted, even to the stumps of trees.  There were no teams to draw it from the opposite bank, where it was abundant.  The only way of supplying fuel, for some time before my arrival, had been to cut trees on the north bank of the river at a considerable distance up the stream, form rafts of it and float it down with the current, effecting a landing on the south side within our lines by the use of paddles or poles.  It would then be carried on the shoulders of the men to their camps.

If a retreat had occurred at this time it is not probable that any of the army would have reached the railroad as an organized body, if followed by the enemy.

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On the receipt of Mr. Dana’s dispatch Mr. Stanton sent for me.  Finding that I was out he became nervous and excited, inquiring of every person he met, including guests of the house, whether they knew where I was, and bidding them find me and send me to him at once.  About eleven o’clock I returned to the hotel, and on my way, when near the house, every person met was a messenger from the Secretary, apparently partaking of his impatience to see me.  I hastened to the room of the Secretary and found him pacing the floor rapidly in his dressing-gown.  Saying that the retreat must be prevented, he showed me the dispatch.  I immediately wrote an order assuming command of the Military Division of the Mississippi, and telegraphed it to General Rosecrans.  I then telegraphed to him the order from Washington assigning Thomas to the command of the Army of the Cumberland; and to Thomas that he must hold Chattanooga at all hazards, informing him at the same time that I would be at the front as soon as possible.  A prompt reply was received from Thomas, saying, “We will hold the town till we starve.”  I appreciated the force of this dispatch later when I witnessed the condition of affairs which prompted it.  It looked, indeed, as if but two courses were open:  one to starve, the other to surrender or be captured.

On the morning of the 20th of October I started, with my staff, and proceeded as far as Nashville.  At that time it was not prudent to travel beyond that point by night, so I remained in Nashville until the next morning.  Here I met for the first time Andrew Johnson, Military Governor of Tennessee.  He delivered a speech of welcome.  His composure showed that it was by no means his maiden effort.  It was long, and I was in torture while he was delivering it, fearing something would be expected from me in response.  I was relieved, however, the people assembled having apparently heard enough.  At all events they commenced a general hand-shaking, which, although trying where there is so much of it, was a great relief to me in this emergency.

From Nashville I telegraphed to Burnside, who was then at Knoxville, that important points in his department ought to be fortified, so that they could be held with the least number of men; to Admiral Porter at Cairo, that Sherman’s advance had passed Eastport, Mississippi, that rations were probably on their way from St. Louis by boat for supplying his army, and requesting him to send a gunboat to convoy them; and to Thomas, suggesting that large parties should be put at work on the wagon-road then in use back to Bridgeport.

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On the morning of the 21st we took the train for the front, reaching Stevenson Alabama, after dark.  Rosecrans was there on his way north.  He came into my car and we held a brief interview, in which he described very clearly the situation at Chattanooga, and made some excellent suggestions as to what should be done.  My only wonder was that he had not carried them out.  We then proceeded to Bridgeport, where we stopped for the night.  From here we took horses and made our way by Jasper and over Waldron’s Ridge to Chattanooga.  There had been much rain, and the roads were almost impassable from mud, knee-deep in places, and from wash-outs on the mountain sides.  I had been on crutches since the time of my fall in New Orleans, and had to be carried over places where it was not safe to cross on horseback.  The roads were strewn with the debris of broken wagons and the carcasses of thousands of starved mules and horses.  At Jasper, some ten or twelve miles from Bridgeport, there was a halt.  General O. O. Howard had his headquarters there.  From this point I telegraphed Burnside to make every effort to secure five hundred rounds of ammunition for his artillery and small-arms.  We stopped for the night at a little hamlet some ten or twelve miles farther on.  The next day we reached Chattanooga a little before dark.  I went directly to General Thomas’s headquarters, and remaining there a few days, until I could establish my own.

During the evening most of the general officers called in to pay their respects and to talk about the condition of affairs.  They pointed out on the map the line, marked with a red or blue pencil, which Rosecrans had contemplated falling back upon.  If any of them had approved the move they did not say so to me.  I found General W. F. Smith occupying the position of chief engineer of the Army of the Cumberland.  I had known Smith as a cadet at West Point, but had no recollection of having met him after my graduation, in 1843, up to this time.  He explained the situation of the two armies and the topography of the country so plainly that I could see it without an inspection.  I found that he had established a saw-mill on the banks of the river, by utilizing an old engine found in the neighborhood; and, by rafting logs from the north side of the river above, had got out the lumber and completed pontoons and roadway plank for a second bridge, one flying bridge being there already.  He was also rapidly getting out the materials and constructing the boats for a third bridge.  In addition to this he had far under way a steamer for plying between Chattanooga and Bridgeport whenever we might get possession of the river.  This boat consisted of a scow, made of the plank sawed out at the mill, housed in, and a stern wheel attached which was propelled by a second engine taken from some shop or factory.

I telegraphed to Washington this night, notifying General Halleck of my arrival, and asking to have General Sherman assigned to the command of the Army of the Tennessee, headquarters in the field.  The request was at once complied with.

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CHAPTER XLI.

Assuming the command at Chattanooga—­opening A line of supplies—­battle of Wauhatchie—­on the picket line.

The next day, the 24th, I started out to make a personal inspection, taking Thomas and Smith with me, besides most of the members of my personal staff.  We crossed to the north side of the river, and, moving to the north of detached spurs of hills, reached the Tennessee at Brown’s Ferry, some three miles below Lookout Mountain, unobserved by the enemy.  Here we left our horses back from the river and approached the water on foot.  There was a picket station of the enemy on the opposite side, of about twenty men, in full view, and we were within easy range.  They did not fire upon us nor seem to be disturbed by our presence.  They must have seen that we were all commissioned officers.  But, I suppose, they looked upon the garrison of Chattanooga as prisoners of war, feeding or starving themselves, and thought it would be inhuman to kill any of them except in self-defence.

That night I issued orders for opening the route to Bridgeport—­a cracker line, as the soldiers appropriately termed it.  They had been so long on short rations that my first thought was the establishment of a line over which food might reach them.

Chattanooga is on the south bank of the Tennessee, where that river runs nearly due west.  It is at the northern end of a valley five or six miles in width, through which Chattanooga Creek runs.  To the east of the valley is Missionary Ridge, rising from five to eight hundred feet above the creek and terminating somewhat abruptly a half mile or more before reaching the Tennessee.  On the west of the valley is Lookout Mountain, twenty-two hundred feet above-tide water.  Just below the town the Tennessee makes a turn to the south and runs to the base of Lookout Mountain, leaving no level ground between the mountain and river.  The Memphis and Charleston Railroad passes this point, where the mountain stands nearly perpendicular.  East of Missionary Ridge flows the South Chickamauga River; west of Lookout Mountain is Lookout Creek; and west of that, Raccoon Mountains.  Lookout Mountain, at its northern end, rises almost perpendicularly for some distance, then breaks off in a gentle slope of cultivated fields to near the summit, where it ends in a palisade thirty or more feet in height.  On the gently sloping ground, between the upper and lower palisades, there is a single farmhouse, which is reached by a wagon-road from the valley east.

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The intrenched line of the enemy commenced on the north end of Missionary Ridge and extended along the crest for some distance south, thence across Chattanooga valley to Lookout Mountain.  Lookout Mountain was also fortified and held by the enemy, who also kept troops in Lookout valley west, and on Raccoon Mountain, with pickets extending down the river so as to command the road on the north bank and render it useless to us.  In addition to this there was an intrenched line in Chattanooga valley extending from the river east of the town to Lookout Mountain, to make the investment complete.  Besides the fortifications on Mission Ridge, there was a line at the base of the hill, with occasional spurs of rifle-pits half-way up the front.  The enemy’s pickets extended out into the valley towards the town, so far that the pickets of the two armies could converse.  At one point they were separated only by the narrow creek which gives its name to the valley and town, and from which both sides drew water.  The Union lines were shorter than those of the enemy.

Thus the enemy, with a vastly superior force, was strongly fortified to the east, south, and west, and commanded the river below.  Practically, the Army of the Cumberland was besieged.  The enemy had stopped with his cavalry north of the river the passing of a train loaded with ammunition and medical supplies.  The Union army was short of both, not having ammunition enough for a day’s fighting.

General Halleck had, long before my coming into this new field, ordered parts of the 11th and 12th corps, commanded respectively by Generals Howard and Slocum, Hooker in command of the whole, from the Army of the Potomac to reinforce Rosecrans.  It would have been folly to send them to Chattanooga to help eat up the few rations left there.  They were consequently left on the railroad, where supplies could be brought to them.  Before my arrival, Thomas ordered their concentration at Bridgeport.

General W. F. Smith had been so instrumental in preparing for the move which I was now about to make, and so clear in his judgment about the manner of making it, that I deemed it but just to him that he should have command of the troops detailed to execute the design, although he was then acting as a staff officer and was not in command of troops.

On the 24th of October, after my return to Chattanooga, the following details were made:  General Hooker, who was now at Bridgeport, was ordered to cross to the south side of the Tennessee and march up by Whitesides and Wauhatchie to Brown’s Ferry.  General Palmer, with a division of the 14th corps, Army of the Cumberland, was ordered to move down the river on the north side, by a back road, until opposite Whitesides, then cross and hold the road in Hooker’s rear after he had passed.  Four thousand men were at the same time detailed to act under General Smith directly from Chattanooga.  Eighteen hundred of them, under General Hazen, were to take sixty pontoon

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boats, and under cover of night float by the pickets of the enemy at the north base of Lookout, down to Brown’s Ferry, then land on the south side and capture or drive away the pickets at that point.  Smith was to march with the remainder of the detail, also under cover of night, by the north bank of the river to Brown’s Ferry, taking with him all the material for laying the bridge as soon as the crossing was secured.

On the 26th, Hooker crossed the river at Bridgeport and commenced his eastward march.  At three o’clock on the morning of the 27th, Hazen moved into the stream with his sixty pontoons and eighteen hundred brave and well-equipped men.  Smith started enough in advance to be near the river when Hazen should arrive.  There are a number of detached spurs of hills north of the river at Chattanooga, back of which is a good road parallel to the stream, sheltered from the view from the top of Lookout.  It was over this road Smith marched.  At five o’clock Hazen landed at Brown’s Ferry, surprised the picket guard, and captured most of it.  By seven o’clock the whole of Smith’s force was ferried over and in possession of a height commanding the ferry.  This was speedily fortified, while a detail was laying the pontoon bridge.  By ten o’clock the bridge was laid, and our extreme right, now in Lookout valley, was fortified and connected with the rest of the army.  The two bridges over the Tennessee River—­a flying one at Chattanooga and the new one at Brown’s Ferry—­with the road north of the river, covered from both the fire and the view of the enemy, made the connection complete.  Hooker found but slight obstacles in his way, and on the afternoon of the 28th emerged into Lookout valley at Wauhatchie.  Howard marched on to Brown’s Ferry, while Geary, who commanded a division in the 12th corps, stopped three miles south.  The pickets of the enemy on the river below were now cut off, and soon came in and surrendered.

The river was now opened to us from Lookout valley to Bridgeport.  Between Brown’s Ferry and Kelly’s Ferry the Tennessee runs through a narrow gorge in the mountains, which contracts the stream so much as to increase the current beyond the capacity of an ordinary steamer to stem it.  To get up these rapids, steamers must be cordelled; that is, pulled up by ropes from the shore.  But there is no difficulty in navigating the stream from Bridgeport to Kelly’s Ferry.  The latter point is only eight miles from Chattanooga and connected with it by a good wagon-road, which runs through a low pass in the Raccoon Mountains on the south side of the river to Brown’s Ferry, thence on the north side to the river opposite Chattanooga.  There were several steamers at Bridgeport, and abundance of forage, clothing and provisions.

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On the way to Chattanooga I had telegraphed back to Nashville for a good supply of vegetables and small rations, which the troops had been so long deprived of.  Hooker had brought with him from the east a full supply of land transportation.  His animals had not been subjected to hard work on bad roads without forage, but were in good condition.  In five days from my arrival in Chattanooga the way was open to Bridgeport and, with the aid of steamers and Hooker’s teams, in a week the troops were receiving full rations.  It is hard for any one not an eye-witness to realize the relief this brought.  The men were soon reclothed and also well fed, an abundance of ammunition was brought up, and a cheerfulness prevailed not before enjoyed in many weeks.  Neither officers nor men looked upon themselves any longer as doomed.  The weak and languid appearance of the troops, so visible before, disappeared at once.  I do not know what the effect was on the other side, but assume it must have been correspondingly depressing.  Mr. Davis had visited Bragg but a short time before, and must have perceived our condition to be about as Bragg described it in his subsequent report.  “These dispositions,” he said, “faithfully sustained, insured the enemy’s speedy evacuation of Chattanooga for want of food and forage.  Possessed of the shortest route to his depot, and the one by which reinforcements must reach him, we held him at our mercy, and his destruction was only a question of time.”  But the dispositions were not “faithfully sustained,” and I doubt not but thousands of men engaged in trying to “sustain” them now rejoice that they were not.  There was no time during the rebellion when I did not think, and often say, that the South was more to be benefited by its defeat than the North.  The latter had the people, the institutions, and the territory to make a great and prosperous nation.  The former was burdened with an institution abhorrent to all civilized people not brought up under it, and one which degraded labor, kept it in ignorance, and enervated the governing class.  With the outside world at war with this institution, they could not have extended their territory.  The labor of the country was not skilled, nor allowed to become so.  The whites could not toil without becoming degraded, and those who did were denominated “poor white trash.”  The system of labor would have soon exhausted the soil and left the people poor.  The non-slaveholders would have left the country, and the small slaveholder must have sold out to his more fortunate neighbor.  Soon the slaves would have outnumbered the masters, and, not being in sympathy with them, would have risen in their might and exterminated them.  The war was expensive to the South as well as to the North, both in blood and treasure, but it was worth all it cost.

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The enemy was surprised by the movements which secured to us a line of supplies.  He appreciated its importance, and hastened to try to recover the line from us.  His strength on Lookout Mountain was not equal to Hooker’s command in the valley below.  From Missionary Ridge he had to march twice the distance we had from Chattanooga, in order to reach Lookout Valley; but on the night of the 28th and 29th an attack was made on Geary at Wauhatchie by Longstreet’s corps.  When the battle commenced, Hooker ordered Howard up from Brown’s Ferry.  He had three miles to march to reach Geary.  On his way he was fired upon by rebel troops from a foot-hill to the left of the road and from which the road was commanded.  Howard turned to the left, charged up the hill and captured it before the enemy had time to intrench, taking many prisoners.  Leaving sufficient men to hold this height, he pushed on to reinforce Geary.  Before he got up, Geary had been engaged for about three hours against a vastly superior force.  The night was so dark that the men could not distinguish one from another except by the light of the flashes of their muskets.  In the darkness and uproar Hooker’s teamsters became frightened and deserted their teams.  The mules also became frightened, and breaking loose from their fastenings stampeded directly towards the enemy.  The latter, no doubt, took this for a charge, and stampeded in turn.  By four o’clock in the morning the battle had entirely ceased, and our “cracker line” was never afterward disturbed.

In securing possession of Lookout Valley, Smith lost one man killed and four or five wounded.  The enemy lost most of his pickets at the ferry, captured.  In the night engagement of the 28th-9th Hooker lost 416 killed and wounded.  I never knew the loss of the enemy, but our troops buried over one hundred and fifty of his dead and captured more than a hundred.

After we had secured the opening of a line over which to bring our supplies to the army, I made a personal inspection to see the situation of the pickets of the two armies.  As I have stated, Chattanooga Creek comes down the centre of the valley to within a mile or such a matter of the town of Chattanooga, then bears off westerly, then north-westerly, and enters the Tennessee River at the foot of Lookout Mountain.  This creek, from its mouth up to where it bears off west, lay between the two lines of pickets, and the guards of both armies drew their water from the same stream.  As I would be under short-range fire and in an open country, I took nobody with me, except, I believe, a bugler, who stayed some distance to the rear.  I rode from our right around to our left.  When I came to the camp of the picket guard of our side, I heard the call, “Turn out the guard for the commanding general.”  I replied, “Never mind the guard,” and they were dismissed and went back to their tents.  Just back of these, and about equally distant from the creek, were the guards of the Confederate pickets.  The sentinel on their post called out in like manner, “Turn out the guard for the commanding general,” and, I believe, added, “General Grant.”  Their line in a moment front-faced to the north, facing me, and gave a salute, which I returned.

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The most friendly relations seemed to exist between the pickets of the two armies.  At one place there was a tree which had fallen across the stream, and which was used by the soldiers of both armies in drawing water for their camps.  General Longstreet’s corps was stationed there at the time, and wore blue of a little different shade from our uniform.  Seeing a soldier in blue on this log, I rode up to him, commenced conversing with him, and asked whose corps he belonged to.  He was very polite, and, touching his hat to me, said he belonged to General Longstreet’s corps.  I asked him a few questions—­but not with a view of gaining any particular information—­all of which he answered, and I rode off.

CHAPTER XLII.

Condition of the army—­rebuilding the railroad—­general Burnside’s situation—­orders for battle—­plans for the attack—­Hooker’s position —­Sherman’s movements.

Having got the Army of the Cumberland in a comfortable position, I now began to look after the remainder of my new command.  Burnside was in about as desperate a condition as the Army of the Cumberland had been, only he was not yet besieged.  He was a hundred miles from the nearest possible base, Big South Fork of the Cumberland River, and much farther from any railroad we had possession of.  The roads back were over mountains, and all supplies along the line had long since been exhausted.  His animals, too, had been starved, and their carcasses lined the road from Cumberland Gap, and far back towards Lexington, Ky.  East Tennessee still furnished supplies of beef, bread and forage, but it did not supply ammunition, clothing, medical supplies, or small rations, such as coffee, sugar, salt and rice.

Sherman had started from Memphis for Corinth on the 11th of October.  His instructions required him to repair the road in his rear in order to bring up supplies.  The distance was about three hundred and thirty miles through a hostile country.  His entire command could not have maintained the road if it had been completed.  The bridges had all been destroyed by the enemy, and much other damage done.  A hostile community lived along the road; guerilla bands infested the country, and more or less of the cavalry of the enemy was still in the West.  Often Sherman’s work was destroyed as soon as completed, and he only a short distance away.

The Memphis and Charleston Railroad strikes the Tennessee River at Eastport, Mississippi.  Knowing the difficulty Sherman would have to supply himself from Memphis, I had previously ordered supplies sent from St. Louis on small steamers, to be convoyed by the navy, to meet him at Eastport.  These he got.  I now ordered him to discontinue his work of repairing roads and to move on with his whole force to Stevenson,

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Alabama, without delay.  This order was borne to Sherman by a messenger, who paddled down the Tennessee in a canoe and floated over Muscle Shoals; it was delivered at Iuka on the 27th.  In this Sherman was notified that the rebels were moving a force towards Cleveland, East Tennessee, and might be going to Nashville, in which event his troops were in the best position to beat them there.  Sherman, with his characteristic promptness, abandoned the work he was engaged upon and pushed on at once.  On the 1st of November he crossed the Tennessee at Eastport, and that day was in Florence, Alabama, with the head of column, while his troops were still crossing at Eastport, with Blair bringing up the rear.

Sherman’s force made an additional army, with cavalry, artillery, and trains, all to be supplied by the single track road from Nashville.  All indications pointed also to the probable necessity of supplying Burnside’s command in East Tennessee, twenty-five thousand more, by the same route.  A single track could not do this.  I gave, therefore, an order to Sherman to halt General G. M. Dodge’s command, of about eight thousand men, at Athens, and subsequently directed the latter to arrange his troops along the railroad from Decatur north towards Nashville, and to rebuild that road.  The road from Nashville to Decatur passes over a broken country, cut up with innumerable streams, many of them of considerable width, and with valleys far below the road-bed.  All the bridges over these had been destroyed, and the rails taken up and twisted by the enemy.  All the cars and locomotives not carried off had been destroyed as effectually as they knew how to destroy them.  All bridges and culverts had been destroyed between Nashville and Decatur, and thence to Stevenson, where the Memphis and Charleston and the Nashville and Chattanooga roads unite.  The rebuilding of this road would give us two roads as far as Stevenson over which to supply the army.  From Bridgeport, a short distance farther east, the river supplements the road.

General Dodge, besides being a most capable soldier, was an experienced railroad builder.  He had no tools to work with except those of the pioneers—­axes, picks, and spades.  With these he was able to intrench his men and protect them against surprises by small parties of the enemy.  As he had no base of supplies until the road could be completed back to Nashville, the first matter to consider after protecting his men was the getting in of food and forage from the surrounding country.  He had his men and teams bring in all the grain they could find, or all they needed, and all the cattle for beef, and such other food as could be found.  Millers were detailed from the ranks to run the mills along the line of the army.  When these were not near enough to the troops for protection they were taken down and moved up to the line of the road.  Blacksmith shops, with all the iron and steel found in them, were

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moved up in like manner.  Blacksmiths were detailed and set to work making the tools necessary in railroad and bridge building.  Axemen were put to work getting out timber for bridges and cutting fuel for locomotives when the road should be completed.  Car-builders were set to work repairing the locomotives and cars.  Thus every branch of railroad building, making tools to work with, and supplying the workmen with food, was all going on at once, and without the aid of a mechanic or laborer except what the command itself furnished.  But rails and cars the men could not make without material, and there was not enough rolling stock to keep the road we already had worked to its full capacity.  There were no rails except those in use.  To supply these deficiencies I ordered eight of the ten engines General McPherson had at Vicksburg to be sent to Nashville, and all the cars he had except ten.  I also ordered the troops in West Tennessee to points on the river and on the Memphis and Charleston road, and ordered the cars, locomotives and rails from all the railroads except the Memphis and Charleston to Nashville.  The military manager of railroads also was directed to furnish more rolling stock and, as far as he could, bridge material.  General Dodge had the work assigned him finished within forty days after receiving his orders.  The number of bridges to rebuild was one hundred and eighty-two, many of them over deep and wide chasms; the length of road repaired was one hundred and two miles.

The enemy’s troops, which it was thought were either moving against Burnside or were going to Nashville, went no farther than Cleveland.  Their presence there, however, alarmed the authorities at Washington, and, on account of our helpless condition at Chattanooga, caused me much uneasiness.  Dispatches were constantly coming, urging me to do something for Burnside’s relief; calling attention to the importance of holding East Tennessee; saying the President was much concerned for the protection of the loyal people in that section, etc.  We had not at Chattanooga animals to pull a single piece of artillery, much less a supply train.  Reinforcements could not help Burnside, because he had neither supplies nor ammunition sufficient for them; hardly, indeed, bread and meat for the men he had.  There was no relief possible for him except by expelling the enemy from Missionary Ridge and about Chattanooga.

On the 4th of November Longstreet left our front with about fifteen thousand troops, besides Wheeler’s cavalry, five thousand more, to go against Burnside.  The situation seemed desperate, and was more aggravating because nothing could be done until Sherman should get up.  The authorities at Washington were now more than ever anxious for the safety of Burnside’s army, and plied me with dispatches faster than ever, urging that something should be done for his relief.  On the 7th, before Longstreet could possibly have reached Knoxville, I ordered Thomas peremptorily to

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attack the enemy’s right, so as to force the return of the troops that had gone up the valley.  I directed him to take mules, officers’ horses, or animals wherever he could get them to move the necessary artillery.  But he persisted in the declaration that he could not move a single piece of artillery, and could not see how he could possibly comply with the order.  Nothing was left to be done but to answer Washington dispatches as best I could; urge Sherman forward, although he was making every effort to get forward, and encourage Burnside to hold on, assuring him that in a short time he should be relieved.  All of Burnside’s dispatches showed the greatest confidence in his ability to hold his position as long as his ammunition held out.  He even suggested the propriety of abandoning the territory he held south and west of Knoxville, so as to draw the enemy farther from his base and make it more difficult for him to get back to Chattanooga when the battle should begin.  Longstreet had a railroad as far as Loudon; but from there to Knoxville he had to rely on wagon trains.  Burnside’s suggestion, therefore, was a good one, and it was adopted.  On the 14th I telegraphed him: 

“Sherman’s advance has reached Bridgeport.  His whole force will be ready to move from there by Tuesday at farthest.  If you can hold Longstreet in check until he gets up, or by skirmishing and falling back can avoid serious loss to yourself and gain time, I will be able to force the enemy back from here and place a force between Longstreet and Bragg that must inevitably make the former take to the mountain-passes by every available road, to get to his supplies.  Sherman would have been here before this but for high water in Elk River driving him some thirty miles up that river to cross.”

And again later in the day, indicating my plans for his relief, as follows: 

“Your dispatch and Dana’s just received.  Being there, you can tell better how to resist Longstreet’s attack than I can direct.  With your showing you had better give up Kingston at the last moment and save the most productive part of your possessions.  Every arrangement is now made to throw Sherman’s force across the river, just at and below the mouth of Chickamauga Creek, as soon as it arrives.  Thomas will attack on his left at the same time, and together it is expected to carry Missionary Ridge, and from there push a force on to the railroad between Cleveland and Dalton.  Hooker will at the same time attack, and, if he can, carry Lookout Mountain.  The enemy now seems to be looking for an attack on his left flank.  This favors us.  To further confirm this, Sherman’s advance division will march direct from Whiteside to Trenton.  The remainder of his force will pass over a new road just made from Whiteside to Kelly’s Ferry, thus being concealed from the enemy, and leave him to suppose the whole force is going up Lookout Valley.  Sherman’s advance has only just reached Bridgeport.  The

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rear will only reach there on the 16th.  This will bring it to the 19th as the earliest day for making the combined movement as desired.  Inform me if you think you can sustain yourself until this time.  I can hardly conceive of the enemy breaking through at Kingston and pushing for Kentucky.  If they should, however, a new problem would be left for solution.  Thomas has ordered a division of cavalry to the vicinity of Sparta.  I will ascertain if they have started, and inform you.  It will be entirely out of the question to send you ten thousand men, not because they cannot be spared, but how would they be fed after they got even one day east from here?”

Longstreet, for some reason or other, stopped at Loudon until the 13th.  That being the terminus of his railroad communications, it is probable he was directed to remain there awaiting orders.  He was in a position threatening Knoxville, and at the same time where he could be brought back speedily to Chattanooga.  The day after Longstreet left Loudon, Sherman reached Bridgeport in person and proceeded on to see me that evening, the 14th, and reached Chattanooga the next day.

My orders for battle were all prepared in advance of Sherman’s arrival (15), except the dates, which could not be fixed while troops to be engaged were so far away.  The possession of Lookout Mountain was of no special advantage to us now.  Hooker was instructed to send Howard’s corps to the north side of the Tennessee, thence up behind the hills on the north side, and to go into camp opposite Chattanooga; with the remainder of the command, Hooker was, at a time to be afterwards appointed, to ascend the western slope between the upper and lower palisades, and so get into Chattanooga valley.

The plan of battle was for Sherman to attack the enemy’s right flank, form a line across it, extend our left over South Chickamauga River so as to threaten or hold the railroad in Bragg’s rear, and thus force him either to weaken his lines elsewhere or lose his connection with his base at Chickamauga Station.  Hooker was to perform like service on our right.  His problem was to get from Lookout Valley to Chattanooga Valley in the most expeditious way possible; cross the latter valley rapidly to Rossville, south of Bragg’s line on Missionary Ridge, form line there across the ridge facing north, with his right flank extended to Chickamauga Valley east of the ridge, thus threatening the enemy’s rear on that flank and compelling him to reinforce this also.  Thomas, with the Army of the Cumberland, occupied the centre, and was to assault while the enemy was engaged with most of his forces on his two flanks.

To carry out this plan, Sherman was to cross the Tennessee at Brown’s Ferry and move east of Chattanooga to a point opposite the north end of Mission Ridge, and to place his command back of the foot-hills out of sight of the enemy on the ridge.  There are two streams called Chickamauga emptying into the Tennessee River east of Chattanooga—­North Chickamauga, taking its rise in Tennessee, flowing south, and emptying into the river some seven or eight miles east; while the South Chickamauga, which takes its rise in Georgia, flows northward, and empties into the Tennessee some three or four miles above the town.  There were now one hundred and sixteen pontoons in the North Chickamauga River, their presence there being unknown to the enemy.

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At night a division was to be marched up to that point, and at two o’clock in the morning moved down with the current, thirty men in each boat.  A few were to land east of the mouth of the South Chickamauga, capture the pickets there, and then lay a bridge connecting the two banks of the river.  The rest were to land on the south side of the Tennessee, where Missionary Ridge would strike it if prolonged, and a sufficient number of men to man the boats were to push to the north side to ferry over the main body of Sherman’s command while those left on the south side intrenched themselves.  Thomas was to move out from his lines facing the ridge, leaving enough of Palmer’s corps to guard against an attack down the valley.  Lookout Valley being of no present value to us, and being untenable by the enemy if we should secure Missionary Ridge, Hooker’s orders were changed.  His revised orders brought him to Chattanooga by the established route north of the Tennessee.  He was then to move out to the right to Rossville.

Hooker’s position in Lookout Valley was absolutely essential to us so long as Chattanooga was besieged.  It was the key to our line for supplying the army.  But it was not essential after the enemy was dispersed from our front, or even after the battle for this purpose was begun.  Hooker’s orders, therefore, were designed to get his force past Lookout Mountain and Chattanooga Valley, and up to Missionary Ridge.  By crossing the north face of Lookout the troops would come into Chattanooga Valley in rear of the line held by the enemy across the valley, and would necessarily force its evacuation.  Orders were accordingly given to march by this route.  But days before the battle began the advantages as well as the disadvantages of this plan of action were all considered.  The passage over the mountain was a difficult one to make in the face of an enemy.  It might consume so much time as to lose us the use of the troops engaged in it at other points where they were more wanted.  After reaching Chattanooga Valley, the creek of the same name, quite a formidable stream to get an army over, had to be crossed.  I was perfectly willing that the enemy should keep Lookout Mountain until we got through with the troops on Missionary Ridge.  By marching Hooker to the north side of the river, thence up the stream, and recrossing at the town, he could be got in position at any named time; when in this new position, he would have Chattanooga Creek behind him, and the attack on Missionary Ridge would unquestionably cause the evacuation by the enemy of his line across the valley and on Lookout Mountain.  Hooker’s order was changed accordingly.  As explained elsewhere, the original order had to be reverted to, because of a flood in the river rendering the bridge at Brown’s Ferry unsafe for the passage of troops at the exact juncture when it was wanted to bring all the troops together against Missionary Ridge.

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The next day after Sherman’s arrival I took him, with Generals Thomas and Smith and other officers, to the north side of the river, and showed them the ground over which Sherman had to march, and pointed out generally what he was expected to do.  I, as well as the authorities in Washington, was still in a great state of anxiety for Burnside’s safety.  Burnside himself, I believe, was the only one who did not share in this anxiety.  Nothing could be done for him, however, until Sherman’s troops were up.  As soon, therefore, as the inspection was over, Sherman started for Bridgeport to hasten matters, rowing a boat himself, I believe, from Kelly’s Ferry.  Sherman had left Bridgeport the night of the 14th, reached Chattanooga the evening of the 15th, made the above-described inspection on the morning of the 16th, and started back the same evening to hurry up his command, fully appreciating the importance of time.

His march was conducted with as much expedition as the roads and season would admit of.  By the 20th he was himself at Brown’s Ferry with the head of column, but many of his troops were far behind, and one division (Ewing’s) was at Trenton, sent that way to create the impression that Lookout was to be taken from the south.  Sherman received his orders at the ferry, and was asked if he could not be ready for the assault the following morning.  News had been received that the battle had been commenced at Knoxville.  Burnside had been cut off from telegraphic communications.  The President, the Secretary of War, and General Halleck, were in an agony of suspense.  My suspense was also great, but more endurable, because I was where I could soon do something to relieve the situation.  It was impossible to get Sherman’s troops up for the next day.  I then asked him if they could not be got up to make the assault on the morning of the 22d, and ordered Thomas to move on that date.  But the elements were against us.  It rained all the 20th and 21st.  The river rose so rapidly that it was difficult to keep the pontoons in place.

General Orlando B. Willcox, a division commander under Burnside, was at this time occupying a position farther up the valley than Knoxville —­about Maynardville—­and was still in telegraphic communication with the North.  A dispatch was received from him saying that he was threatened from the east.  The following was sent in reply: 

“If you can communicate with General Burnside, say to him that our attack on Bragg will commence in the morning.  If successful, such a move will be made as I think will relieve East Tennessee, if he can hold out.  Longstreet passing through our lines to Kentucky need not cause alarm.  He would find the country so bare that he would lose his transportation and artillery before reaching Kentucky, and would meet such a force before he got through, that he could not return.”

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Meantime, Sherman continued his crossing without intermission as fast as his troops could be got up.  The crossing had to be effected in full view of the enemy on the top of Lookout Mountain.  Once over, however, the troops soon disappeared behind the detached hill on the north side, and would not come to view again, either to watchmen on Lookout Mountain or Missionary Ridge, until they emerged between the hills to strike the bank of the river.  But when Sherman’s advance reached a point opposite the town of Chattanooga, Howard, who, it will be remembered, had been concealed behind the hills on the north side, took up his line of march to join the troops on the south side.  His crossing was in full view both from Missionary Ridge and the top of Lookout, and the enemy of course supposed these troops to be Sherman’s.  This enabled Sherman to get to his assigned position without discovery.

CHAPTER XLIII.

Preparations for battle—­Thomas carries the first line of the enemy —­Sherman carries Missionary ridge—­battle of lookout mountain —­general Hooker’s fight.

On the 20th, when so much was occurring to discourage—­rains falling so heavily as to delay the passage of troops over the river at Brown’s Ferry and threatening the entire breaking of the bridge; news coming of a battle raging at Knoxville; of Willcox being threatened by a force from the east—­a letter was received from Bragg which contained these words:  “As there may still be some non-combatants in Chattanooga, I deem it proper to notify you that prudence would dictate their early withdrawal.”  Of course, I understood that this was a device intended to deceive; but I did not know what the intended deception was.  On the 22d, however, a deserter came in who informed me that Bragg was leaving our front, and on that day Buckner’s division was sent to reinforce Longstreet at Knoxville, and another division started to follow but was recalled.  The object of Bragg’s letter, no doubt, was in some way to detain me until Knoxville could be captured, and his troops there be returned to Chattanooga.

During the night of the 21st the rest of the pontoon boats, completed, one hundred and sixteen in all, were carried up to and placed in North Chickamauga.  The material for the roadway over these was deposited out of view of the enemy within a few hundred yards of the bank of the Tennessee, where the north end of the bridge was to rest.

Hearing nothing from Burnside, and hearing much of the distress in Washington on his account, I could no longer defer operations for his relief.  I determined, therefore, to do on the 23d, with the Army of the Cumberland, what had been intended to be done on the 24th.

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The position occupied by the Army of the Cumberland had been made very strong for defence during the months it had been besieged.  The line was about a mile from the town, and extended from Citico Creek, a small stream running near the base of Missionary Ridge and emptying into the Tennessee about two miles below the mouth of the South Chickamauga, on the left, to Chattanooga Creek on the right.  All commanding points on the line were well fortified and well equipped with artillery.  The important elevations within the line had all been carefully fortified and supplied with a proper armament.  Among the elevations so fortified was one to the east of the town, named Fort Wood.  It owed its importance chiefly to the fact that it lay between the town and Missionary Ridge, where most of the strength of the enemy was.  Fort Wood had in it twenty-two pieces of artillery, most of which would reach the nearer points of the enemy’s line.  On the morning of the 23d Thomas, according to instructions, moved Granger’s corps of two divisions, Sheridan and T. J. Wood commanding, to the foot of Fort Wood, and formed them into line as if going on parade, Sheridan on the right, Wood to the left, extending to or near Citico Creek.  Palmer, commanding the 14th corps, held that part of our line facing south and southwest.  He supported Sheridan with one division (Baird’s), while his other division under Johnson remained in the trenches, under arms, ready to be moved to any point.  Howard’s corps was moved in rear of the centre.  The picket lines were within a few hundred yards of each other.  At two o’clock in the afternoon all were ready to advance.  By this time the clouds had lifted so that the enemy could see from his elevated position all that was going on.  The signal for advance was given by a booming of cannon from Fort Wood and other points on the line.  The rebel pickets were soon driven back upon the main guards, which occupied minor and detached heights between the main ridge and our lines.  These too were carried before halting, and before the enemy had time to reinforce their advance guards.  But it was not without loss on both sides.  This movement secured to us a line fully a mile in advance of the one we occupied in the morning, and the one which the enemy had occupied up to this time.  The fortifications were rapidly turned to face the other way.  During the following night they were made strong.  We lost in this preliminary action about eleven hundred killed and wounded, while the enemy probably lost quite as heavily, including the prisoners that were captured.  With the exception of the firing of artillery, kept up from Missionary Ridge and Fort Wood until night closed in, this ended the fighting for the first day.

The advantage was greatly on our side now, and if I could only have been assured that Burnside could hold out ten days longer I should have rested more easily.  But we were doing the best we could for him and the cause.

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By the night of the 23d Sherman’s command was in a position to move, though one division (Osterhaus’s) had not yet crossed the river at Brown’s Ferry.  The continuous rise in the Tennessee had rendered it impossible to keep the bridge at that point in condition for troops to cross; but I was determined to move that night even without this division.  Orders were sent to Osterhaus accordingly to report to Hooker, if he could not cross by eight o’clock on the morning of the 24th.  Because of the break in the bridge, Hooker’s orders were again changed, but this time only back to those first given to him.

General W. F. Smith had been assigned to duty as Chief Engineer of the Military Division.  To him were given the general direction of moving troops by the boats from North Chickamauga, laying the bridge after they reached their position, and generally all the duties pertaining to his office of chief engineer.  During the night General Morgan L. Smith’s division was marched to the point where the pontoons were, and the brigade of Giles A. Smith was selected for the delicate duty of manning the boats and surprising the enemy’s pickets on the south bank of the river.  During this night also General J. M. Brannan, chief of artillery, moved forty pieces of artillery, belonging to the Army of the Cumberland, and placed them on the north side of the river so as to command the ground opposite, to aid in protecting the approach to the point where the south end of the bridge was to rest.  He had to use Sherman’s artillery horses for this purpose, Thomas having none.

At two o’clock in the morning, November 24th, Giles A. Smith pushed out from the North Chickamauga with his one hundred and sixteen boats, each loaded with thirty brave and well-armed men.  The boats with their precious freight dropped down quietly with the current to avoid attracting the attention of any one who could convey information to the enemy, until arriving near the mouth of South Chickamauga.  Here a few boats were landed, the troops debarked, and a rush was made upon the picket guard known to be at that point.  The guard were surprised, and twenty of their number captured.  The remainder of the troops effected a landing at the point where the bridge was to start, with equally good results.  The work of ferrying over Sherman’s command from the north side of the Tennessee was at once commenced, using the pontoons for the purpose.  A steamer was also brought up from the town to assist.  The rest of M. L. Smith’s division came first, then the division of John E. Smith.  The troops as they landed were put to work intrenching their position.  By daylight the two entire divisions were over, and well covered by the works they had built.

The work of laying the bridge, on which to cross the artillery and cavalry, was now begun.  The ferrying over the infantry was continued with the steamer and the pontoons, taking the pontoons, however, as fast as they were wanted to put in their place in the bridge.  By a little past noon the bridge was completed, as well as one over the South Chickamauga connecting the troops left on that side with their comrades below, and all the infantry and artillery were on the south bank of the Tennessee.

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Sherman at once formed his troops for assault on Missionary Ridge.  By one o’clock he started with M. L. Smith on his left, keeping nearly the course of Chickamauga River; J. E. Smith next to the right and a little to the rear; and Ewing still farther to the right and also a little to the rear of J. E. Smith’s command, in column, ready to deploy to the right if an enemy should come from that direction.  A good skirmish line preceded each of these columns.  Soon the foot of the hill was reached; the skirmishers pushed directly up, followed closely by their supports.  By half-past three Sherman was in possession of the height without having sustained much loss.  A brigade from each division was now brought up, and artillery was dragged to the top of the hill by hand.  The enemy did not seem to be aware of this movement until the top of the hill was gained.  There had been a drizzling rain during the day, and the clouds were so low that Lookout Mountain and the top of Missionary Ridge were obscured from the view of persons in the valley.  But now the enemy opened fire upon their assailants, and made several attempts with their skirmishers to drive them away, but without avail.  Later in the day a more determined attack was made, but this, too, failed, and Sherman was left to fortify what he had gained.

Sherman’s cavalry took up its line of march soon after the bridge was completed, and by half-past three the whole of it was over both bridges and on its way to strike the enemy’s communications at Chickamauga Station.  All of Sherman’s command was now south of the Tennessee.  During the afternoon General Giles A. Smith was severely wounded and carried from the field.

Thomas having done on the 23d what was expected of him on the 24th, there was nothing for him to do this day except to strengthen his position.  Howard, however, effected a crossing of Citico Creek and a junction with Sherman, and was directed to report to him.  With two or three regiments of his command he moved in the morning along the banks of the Tennessee, and reached the point where the bridge was being laid.  He went out on the bridge as far as it was completed from the south end, and saw Sherman superintending the work from the north side and moving himself south as fast as an additional boat was put in and the roadway put upon it.  Howard reported to his new chief across the chasm between them, which was now narrow and in a few minutes closed.

While these operations were going on to the east of Chattanooga, Hooker was engaged on the west.  He had three divisions:  Osterhaus’s, of the 15th corps, Army of the Tennessee; Geary’s, 12th corps, Army of the Potomac; and Cruft’s, 14th corps, Army of the Cumberland.  Geary was on the right at Wauhatchie, Cruft at the centre, and Osterhaus near Brown’s Ferry.  These troops were all west of Lookout Creek.  The enemy had the east bank of the creek strongly picketed and intrenched, and three brigades of troops in the rear to reinforce

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them if attacked.  These brigades occupied the summit of the mountain.  General Carter L. Stevenson was in command of the whole.  Why any troops, except artillery with a small infantry guard, were kept on the mountain-top, I do not see.  A hundred men could have held the summit—­which is a palisade for more than thirty feet down—­against the assault of any number of men from the position Hooker occupied.

The side of Lookout Mountain confronting Hooker’s command was rugged, heavily timbered, and full of chasms, making it difficult to advance with troops, even in the absence of an opposing force.  Farther up, the ground becomes more even and level, and was in cultivation.  On the east side the slope is much more gradual, and a good wagon road, zigzagging up it, connects the town of Chattanooga with the summit.

Early on the morning of the 24th Hooker moved Geary’s division, supported by a brigade of Cruft’s, up Lookout Creek, to effect a crossing.  The remainder of Cruft’s division was to seize the bridge over the creek, near the crossing of the railroad.  Osterhaus was to move up to the bridge and cross it.  The bridge was seized by Gross’s brigade after a slight skirmish with the pickets guarding it.  This attracted the enemy so that Geary’s movement farther up was not observed.  A heavy mist obscured him from the view of the troops on the top of the mountain.  He crossed the creek almost unobserved, and captured the picket of over forty men on guard near by.  He then commenced ascending the mountain directly in his front.  By this time the enemy was seen coming down from their camps on the mountain slope, and filing into their rifle-pits to contest the crossing of the bridge.  By eleven o’clock the bridge was complete.  Osterhaus was up, and after some sharp skirmishing the enemy was driven away with considerable loss in killed and captured.

While the operations at the bridge were progressing, Geary was pushing up the hill over great obstacles, resisted by the enemy directly in his front, and in face of the guns on top of the mountain.  The enemy, seeing their left flank and rear menaced, gave way, and were followed by Cruft and Osterhaus.  Soon these were up abreast of Geary, and the whole command pushed up the hill, driving the enemy in advance.  By noon Geary had gained the open ground on the north slope of the mountain, with his right close up to the base of the upper palisade, but there were strong fortifications in his front.  The rest of the command coming up, a line was formed from the base of the upper palisade to the mouth of Chattanooga Creek.

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Thomas and I were on the top of Orchard Knob.  Hooker’s advance now made our line a continuous one.  It was in full view, extending from the Tennessee River, where Sherman had crossed, up Chickamauga River to the base of Mission Ridge, over the top of the north end of the ridge to Chattanooga Valley, then along parallel to the ridge a mile or more, across the valley to the mouth of Chattanooga Creek, thence up the slope of Lookout Mountain to the foot of the upper palisade.  The day was hazy, so that Hooker’s operations were not visible to us except at moments when the clouds would rise.  But the sound of his artillery and musketry was heard incessantly.  The enemy on his front was partially fortified, but was soon driven out of his works.  During the afternoon the clouds, which had so obscured the top of Lookout all day as to hide whatever was going on from the view of those below, settled down and made it so dark where Hooker was as to stop operations for the time.  At four o’clock Hooker reported his position as impregnable.  By a little after five direct communication was established, and a brigade of troops was sent from Chattanooga to reinforce him.  These troops had to cross Chattanooga Creek and met with some opposition, but soon overcame it, and by night the commander, General Carlin, reported to Hooker and was assigned to his left.  I now telegraphed to Washington:  “The fight to-day progressed favorably.  Sherman carried the end of Missionary Ridge, and his right is now at the tunnel, and his left at Chickamauga Creek.  Troops from Lookout Valley carried the point of the mountain, and now hold the eastern slope and a point high up.  Hooker reports two thousand prisoners taken, besides which a small number have fallen into our hands from Missionary Ridge.”  The next day the President replied:  “Your dispatches as to fighting on Monday and Tuesday are here.  Well done.  Many thanks to all.  Remember Burnside.”  And Halleck also telegraphed:  “I congratulate you on the success thus far of your plans.  I fear that Burnside is hard pushed, and that any further delay may prove fatal.  I know you will do all in your power to relieve him.”

The division of Jefferson C. Davis, Army of the Cumberland, had been sent to the North Chickamauga to guard the pontoons as they were deposited in the river, and to prevent all ingress or egress of citizens.  On the night of the 24th his division, having crossed with Sherman, occupied our extreme left from the upper bridge over the plain to the north base of Missionary Ridge.  Firing continued to a late hour in the night, but it was not connected with an assault at any point.

CHAPTER XLIV.

Battle of Chattanooga—­A gallant charge—­complete Rout of the enemy —­pursuit of the confederates—­general Bragg—­remarks on Chattanooga.

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At twelve o’clock at night, when all was quiet, I began to give orders for the next day, and sent a dispatch to Willcox to encourage Burnside.  Sherman was directed to attack at daylight.  Hooker was ordered to move at the same hour, and endeavor to intercept the enemy’s retreat if he still remained; if he had gone, then to move directly to Rossville and operate against the left and rear of the force on Missionary Ridge.  Thomas was not to move until Hooker had reached Missionary Ridge.  As I was with him on Orchard Knob, he would not move without further orders from me.

The morning of the 25th opened clear and bright, and the whole field was in full view from the top of Orchard Knob.  It remained so all day.  Bragg’s headquarters were in full view, and officers—­presumably staff officers—­could be seen coming and going constantly.

The point of ground which Sherman had carried on the 24th was almost disconnected from the main ridge occupied by the enemy.  A low pass, over which there is a wagon road crossing the hill, and near which there is a railroad tunnel, intervenes between the two hills.  The problem now was to get to the main ridge.  The enemy was fortified on the point; and back farther, where the ground was still higher, was a second fortification commanding the first.  Sherman was out as soon as it was light enough to see, and by sunrise his command was in motion.  Three brigades held the hill already gained.  Morgan L. Smith moved along the east base of Missionary Ridge; Loomis along the west base, supported by two brigades of John E. Smith’s division; and Corse with his brigade was between the two, moving directly towards the hill to be captured.  The ridge is steep and heavily wooded on the east side, where M. L. Smith’s troops were advancing, but cleared and with a more gentle slope on the west side.  The troops advanced rapidly and carried the extreme end of the rebel works.  Morgan L. Smith advanced to a point which cut the enemy off from the railroad bridge and the means of bringing up supplies by rail from Chickamauga Station, where the main depot was located.  The enemy made brave and strenuous efforts to drive our troops from the position we had gained, but without success.  The contest lasted for two hours.  Corse, a brave and efficient commander, was badly wounded in this assault.  Sherman now threatened both Bragg’s flank and his stores, and made it necessary for him to weaken other points of his line to strengthen his right.  From the position I occupied I could see column after column of Bragg’s forces moving against Sherman.  Every Confederate gun that could be brought to bear upon the Union forces was concentrated upon him.  J. E. Smith, with two brigades, charged up the west side of the ridge to the support of Corse’s command, over open ground and in the face of a heavy fire of both artillery and musketry, and reached the very parapet of the enemy.  He lay here for a time, but the enemy coming with a heavy force upon his right flank, he was compelled to fall back, followed by the foe.  A few hundred yards brought Smith’s troops into a wood, where they were speedily reformed, when they charged and drove the attacking party back to his intrenchments.

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Seeing the advance, repulse, and second advance of J. E. Smith from the position I occupied, I directed Thomas to send a division to reinforce him.  Baird’s division was accordingly sent from the right of Orchard Knob.  It had to march a considerable distance directly under the eye of the enemy to reach its position.  Bragg at once commenced massing in the same direction.  This was what I wanted.  But it had now got to be late in the afternoon, and I had expected before this to see Hooker crossing the ridge in the neighborhood of Rossville and compelling Bragg to mass in that direction also.

The enemy had evacuated Lookout Mountain during the night, as I expected he would.  In crossing the valley he burned the bridge over Chattanooga Creek, and did all he could to obstruct the roads behind him.  Hooker was off bright and early, with no obstructions in his front but distance and the destruction above named.  He was detained four hours crossing Chattanooga Creek, and thus was lost the immediate advantage I expected from his forces.  His reaching Bragg’s flank and extending across it was to be the signal for Thomas’s assault of the ridge.  But Sherman’s condition was getting so critical that the assault for his relief could not be delayed any longer.

Sheridan’s and Wood’s divisions had been lying under arms from early morning, ready to move the instant the signal was given.  I now directed Thomas to order the charge at once (16).  I watched eagerly to see the effect, and became impatient at last that there was no indication of any charge being made.  The centre of the line which was to make the charge was near where Thomas and I stood, but concealed from view by an intervening forest.  Turning to Thomas to inquire what caused the delay, I was surprised to see Thomas J. Wood, one of the division commanders who was to make the charge, standing talking to him.  I spoke to General Wood, asking him why he did not charge as ordered an hour before.  He replied very promptly that this was the first he had heard of it, but that he had been ready all day to move at a moment’s notice.  I told him to make the charge at once.  He was off in a moment, and in an incredibly short time loud cheering was heard, and he and Sheridan were driving the enemy’s advance before them towards Missionary Ridge.  The Confederates were strongly intrenched on the crest of the ridge in front of us, and had a second line half-way down and another at the base.  Our men drove the troops in front of the lower line of rifle-pits so rapidly, and followed them so closely, that rebel and Union troops went over the first line of works almost at the same time.  Many rebels were captured and sent to the rear under the fire of their own friends higher up the hill.  Those that were not captured retreated, and were pursued.  The retreating hordes being between friends and pursuers caused the enemy to fire high to avoid killing their own men.  In fact, on that occasion the Union soldier nearest the enemy was in the safest position.  Without awaiting further orders or stopping to reform, on our troops went to the second line of works; over that and on for the crest—­thus effectually carrying out my orders of the 18th for the battle and of the 24th (17) for this charge.

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I watched their progress with intense interest.  The fire along the rebel line was terrific.  Cannon and musket balls filled the air:  but the damage done was in small proportion to the ammunition expended.  The pursuit continued until the crest was reached, and soon our men were seen climbing over the Confederate barriers at different points in front of both Sheridan’s and Wood’s divisions.  The retreat of the enemy along most of his line was precipitate and the panic so great that Bragg and his officers lost all control over their men.  Many were captured, and thousands threw away their arms in their flight.

Sheridan pushed forward until he reached the Chickamauga River at a point above where the enemy crossed.  He met some resistance from troops occupying a second hill in rear of Missionary Ridge, probably to cover the retreat of the main body and of the artillery and trains.  It was now getting dark, but Sheridan, without halting on that account pushed his men forward up this second hill slowly and without attracting the attention of the men placed to defend it, while he detached to the right and left to surround the position.  The enemy discovered the movement before these dispositions were complete, and beat a hasty retreat, leaving artillery, wagon trains, and many prisoners in our hands.  To Sheridan’s prompt movement the Army of the Cumberland, and the nation, are indebted for the bulk of the capture of prisoners, artillery, and small-arms that day.  Except for his prompt pursuit, so much in this way would not have been accomplished.

While the advance up Mission Ridge was going forward, General Thomas with staff, General Gordon Granger, commander of the corps making the assault, and myself and staff occupied Orchard Knob, from which the entire field could be observed.  The moment the troops were seen going over the last line of rebel defences, I ordered Granger to join his command, and mounting my horse I rode to the front.  General Thomas left about the same time.  Sheridan on the extreme right was already in pursuit of the enemy east of the ridge.  Wood, who commanded the division to the left of Sheridan, accompanied his men on horseback in the charge, but did not join Sheridan in the pursuit.  To the left, in Baird’s front where Bragg’s troops had massed against Sherman, the resistance was more stubborn and the contest lasted longer.  I ordered Granger to follow the enemy with Wood’s division, but he was so much excited, and kept up such a roar of musketry in the direction the enemy had taken, that by the time I could stop the firing the enemy had got well out of the way.  The enemy confronting Sherman, now seeing everything to their left giving way, fled also.  Sherman, however, was not aware of the extent of our success until after nightfall, when he received orders to pursue at daylight in the morning.

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As soon as Sherman discovered that the enemy had left his front he directed his reserves, Davis’s division of the Army of the Cumberland, to push over the pontoon-bridge at the mouth of the Chickamauga, and to move forward to Chickamauga Station.  He ordered Howard to move up the stream some two miles to where there was an old bridge, repair it during the night, and follow Davis at four o’clock in the morning.  Morgan L. Smith was ordered to reconnoitre the tunnel to see if that was still held.  Nothing was found there but dead bodies of men of both armies.  The rest of Sherman’s command was directed to follow Howard at daylight in the morning to get on to the railroad towards Graysville.

Hooker, as stated, was detained at Chattanooga Creek by the destruction of the bridge at that point.  He got his troops over, with the exception of the artillery, by fording the stream at a little after three o’clock.  Leaving his artillery to follow when the bridge should be reconstructed, he pushed on with the remainder of his command.  At Rossville he came upon the flank of a division of the enemy, which soon commenced a retreat along the ridge.  This threw them on Palmer.  They could make but little resistance in the position they were caught in, and as many of them as could do so escaped.  Many, however, were captured.  Hooker’s position during the night of the 25th was near Rossville, extending east of the ridge.  Palmer was on his left, on the road to Graysville.

During the night I telegraphed to Willcox that Bragg had been defeated, and that immediate relief would be sent to Burnside if he could hold out; to Halleck I sent an announcement of our victory, and informed him that forces would be sent up the valley to relieve Burnside.

Before the battle of Chattanooga opened I had taken measures for the relief of Burnside the moment the way should be clear.  Thomas was directed to have the little steamer that had been built at Chattanooga loaded to its capacity with rations and ammunition.  Granger’s corps was to move by the south bank of the Tennessee River to the mouth of the Holston, and up that to Knoxville accompanied by the boat.  In addition to the supplies transported by boat, the men were to carry forty rounds of ammunition in their cartridge-boxes, and four days’ rations in haversacks.

In the battle of Chattanooga, troops from the Army of the Potomac, from the Army of the Tennessee, and from the Army of the Cumberland participated.  In fact, the accidents growing out of the heavy rains and the sudden rise in the Tennessee River so mingled the troops that the organizations were not kept together, under their respective commanders, during the battle.  Hooker, on the right, had Geary’s division of the 12th corps, Army of the Potomac; Osterhaus’s division of the 15th corps, Army of the Tennessee; and Cruft’s division of the Army of the Cumberland.  Sherman had three divisions of his own army, Howard’s

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corps from the Army of the Potomac, and Jefferson C. Davis’s division of the Army of the Cumberland.  There was no jealousy—­hardly rivalry.  Indeed, I doubt whether officers or men took any note at the time of the fact of this intermingling of commands.  All saw a defiant foe surrounding them, and took it for granted that every move was intended to dislodge him, and it made no difference where the troops came from so that the end was accomplished.

The victory at Chattanooga was won against great odds, considering the advantage the enemy had of position, and was accomplished more easily than was expected by reason of Bragg’s making several grave mistakes:  first, in sending away his ablest corps commander with over twenty thousand troops; second, in sending away a division of troops on the eve of battle; third, in placing so much of a force on the plain in front of his impregnable position.

It was known that Mr. Jefferson Davis had visited Bragg on Missionary Ridge a short time before my reaching Chattanooga.  It was reported and believed that he had come out to reconcile a serious difference between Bragg and Longstreet, and finding this difficult to do, planned the campaign against Knoxville, to be conducted by the latter general.  I had known both Bragg and Longstreet before the war, the latter very well.  We had been three years at West Point together, and, after my graduation, for a time in the same regiment.  Then we served together in the Mexican War.  I had known Bragg in Mexico, and met him occasionally subsequently.  I could well understand how there might be an irreconcilable difference between them.

Bragg was a remarkably intelligent and well-informed man, professionally and otherwise.  He was also thoroughly upright.  But he was possessed of an irascible temper, and was naturally disputatious.  A man of the highest moral character and the most correct habits, yet in the old army he was in frequent trouble.  As a subordinate he was always on the lookout to catch his commanding officer infringing his prerogatives; as a post commander he was equally vigilant to detect the slightest neglect, even of the most trivial order.

I have heard in the old army an anecdote very characteristic of Bragg.  On one occasion, when stationed at a post of several companies commanded by a field officer, he was himself commanding one of the companies and at the same time acting as post quartermaster and commissary.  He was first lieutenant at the time, but his captain was detached on other duty.  As commander of the company he made a requisition upon the quartermaster—­himself—­for something he wanted.  As quartermaster he declined to fill the requisition, and endorsed on the back of it his reasons for so doing.  As company commander he responded to this, urging that his requisition called for nothing but what he was entitled to, and that it was the duty of the quartermaster to fill it.  As quartermaster he still persisted that he was right.  In this condition of affairs Bragg referred the whole matter to the commanding officer of the post.  The latter, when he saw the nature of the matter referred, exclaimed:  “My God, Mr. Bragg, you have quarrelled with every officer in the army, and now you are quarrelling with yourself!”

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Longstreet was an entirely different man.  He was brave, honest, intelligent, a very capable soldier, subordinate to his superiors, just and kind to his subordinates, but jealous of his own rights, which he had the courage to maintain.  He was never on the lookout to detect a slight, but saw one as soon as anybody when intentionally given.

It may be that Longstreet was not sent to Knoxville for the reason stated, but because Mr. Davis had an exalted opinion of his own military genius, and thought he saw a chance of “killing two birds with one stone.”  On several occasions during the war he came to the relief of the Union army by means of his superior military genius.

I speak advisedly when I saw Mr. Davis prided himself on his military capacity.  He says so himself, virtually, in his answer to the notice of his nomination to the Confederate presidency.  Some of his generals have said so in their writings since the downfall of the Confederacy.

My recollection is that my first orders for the battle of Chattanooga were as fought.  Sherman was to get on Missionary Ridge, as he did; Hooker to cross the north end of Lookout Mountain, as he did, sweep across Chattanooga Valley and get across the south end of the ridge near Rossville.  When Hooker had secured that position the Army of the Cumberland was to assault in the centre.  Before Sherman arrived, however, the order was so changed as that Hooker was directed to come to Chattanooga by the north bank of the Tennessee River.  The waters in the river, owing to heavy rains, rose so fast that the bridge at Brown’s Ferry could not be maintained in a condition to be used in crossing troops upon it.  For this reason Hooker’s orders were changed by telegraph back to what they were originally.------

Note.—­From this point on this volume was written (with the exception of the campaign in the Wilderness, which had been previously written) by General Grant, after his great illness in April, and the present arrangement of the subject-matter was made by him between the 10th and 18th of July, 1885.

CHAPTER XLV.

The relief of Knoxville—­headquarters moved to Nashville—­visiting Knoxville-cipher cipher dispatches—­withholding orders.

Chattanooga now being secure to the National troops beyond any doubt, I immediately turned my attention to relieving Knoxville, about the situation of which the President, in particular, was very anxious.  Prior to the battles, I had made preparations for sending troops to the relief of Burnside at the very earliest moment after securing Chattanooga.  We had there two little steamers which had been built and fitted up from the remains of old boats and put in condition to run.  General Thomas was directed to have one of these boats loaded with rations and ammunition

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and move up the Tennessee River to the mouth of the Holston, keeping the boat all the time abreast of the troops.  General Granger, with the 4th corps reinforced to make twenty thousand men, was to start the moment Missionary Ridge was carried, and under no circumstances were the troops to return to their old camps.  With the provisions carried, and the little that could be got in the country, it was supposed he could hold out until Longstreet was driven away, after which event East Tennessee would furnish abundance of food for Burnside’s army and his own also.

While following the enemy on the 26th, and again on the morning of the 27th, part of the time by the road to Ringgold, I directed Thomas, verbally, not to start Granger until he received further orders from me; advising him that I was going to the front to more fully see the situation.  I was not right sure but that Bragg’s troops might be over their stampede by the time they reached Dalton.  In that case Bragg might think it well to take the road back to Cleveland, move thence towards Knoxville, and, uniting with Longstreet, make a sudden dash upon Burnside.

When I arrived at Ringgold, however, on the 27th, I saw that the retreat was most earnest.  The enemy had been throwing away guns, caissons and small-arms, abandoning provisions, and, altogether, seemed to be moving like a disorganized mob, with the exception of Cleburne’s division, which was acting as rear-guard to cover the retreat.

When Hooker moved from Rossville toward Ringgold Palmer’s division took the road to Graysville, and Sherman moved by the way of Chickamauga Station toward the same point.  As soon as I saw the situation at Ringgold I sent a staff officer back to Chattanooga to advise Thomas of the condition of affairs, and direct him by my orders to start Granger at once.  Feeling now that the troops were already on the march for the relief of Burnside I was in no hurry to get back, but stayed at Ringgold through the day to prepare for the return of our troops.

Ringgold is in a valley in the mountains, situated between East Chickamauga Creek and Taylor’s Ridge, and about twenty miles south-east from Chattanooga.  I arrived just as the artillery that Hooker had left behind at Chattanooga Creek got up.  His men were attacking Cleburne’s division, which had taken a strong position in the adjacent hills so as to cover the retreat of the Confederate army through a narrow gorge which presents itself at that point.  Just beyond the gorge the valley is narrow, and the creek so tortuous that it has to be crossed a great many times in the course of the first mile.  This attack was unfortunate, and cost us some men unnecessarily.  Hooker captured, however, 3 pieces of artillery and 230 prisoners, and 130 rebel dead were left upon the field.

I directed General Hooker to collect the flour and wheat in the neighboring mills for the use of the troops, and then to destroy the mills and all other property that could be of use to the enemy, but not to make any wanton destruction.

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At this point Sherman came up, having reached Graysville with his troops, where he found Palmer had preceded him.  Palmer had picked up many prisoners and much abandoned property on the route.  I went back in the evening to Graysville with Sherman, remained there over night and did not return to Chattanooga until the following night, the 29th.  I then found that Thomas had not yet started Granger, thus having lost a full day which I deemed of so much importance in determining the fate of Knoxville.  Thomas and Granger were aware that on the 23d of the month Burnside had telegraphed that his supplies would last for ten or twelve days and during that time he could hold out against Longstreet, but if not relieved within the time indicated he would be obliged to surrender or attempt to retreat.  To effect a retreat would have been an impossibility.  He was already very low in ammunition, and with an army pursuing he would not have been able to gather supplies.

Finding that Granger had not only not started but was very reluctant to go, he having decided for himself that it was a very bad move to make, I sent word to General Sherman of the situation and directed him to march to the relief of Knoxville.  I also gave him the problem that we had to solve—­that Burnside had now but four to six days supplies left, and that he must be relieved within that time.

Sherman, fortunately, had not started on his return from Graysville, having sent out detachments on the railroad which runs from Dalton to Cleveland and Knoxville to thoroughly destroy that road, and these troops had not yet returned to camp.  I was very loath to send Sherman, because his men needed rest after their long march from Memphis and hard fighting at Chattanooga.  But I had become satisfied that Burnside would not be rescued if his relief depended upon General Granger’s movements.

Sherman had left his camp on the north side of the Tennessee River, near Chattanooga, on the night of the 23d, the men having two days’ cooked rations in their haversacks.  Expecting to be back in their tents by that time and to be engaged in battle while out, they took with them neither overcoats nor blankets.  The weather was already cold, and at night they must have suffered more or less.  The two days’ rations had already lasted them five days; and they were now to go through a country which had been run over so much by Confederate troops that there was but little probability of finding much food.  They did, however, succeed in capturing some flour.  They also found a good deal of bran in some of the mills, which the men made up into bread; and in this and other ways they eked out an existence until they could reach Knoxville.

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I was so very anxious that Burnside should get news of the steps being taken for his relief, and thus induce him to hold out a little longer if it became necessary, that I determined to send a message to him.  I therefore sent a member of my staff, Colonel J. H. Wilson, to get into Knoxville if he could report to Burnside the situation fully, and give him all the encouragement possible.  Mr. Charles A. Dana was at Chattanooga during the battle, and had been there even before I assumed command.  Mr. Dana volunteered to accompany Colonel Wilson, and did accompany him.  I put the information of what was being done for the relief of Knoxville into writing, and directed that in some way or other it must be secretly managed so as to have a copy of this fall into the hands of General Longstreet.  They made the trip safely; General Longstreet did learn of Sherman’s coming in advance of his reaching there, and Burnside was prepared to hold out even for a longer time if it had been necessary.

Burnside had stretched a boom across the Holston River to catch scows and flats as they floated down.  On these, by previous arrangements with the loyal people of East Tennessee, were placed flour and corn, with forage and provisions generally, and were thus secured for the use of the Union troops.  They also drove cattle into Knoxville by the east side, which was not covered by the enemy; so that when relief arrived Burnside had more provisions on hand than when he had last reported.

Our total loss (not including Burnside’s) in all these engagements amounted to 757 killed, 4,529 wounded and 330 missing.  We captured 6,142 prisoners—­about 50 per cent. more than the enemy reported for their total loss—­40 pieces of artillery, 69 artillery carriages and caissons and over 7,000 stands of small-arms.  The enemy’s loss in arms was probably much greater than here reported, because we picked up a great many that were found abandoned.

I had at Chattanooga, in round numbers, about 60,000 men.  Bragg had about half this number, but his position was supposed to be impregnable.  It was his own fault that he did not have more men present.  He had sent Longstreet away with his corps swelled by reinforcements up to over twenty thousand men, thus reducing his own force more than one-third and depriving himself of the presence of the ablest general of his command.  He did this, too, after our troops had opened a line of communication by way of Brown’s and Kelly’s ferries with Bridgeport, thus securing full rations and supplies of every kind; and also when he knew reinforcements were coming to me.  Knoxville was of no earthly use to him while Chattanooga was in our hands.  If he should capture Chattanooga, Knoxville with its garrison would have fallen into his hands without a struggle.  I have never been able to see the wisdom of this move.

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Then, too, after Sherman had arrived, and when Bragg knew that he was on the north side of the Tennessee River, he sent Buckner’s division to reinforce Longstreet.  He also started another division a day later, but our attack having commenced before it reached Knoxville Bragg ordered it back.  It had got so far, however, that it could not return to Chattanooga in time to be of service there.  It is possible this latter blunder may have been made by Bragg having become confused as to what was going on on our side.  Sherman had, as already stated, crossed to the north side of the Tennessee River at Brown’s Ferry, in full view of Bragg’s troops from Lookout Mountain, a few days before the attack.  They then disappeared behind foot hills, and did not come to the view of the troops on Missionary Ridge until they met their assault.  Bragg knew it was Sherman’s troops that had crossed, and, they being so long out of view, may have supposed that they had gone up the north bank of the Tennessee River to the relief of Knoxville and that Longstreet was therefore in danger.  But the first great blunder, detaching Longstreet, cannot be accounted for in any way I know of.  If he had captured Chattanooga, East Tennessee would have fallen without a struggle.  It would have been a victory for us to have got our army away from Chattanooga safely.  It was a manifold greater victory to drive away the besieging army; a still greater one to defeat that army in his chosen ground and nearly annihilate it.

The probabilities are that our loss in killed was the heavier, as we were the attacking party.  The enemy reported his loss in killed at 361:  but as he reported his missing at 4,146, while we held over 6,000 of them as prisoners, and there must have been hundreds if not thousands who deserted, but little reliance can be placed on this report.  There was certainly great dissatisfaction with Bragg on the part of the soldiers for his harsh treatment of them, and a disposition to get away if they could.  Then, too, Chattanooga, following in the same half year with Gettysburg in the East and Vicksburg in the West, there was much the same feeling in the South at this time that there had been in the North the fall and winter before.  If the same license had been allowed the people and press in the South that was allowed in the North, Chattanooga would probably have been the last battle fought for the preservation of the Union.

General William F. Smith’s services in these battles had been such that I thought him eminently entitled to promotion.  I was aware that he had previously been named by the President for promotion to the grade of major-general, but that the Senate had rejected the nomination.  I was not aware of the reasons for this course, and therefore strongly recommended him for a major-generalcy.  My recommendation was heeded and the appointment made.

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Upon the raising of the siege of Knoxville I, of course, informed the authorities at Washington—­the President and Secretary of War—­of the fact, which caused great rejoicing there.  The President especially was rejoiced that Knoxville had been relieved (18) without further bloodshed.  The safety of Burnside’s army and the loyal people of East Tennessee had been the subject of much anxiety to the President for several months, during which time he was doing all he could to relieve the situation; sending a new commander (19) with a few thousand troops by the way of Cumberland Gap, and telegraphing me daily, almost hourly, to “remember Burnside,” “do something for Burnside,” and other appeals of like tenor.  He saw no escape for East Tennessee until after our victory at Chattanooga.  Even then he was afraid that Burnside might be out of ammunition, in a starving condition, or overpowered:  and his anxiety was still intense until he heard that Longstreet had been driven from the field.

Burnside followed Longstreet only to Strawberry Plains, some twenty miles or more east, and then stopped, believing that Longstreet would leave the State.  The latter did not do so, however, but stopped only a short distance farther on and subsisted his army for the entire winter off East Tennessee.  Foster now relieved Burnside.  Sherman made disposition of his troops along the Tennessee River in accordance with instructions.  I left Thomas in command at Chattanooga, and, about the 20th of December, moved my headquarters to Nashville, Tennessee.

Nashville was the most central point from which to communicate with my entire military division, and also with the authorities at Washington.  While remaining at Chattanooga I was liable to have my telegraphic communications cut so as to throw me out of communication with both my command and Washington.

Nothing occurred at Nashville worthy of mention during the winter, (20) so I set myself to the task of having troops in positions from which they could move to advantage, and in collecting all necessary supplies so as to be ready to claim a due share of the enemy’s attention upon the appearance of the first good weather in the spring.  I expected to retain the command I then had, and prepared myself for the campaign against Atlanta.  I also had great hopes of having a campaign made against Mobile from the Gulf.  I expected after Atlanta fell to occupy that place permanently, and to cut off Lee’s army from the West by way of the road running through Augusta to Atlanta and thence south-west.  I was preparing to hold Atlanta with a small garrison, and it was my expectation to push through to Mobile if that city was in our possession:  if not, to Savannah; and in this manner to get possession of the only east and west railroad that would then be left to the enemy.  But the spring campaign against Mobile was not made.

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The Army of the Ohio had been getting supplies over Cumberland Gap until their animals had nearly all starved.  I now determined to go myself to see if there was any possible chance of using that route in the spring, and if not to abandon it.  Accordingly I left Nashville in the latter part of December by rail for Chattanooga.  From Chattanooga I took one of the little steamers previously spoken of as having been built there, and, putting my horses aboard, went up to the junction of the Clinch with the Tennessee.  From that point the railroad had been repaired up to Knoxville and out east to Strawberry Plains.  I went by rail therefore to Knoxville, where I remained for several days.  General John G. Foster was then commanding the Department of the Ohio.  It was an intensely cold winter, the thermometer being down as low as zero every morning for more than a week while I was at Knoxville and on my way from there on horseback to Lexington, Kentucky, the first point where I could reach rail to carry me back to my headquarters at Nashville.

The road over Cumberland Gap, and back of it, was strewn with debris of broken wagons and dead animals, much as I had found it on my first trip to Chattanooga over Waldron’s Ridge.  The road had been cut up to as great a depth as clay could be by mules and wagons, and in that condition frozen; so that the ride of six days from Strawberry Plains to Lexington over these holes and knobs in the road was a very cheerless one, and very disagreeable.

I found a great many people at home along that route, both in Tennessee and Kentucky, and, almost universally, intensely loyal.  They would collect in little places where we would stop of evenings, to see me, generally hearing of my approach before we arrived.  The people naturally expected to see the commanding general the oldest person in the party.  I was then forty-one years of age, while my medical director was gray-haired and probably twelve or more years my senior.  The crowds would generally swarm around him, and thus give me an opportunity of quietly dismounting and getting into the house.  It also gave me an opportunity of hearing passing remarks from one spectator to another about their general.  Those remarks were apt to be more complimentary to the cause than to the appearance of the supposed general, owing to his being muffled up, and also owing to the travel-worn condition we were all in after a hard day’s ride.  I was back in Nashville by the 13th of January, 1864.

When I started on this trip it was necessary for me to have some person along who could turn dispatches into cipher, and who could also read the cipher dispatches which I was liable to receive daily and almost hourly.  Under the rules of the War Department at that time, Mr. Stanton had taken entire control of the matter of regulating the telegraph and determining how it should be used, and of saying who, and who alone, should have the ciphers.  The operators possessed of the ciphers, as well as the ciphers used, were practically independent of the commanders whom they were serving immediately under, and had to report to the War Department through General Stager all the dispatches which they received or forwarded.

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I was obliged to leave the telegraphic operator back at Nashville, because that was the point at which all dispatches to me would come, to be forwarded from there.  As I have said, it was necessary for me also to have an operator during this inspection who had possession of this cipher to enable me to telegraph to my division and to the War Department without my dispatches being read by all the operators along the line of wires over which they were transmitted.  Accordingly I ordered the cipher operator to turn over the key to Captain Cyrus B. Comstock, of the Corps of Engineers, whom I had selected as a wise and discreet man who certainly could be trusted with the cipher if the operator at my headquarters could.

The operator refused point blank to turn over the key to Captain Comstock as directed by me, stating that his orders from the War Department were not to give it to anybody—­the commanding general or any one else.  I told him I would see whether he would or not.  He said that if he did he would be punished.  I told him if he did not he most certainly would be punished.  Finally, seeing that punishment was certain if he refused longer to obey my order, and being somewhat remote (even if he was not protected altogether from the consequences of his disobedience to his orders) from the War Department, he yielded.  When I returned from Knoxville I found quite a commotion.  The operator had been reprimanded very severely and ordered to be relieved.  I informed the Secretary of War, or his assistant secretary in charge of the telegraph, Stager, that the man could not be relieved, for he had only obeyed my orders.  It was absolutely necessary for me to have the cipher, and the man would most certainly have been punished if he had not delivered it; that they would have to punish me if they punished anybody, or words to that effect.

This was about the only thing approaching a disagreeable difference between the Secretary of War and myself that occurred until the war was over, when we had another little spat.  Owing to his natural disposition to assume all power and control in all matters that he had anything whatever to do with, he boldly took command of the armies, and, while issuing no orders on the subject, prohibited any order from me going out of the adjutant-general’s office until he had approved it.  This was done by directing the adjutant-general to hold any orders that came from me to be issued from the adjutant-general’s office until he had examined them and given his approval.  He never disturbed himself, either, in examining my orders until it was entirely convenient for him; so that orders which I had prepared would often lie there three or four days before he would sanction them.  I remonstrated against this in writing, and the Secretary apologetically restored me to my rightful position of General-in-Chief of the Army.  But he soon lapsed again and took control much as before.

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After the relief of Knoxville Sherman had proposed to Burnside that he should go with him to drive Longstreet out of Tennessee; but Burnside assured him that with the troops which had been brought by Granger, and which were to be left, he would be amply prepared to dispose of Longstreet without availing himself of this offer.  As before stated Sherman’s command had left their camps north of the Tennessee, near Chattanooga, with two days’ rations in their haversacks, without coats or blankets, and without many wagons, expecting to return to their camps by the end of that time.  The weather was now cold and they were suffering, but still they were ready to make the further sacrifice, had it been required, for the good of the cause which had brought them into service.  Sherman, having accomplished the object for which he was sent, marched back leisurely to his old camp on the Tennessee River.

CHAPTER XLVI.

Operations in Mississippi—­Longstreet in east Tennessee—­commissioned lieutenant-general—­commanding the armies of the United states—­first interview with President Lincoln.

Soon after his return from Knoxville I ordered Sherman to distribute his forces from Stevenson to Decatur and thence north to Nashville; Sherman suggested that he be permitted to go back to Mississippi, to the limits of his own department and where most of his army still remained, for the purpose of clearing out what Confederates might still be left on the east bank of the Mississippi River to impede its navigation by our boats.  He expected also to have the co-operation of Banks to do the same thing on the west shore.  Of course I approved heartily.

About the 10th of January Sherman was back in Memphis, where Hurlbut commanded, and got together his Memphis men, or ordered them collected and sent to Vicksburg.  He then went to Vicksburg and out to where McPherson was in command, and had him organize his surplus troops so as to give him about 20,000 men in all.

Sherman knew that General (Bishop) Polk was occupying Meridian with his headquarters, and had two divisions of infantry with a considerable force of cavalry scattered west of him.  He determined, therefore, to move directly upon Meridian.

I had sent some 2,500 cavalry under General Sooy Smith to Sherman’s department, and they had mostly arrived before Sherman got to Memphis.  Hurlbut had 7,000 cavalry, and Sherman ordered him to reinforce Smith so as to give the latter a force of about 7,000 with which to go against Forrest, who was then known to be south-east from Memphis.  Smith was ordered to move about the 1st of February.

While Sherman was waiting at Vicksburg for the arrival of Hurlbut with his surplus men, he sent out scouts to ascertain the position and strength of the enemy and to bring back all the information they could gather.  When these scouts returned it was through them that he got the information of General Polk’s being at Meridian, and of the strength and disposition of his command.

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Forrest had about 4,000 cavalry with him, composed of thoroughly well-disciplined men, who under so able a leader were very effective.  Smith’s command was nearly double that of Forrest, but not equal, man to man, for the lack of a successful experience such as Forrest’s men had had.  The fact is, troops who have fought a few battles and won, and followed up their victories, improve upon what they were before to an extent that can hardly be counted by percentage.  The difference in result is often decisive victory instead of inglorious defeat.  This same difference, too, is often due to the way troops are officered, and for the particular kind of warfare which Forrest had carried on neither army could present a more effective officer than he was.

Sherman got off on the 3d of February and moved out on his expedition, meeting with no opposition whatever until he crossed the Big Black, and with no great deal of opposition after that until he reached Jackson, Mississippi.  This latter place he reached on the 6th or 7th, Brandon on the 8th, and Morton on the 9th.  Up to this time he moved in two columns to enable him to get a good supply of forage, etc., and expedite the march.  Here, however, there were indications of the concentration of Confederate infantry, and he was obliged to keep his army close together.  He had no serious engagement; but he met some of the enemy who destroyed a few of his wagons about Decatur, Mississippi, where, by the way, Sherman himself came near being picked up.

He entered Meridian on the 14th of the month, the enemy having retreated toward Demopolis, Alabama.  He spent several days in Meridian in thoroughly destroying the railroad to the north and south, and also for the purpose of hearing from Sooy Smith, who he supposed had met Forrest before this time and he hoped had gained a decisive victory because of a superiority of numbers.  Hearing nothing of him, however, he started on his return trip to Vicksburg.  There he learned that Smith, while waiting for a few of his men who had been ice-bound in the Ohio River, instead of getting off on the 1st as expected, had not left until the 11th.  Smith did meet Forrest, but the result was decidedly in Forrest’s favor.

Sherman had written a letter to Banks, proposing a co-operative movement with him against Shreveport, subject to my approval.  I disapproved of Sherman’s going himself, because I had other important work for him to do, but consented that he might send a few troops to the aid of Banks, though their time to remain absent must be limited.  We must have them for the spring campaign.  The trans-Mississippi movement proved abortive.

My eldest son, who had accompanied me on the Vicksburg campaign and siege, had while there contracted disease, which grew worse, until he had grown so dangerously ill that on the 24th of January I obtained permission to go to St. Louis, where he was staying at the time, to see him, hardly expecting to find him alive on my arrival.  While I was permitted to go, I was not permitted to turn over my command to any one else, but was directed to keep the headquarters with me and to communicate regularly with all parts of my division and with Washington, just as though I had remained at Nashville.

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When I obtained this leave I was at Chattanooga, having gone there again to make preparations to have the troops of Thomas in the southern part of Tennessee co-operate with Sherman’s movement in Mississippi.  I directed Thomas, and Logan who was at Scottsboro, Alabama, to keep up a threatening movement to the south against J. E. Johnston, who had again relieved Bragg, for the purpose of making him keep as many troops as possible there.

I learned through Confederate sources that Johnston had already sent two divisions in the direction of Mobile, presumably to operate against Sherman, and two more divisions to Longstreet in East Tennessee.  Seeing that Johnston had depleted in this way, I directed Thomas to send at least ten thousand men, besides Stanley’s division which was already to the east, into East Tennessee, and notified Schofield, who was now in command in East Tennessee, of this movement of troops into his department and also of the reinforcements Longstreet had received.  My object was to drive Longstreet out of East Tennessee as a part of the preparations for my spring campaign.

About this time General Foster, who had been in command of the Department of the Ohio after Burnside until Schofield relieved him (21), advised me that he thought it would be a good thing to keep Longstreet just where he was; that he was perfectly quiet in East Tennessee, and if he was forced to leave there, his whole well-equipped army would be free to go to any place where it could effect the most for their cause.  I thought the advice was good, and, adopting that view, countermanded the orders for pursuit of Longstreet.

On the 12th of February I ordered Thomas to take Dalton and hold it, if possible; and I directed him to move without delay.  Finding that he had not moved, on the 17th I urged him again to start, telling him how important it was, that the object of the movement was to co-operate with Sherman, who was moving eastward and might be in danger.  Then again on the 21st, he not yet having started, I asked him if he could not start the next day.  He finally got off on the 22d or 23d.  The enemy fell back from his front without a battle, but took a new position quite as strong and farther to the rear.  Thomas reported that he could not go any farther, because it was impossible with his poor teams, nearly starved, to keep up supplies until the railroads were repaired.  He soon fell back.

Schofield also had to return for the same reason.  He could not carry supplies with him, and Longstreet was between him and the supplies still left in the country.  Longstreet, in his retreat, would be moving towards his supplies, while our forces, following, would be receding from theirs.  On the 2d of March, however, I learned of Sherman’s success, which eased my mind very much.  The next day, the 3d, I was ordered to Washington.

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The bill restoring the grade of lieutenant-general of the army had passed through Congress and became a law on the 26th of February.  My nomination had been sent to the Senate on the 1st of March and confirmed the next day (the 2d).  I was ordered to Washington on the 3d to receive my commission, and started the day following that.  The commission was handed to me on the 9th.  It was delivered to me at the Executive Mansion by President Lincoln in the presence of his Cabinet, my eldest son, those of my staff who were with me and and a few other visitors.

The President in presenting my commission read from a paper—­stating, however, as a preliminary, and prior to the delivery of it, that he had drawn that up on paper, knowing my disinclination to speak in public, and handed me a copy in advance so that I might prepare a few lines of reply.  The President said: 

“General Grant, the nation’s appreciation of what you have done, and its reliance upon you for what remains to be done in the existing great struggle, are now presented, with this commission constituting you lieutenant-general in the Army of the United States.  With this high honor, devolves upon you, also, a corresponding responsibility.  As the country herein trusts you, so, under God, it will sustain you.  I scarcely need to add, that, with what I here speak for the nation, goes my own hearty personal concurrence.”

To this I replied:  “Mr. President, I accept the commission, with gratitude for the high honor conferred.  With the aid of the noble armies that have fought in so many fields for our common country, it will be my earnest endeavor not to disappoint your expectations.  I feel the full weight of the responsibilities now devolving on me; and I know that if they are met, it will be due to those armies, and above all, to the favor of that Providence which leads both nations and men.”

On the 10th I visited the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac at Brandy Station; then returned to Washington, and pushed west at once to make my arrangements for turning over the commands there and giving general directions for the preparations to be made for the spring campaign.

It had been my intention before this to remain in the West, even if I was made lieutenant-general; but when I got to Washington and saw the situation it was plain that here was the point for the commanding general to be.  No one else could, probably, resist the pressure that would be brought to bear upon him to desist from his own plans and pursue others.  I determined, therefore, before I started back to have Sherman advanced to my late position, McPherson to Sherman’s in command of the department, and Logan to the command of McPherson’s corps.  These changes were all made on my recommendation and without hesitation.  My commission as lieutenant-general was given to me on the 9th of March, 1864.  On the following day, as already stated, I visited General

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Meade, commanding the Army of the Potomac, at his headquarters at Brandy Station, north of the Rapidan.  I had known General Meade slightly in the Mexican war, but had not met him since until this visit.  I was a stranger to most of the Army of the Potomac, I might say to all except the officers of the regular army who had served in the Mexican war.  There had been some changes ordered in the organization of that army before my promotion.  One was the consolidation of five corps into three, thus throwing some officers of rank out of important commands.  Meade evidently thought that I might want to make still one more change not yet ordered.  He said to me that I might want an officer who had served with me in the West, mentioning Sherman specially, to take his place.  If so, he begged me not to hesitate about making the change.  He urged that the work before us was of such vast importance to the whole nation that the feeling or wishes of no one person should stand in the way of selecting the right men for all positions.  For himself, he would serve to the best of his ability wherever placed.  I assured him that I had no thought of substituting any one for him.  As to Sherman, he could not be spared from the West.

This incident gave me even a more favorable opinion of Meade than did his great victory at Gettysburg the July before.  It is men who wait to be selected, and not those who seek, from whom we may always expect the most efficient service.

Meade’s position afterwards proved embarrassing to me if not to him.  He was commanding an army and, for nearly a year previous to my taking command of all the armies, was in supreme command of the Army of the Potomac—­except from the authorities at Washington.  All other general officers occupying similar positions were independent in their commands so far as any one present with them was concerned.  I tried to make General Meade’s position as nearly as possible what it would have been if I had been in Washington or any other place away from his command.  I therefore gave all orders for the movements of the Army of the Potomac to Meade to have them executed.  To avoid the necessity of having to give orders direct, I established my headquarters near his, unless there were reasons for locating them elsewhere.  This sometimes happened, and I had on occasions to give orders direct to the troops affected.  On the 11th I returned to Washington and, on the day after, orders were published by the War Department placing me in command of all the armies.  I had left Washington the night before to return to my old command in the West and to meet Sherman whom I had telegraphed to join me in Nashville.

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Sherman assumed command of the military division of the Mississippi on the 18th of March, and we left Nashville together for Cincinnati.  I had Sherman accompany me that far on my way back to Washington so that we could talk over the matters about which I wanted to see him, without losing any more time from my new command than was necessary.  The first point which I wished to discuss was particularly about the co-operation of his command with mine when the spring campaign should commence.  There were also other and minor points, minor as compared with the great importance of the question to be decided by sanguinary war—­the restoration to duty of officers who had been relieved from important commands, namely McClellan, Burnside and Fremont in the East, and Buell, McCook, Negley and Crittenden in the West.

Some time in the winter of 1863-64 I had been invited by the general-in-chief to give my views of the campaign I thought advisable for the command under me—­now Sherman’s.  General J. E. Johnston was defending Atlanta and the interior of Georgia with an army, the largest part of which was stationed at Dalton, about 38 miles south of Chattanooga.  Dalton is at the junction of the railroad from Cleveland with the one from Chattanooga to Atlanta.

There could have been no difference of opinion as to the first duty of the armies of the military division of the Mississippi.  Johnston’s army was the first objective, and that important railroad centre, Atlanta, the second.  At the time I wrote General Halleck giving my views of the approaching campaign, and at the time I met General Sherman, it was expected that General Banks would be through with the campaign which he had been ordered upon before my appointment to the command of all the armies, and would be ready to co-operate with the armies east of the Mississippi, his part in the programme being to move upon Mobile by land while the navy would close the harbor and assist to the best of its ability. (22) The plan therefore was for Sherman to attack Johnston and destroy his army if possible, to capture Atlanta and hold it, and with his troops and those of Banks to hold a line through to Mobile, or at least to hold Atlanta and command the railroad running east and west, and the troops from one or other of the armies to hold important points on the southern road, the only east and west road that would be left in the possession of the enemy.  This would cut the Confederacy in two again, as our gaining possession of the Mississippi River had done before.  Banks was not ready in time for the part assigned to him, and circumstances that could not be foreseen determined the campaign which was afterwards made, the success and grandeur of which has resounded throughout all lands.

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In regard to restoring officers who had been relieved from important commands to duty again, I left Sherman to look after those who had been removed in the West while I looked out for the rest.  I directed, however, that he should make no assignment until I could speak to the Secretary of War about the matter.  I shortly after recommended to the Secretary the assignment of General Buell to duty.  I received the assurance that duty would be offered to him; and afterwards the Secretary told me that he had offered Buell an assignment and that the latter had declined it, saying that it would be degradation to accept the assignment offered.  I understood afterwards that he refused to serve under either Sherman or Canby because he had ranked them both.  Both graduated before him and ranked him in the old army.  Sherman ranked him as a brigadier-general.  All of them ranked me in the old army, and Sherman and Buell did as brigadiers.  The worst excuse a soldier can make for declining service is that he once ranked the commander he is ordered to report to.

On the 23d of March I was back in Washington, and on the 26th took up my headquarters at Culpeper Court-House, a few miles south of the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac.

Although hailing from Illinois myself, the State of the President, I never met Mr. Lincoln until called to the capital to receive my commission as lieutenant-general.  I knew him, however, very well and favorably from the accounts given by officers under me at the West who had known him all their lives.  I had also read the remarkable series of debates between Lincoln and Douglas a few years before, when they were rival candidates for the United States Senate.  I was then a resident of Missouri, and by no means a “Lincoln man” in that contest; but I recognized then his great ability.

In my first interview with Mr. Lincoln alone he stated to me that he had never professed to be a military man or to know how campaigns should be conducted, and never wanted to interfere in them:  but that procrastination on the part of commanders, and the pressure from the people at the North and Congress, which was always with him, forced him into issuing his series of “Military Orders”—­one, two, three, etc.  He did not know but they were all wrong, and did know that some of them were.  All he wanted or had ever wanted was some one who would take the responsibility and act, and call on him for all the assistance needed, pledging himself to use all the power of the government in rendering such assistance.  Assuring him that I would do the best I could with the means at hand, and avoid as far as possible annoying him or the War Department, our first interview ended.

The Secretary of War I had met once before only, but felt that I knew him better.

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While commanding in West Tennessee we had occasionally held conversations over the wires, at night, when they were not being otherwise used.  He and General Halleck both cautioned me against giving the President my plans of campaign, saying that he was so kind-hearted, so averse to refusing anything asked of him, that some friend would be sure to get from him all he knew.  I should have said that in our interview the President told me he did not want to know what I proposed to do.  But he submitted a plan of campaign of his own which he wanted me to hear and then do as I pleased about.  He brought out a map of Virginia on which he had evidently marked every position occupied by the Federal and Confederate armies up to that time.  He pointed out on the map two streams which empty into the Potomac, and suggested that the army might be moved on boats and landed between the mouths of these streams.  We would then have the Potomac to bring our supplies, and the tributaries would protect our flanks while we moved out.  I listened respectfully, but did not suggest that the same streams would protect Lee’s flanks while he was shutting us up.

I did not communicate my plans to the President, nor did I to the Secretary of War or to General Halleck.

March the 26th my headquarters were, as stated, at Culpeper, and the work of preparing for an early campaign commenced.

CHAPTER XLVII.

The military situation—­plans for the campaign—­Sheridan assigned to
command of the cavalry—­flank movements—­Forrest at Fort Pillow—­general
Banks’s expedition—­Colonel Mosby—­an incident of the Wilderness
campaign.

When I assumed command of all the armies the situation was about this:  the Mississippi River was guarded from St. Louis to its mouth; the line of the Arkansas was held, thus giving us all the North-west north of that river.  A few points in Louisiana not remote from the river were held by the Federal troops, as was also the mouth of the Rio Grande.  East of the Mississippi we held substantially all north of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad as far east as Chattanooga, thence along the line of the Tennessee and Holston rivers, taking in nearly all of the State of Tennessee.  West Virginia was in our hands; and that part of old Virginia north of the Rapidan and east of the Blue Ridge we also held.  On the sea-coast we had Fortress Monroe and Norfolk in Virginia; Plymouth, Washington and New Berne in North Carolina; Beaufort, Folly and Morris islands, Hilton Head, Port Royal and Fort Pulaski in South Carolina and Georgia; Fernandina, St. Augustine, Key West and Pensacola in Florida.  The balance of the Southern territory, an empire in extent, was still in the hands of the enemy.

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Sherman, who had succeeded me in the command of the military division of the Mississippi, commanded all the troops in the territory west of the Alleghanies and north of Natchez, with a large movable force about Chattanooga.  His command was subdivided into four departments, but the commanders all reported to Sherman and were subject to his orders.  This arrangement, however, insured the better protection of all lines of communication through the acquired territory, for the reason that these different department commanders could act promptly in case of a sudden or unexpected raid within their respective jurisdictions without awaiting the orders of the division commander.

In the East the opposing forces stood in substantially the same relations towards each other as three years before, or when the war began; they were both between the Federal and Confederate capitals.  It is true, footholds had been secured by us on the sea-coast, in Virginia and North Carolina, but, beyond that, no substantial advantage had been gained by either side.  Battles had been fought of as great severity as had ever been known in war, over ground from the James River and Chickahominy, near Richmond, to Gettysburg and Chambersburg, in Pennsylvania, with indecisive results, sometimes favorable to the National army, sometimes to the Confederate army; but in every instance, I believe, claimed as victories for the South by the Southern press if not by the Southern generals.  The Northern press, as a whole, did not discourage these claims; a portion of it always magnified rebel success and belittled ours, while another portion, most sincerely earnest in their desire for the preservation of the Union and the overwhelming success of the Federal armies, would nevertheless generally express dissatisfaction with whatever victories were gained because they were not more complete.

That portion of the Army of the Potomac not engaged in guarding lines of communication was on the northern bank of the Rapidan.  The Army of Northern Virginia confronting it on the opposite bank of the same river, was strongly intrenched and commanded by the acknowledged ablest general in the Confederate army.  The country back to the James River is cut up with many streams, generally narrow, deep, and difficult to cross except where bridged.  The region is heavily timbered, and the roads narrow, and very bad after the least rain.  Such an enemy was not, of course, unprepared with adequate fortifications at convenient intervals all the way back to Richmond, so that when driven from one fortified position they would always have another farther to the rear to fall back into.

To provision an army, campaigning against so formidable a foe through such a country, from wagons alone seemed almost impossible.  System and discipline were both essential to its accomplishment.

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The Union armies were now divided into nineteen departments, though four of them in the West had been concentrated into a single military division.  The Army of the Potomac was a separate command and had no territorial limits.  There were thus seventeen distinct commanders.  Before this time these various armies had acted separately and independently of each other, giving the enemy an opportunity often of depleting one command, not pressed, to reinforce another more actively engaged.  I determined to stop this.  To this end I regarded the Army of the Potomac as the centre, and all west to Memphis along the line described as our position at the time, and north of it, the right wing; the Army of the James, under General Butler, as the left wing, and all the troops south, as a force in rear of the enemy.  Some of these latter were occupying positions from which they could not render service proportionate to their numerical strength.  All such were depleted to the minimum necessary to hold their positions as a guard against blockade runners; where they could not do this their positions were abandoned altogether.  In this way ten thousand men were added to the Army of the James from South Carolina alone, with General Gillmore in command.  It was not contemplated that General Gillmore should leave his department; but as most of his troops were taken, presumably for active service, he asked to accompany them and was permitted to do so.  Officers and soldiers on furlough, of whom there were many thousands, were ordered to their proper commands; concentration was the order of the day, and to have it accomplished in time to advance at the earliest moment the roads would permit was the problem.

As a reinforcement to the Army of the Potomac, or to act in support of it, the 9th army corps, over twenty thousand strong, under General Burnside, had been rendezvoused at Annapolis, Maryland.  This was an admirable position for such a reinforcement.  The corps could be brought at the last moment as a reinforcement to the Army of the Potomac, or it could be thrown on the sea-coast, south of Norfolk, in Virginia or North Carolina, to operate against Richmond from that direction.  In fact Burnside and the War Department both thought the 9th corps was intended for such an expedition up to the last moment.

My general plan now was to concentrate all the force possible against the Confederate armies in the field.  There were but two such, as we have seen, east of the Mississippi River and facing north.  The Army of Northern Virginia, General Robert E. Lee commanding, was on the south bank of the Rapidan, confronting the Army of the Potomac; the second, under General Joseph E. Johnston, was at Dalton, Georgia, opposed to Sherman who was still at Chattanooga.  Beside these main armies the Confederates had to guard the Shenandoah Valley, a great storehouse to feed their armies from, and their line of communications from Richmond to Tennessee.  Forrest, a brave and

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intrepid cavalry general, was in the West with a large force; making a larger command necessary to hold what we had gained in Middle and West Tennessee.  We could not abandon any territory north of the line held by the enemy because it would lay the Northern States open to invasion.  But as the Army of the Potomac was the principal garrison for the protection of Washington even while it was moving on Lee, so all the forces to the west, and the Army of the James, guarded their special trusts when advancing from them as well as when remaining at them.  Better indeed, for they forced the enemy to guard his own lines and resources at a greater distance from ours, and with a greater force.  Little expeditions could not so well be sent out to destroy a bridge or tear up a few miles of railroad track, burn a storehouse, or inflict other little annoyances.  Accordingly I arranged for a simultaneous movement all along the line.  Sherman was to move from Chattanooga, Johnston’s army and Atlanta being his objective points. (23) Crook, commanding in West Virginia, was to move from the mouth of the Gauley River with a cavalry force and some artillery, the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad to be his objective.  Either the enemy would have to keep a large force to protect their communications, or see them destroyed and a large amount of forage and provision, which they so much needed, fall into our hands.  Sigel was in command in the Valley of Virginia.  He was to advance up the valley, covering the North from an invasion through that channel as well while advancing as by remaining near Harper’s Ferry.  Every mile he advanced also gave us possession of stores on which Lee relied.  Butler was to advance by the James River, having Richmond and Petersburg as his objective.

Before the advance commenced I visited Butler at Fort Monroe.  This was the first time I had ever met him.  Before giving him any order as to the part he was to play in the approaching campaign I invited his views.  They were very much such as I intended to direct, and as I did direct (24), in writing, before leaving.

General W. F. Smith, who had been promoted to the rank of major-general shortly after the battle of Chattanooga on my recommendation, had not yet been confirmed.  I found a decided prejudice against his confirmation by a majority of the Senate, but I insisted that his services had been such that he should be rewarded.  My wishes were now reluctantly complied with, and I assigned him to the command of one of the corps under General Butler.  I was not long in finding out that the objections to Smith’s promotion were well founded.

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In one of my early interviews with the President I expressed my dissatisfaction with the little that had been accomplished by the cavalry so far in the war, and the belief that it was capable of accomplishing much more than it had done if under a thorough leader.  I said I wanted the very best man in the army for that command.  Halleck was present and spoke up, saying:  “How would Sheridan do?” I replied:  “The very man I want.”  The President said I could have anybody I wanted.  Sheridan was telegraphed for that day, and on his arrival was assigned to the command of the cavalry corps with the Army of the Potomac.  This relieved General Alfred Pleasonton.  It was not a reflection on that officer, however, for I did not know but that he had been as efficient as any other cavalry commander.

Banks in the Department of the Gulf was ordered to assemble all the troops he had at New Orleans in time to join in the general move, Mobile to be his objective.

At this time I was not entirely decided as to whether I should move the Army of the Potomac by the right flank of the enemy, or by his left.  Each plan presented advantages. (25) If by his right—­my left—­the Potomac, Chesapeake Bay and tributaries would furnish us an easy hauling distance of every position the army could occupy from the Rapidan to the James River.  But Lee could, if he chose, detach or move his whole army north on a line rather interior to the one I would have to take in following.  A movement by his left—­our right—­would obviate this; but all that was done would have to be done with the supplies and ammunition we started with.  All idea of adopting this latter plan was abandoned when the limited quantity of supplies possible to take with us was considered.  The country over which we would have to pass was so exhausted of all food or forage that we would be obliged to carry everything with us.

While these preparations were going on the enemy was not entirely idle.  In the West Forrest made a raid in West Tennessee up to the northern border, capturing the garrison of four or five hundred men at Union City, and followed it up by an attack on Paducah, Kentucky, on the banks of the Ohio.  While he was able to enter the city he failed to capture the forts or any part of the garrison.  On the first intelligence of Forrest’s raid I telegraphed Sherman to send all his cavalry against him, and not to let him get out of the trap he had put himself into.  Sherman had anticipated me by sending troops against him before he got my order.

Forrest, however, fell back rapidly, and attacked the troops at Fort Pillow, a station for the protection of the navigation of the Mississippi River.  The garrison consisted of a regiment of colored troops, infantry, and a detachment of Tennessee cavalry.  These troops fought bravely, but were overpowered.  I will leave Forrest in his dispatches to tell what he did with them.

“The river was dyed,” he says, “with the blood of the slaughtered for two hundred yards.  The approximate loss was upward of five hundred killed, but few of the officers escaping.  My loss was about twenty killed.  It is hoped that these facts will demonstrate to the Northern people that negro soldiers cannot cope with Southerners.”  Subsequently Forrest made a report in which he left out the part which shocks humanity to read.

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At the East, also, the rebels were busy.  I had said to Halleck that Plymouth and Washington, North Carolina, were unnecessary to hold.  It would be better to have the garrisons engaged there added to Butler’s command.  If success attended our arms both places, and others too, would fall into our hands naturally.  These places had been occupied by Federal troops before I took command of the armies, and I knew that the Executive would be reluctant to abandon them, and therefore explained my views; but before my views were carried out the rebels captured the garrison at Plymouth.  I then ordered the abandonment of Washington, but directed the holding of New Berne at all hazards.  This was essential because New Berne was a port into which blockade runners could enter.

General Banks had gone on an expedition up the Red River long before my promotion to general command.  I had opposed the movement strenuously, but acquiesced because it was the order of my superior at the time.  By direction of Halleck I had reinforced Banks with a corps of about ten thousand men from Sherman’s command.  This reinforcement was wanted back badly before the forward movement commenced.  But Banks had got so far that it seemed best that he should take Shreveport on the Red River, and turn over the line of that river to Steele, who commanded in Arkansas, to hold instead of the line of the Arkansas.  Orders were given accordingly, and with the expectation that the campaign would be ended in time for Banks to return A. J. Smith’s command to where it belonged and get back to New Orleans himself in time to execute his part in the general plan.  But the expedition was a failure.  Banks did not get back in time to take part in the programme as laid down.  Nor was Smith returned until long after the movements of May, 1864, had been begun.  The services of forty thousand veteran troops, over and above the number required to hold all that was necessary in the Department of the Gulf, were thus paralyzed.  It is but just to Banks, however, to say that his expedition was ordered from Washington and he was in no way responsible except for the conduct of it.  I make no criticism on this point.  He opposed the expedition.

By the 27th of April spring had so far advanced as to justify me in fixing a day for the great move.  On that day Burnside left Annapolis to occupy Meade’s position between Bull Run and the Rappahannock.  Meade was notified and directed to bring his troops forward to his advance.  On the following day Butler was notified of my intended advance on the 4th of May, and he was directed to move the night of the same day and get as far up the James River as possible by daylight, and push on from there to accomplish the task given him.  He was also notified that reinforcements were being collected in Washington City, which would be forwarded to him should the enemy fall back into the trenches at Richmond.  The same day Sherman was directed to get his forces up ready to advance on the 5th.  Sigel was in Winchester and was notified to move in conjunction with the others.

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The criticism has been made by writers on the campaign from the Rapidan to the James River that all the loss of life could have been obviated by moving the army there on transports.  Richmond was fortified and intrenched so perfectly that one man inside to defend was more than equal to five outside besieging or assaulting.  To get possession of Lee’s army was the first great object.  With the capture of his army Richmond would necessarily follow.  It was better to fight him outside of his stronghold than in it.  If the Army of the Potomac had been moved bodily to the James River by water Lee could have moved a part of his forces back to Richmond, called Beauregard from the south to reinforce it, and with the balance moved on to Washington.  Then, too, I ordered a move, simultaneous with that of the Army of the Potomac, up the James River by a formidable army already collected at the mouth of the river.

While my headquarters were at Culpeper, from the 26th of March to the 4th of May, I generally visited Washington once a week to confer with the Secretary of War and President.  On the last occasion, a few days before moving, a circumstance occurred which came near postponing my part in the campaign altogether.  Colonel John S. Mosby had for a long time been commanding a partisan corps, or regiment, which operated in the rear of the Army of the Potomac.  On my return to the field on this occasion, as the train approached Warrenton Junction, a heavy cloud of dust was seen to the east of the road as if made by a body of cavalry on a charge.  Arriving at the junction the train was stopped and inquiries made as to the cause of the dust.  There was but one man at the station, and he informed us that Mosby had crossed a few minutes before at full speed in pursuit of Federal cavalry.  Had he seen our train coming, no doubt he would have let his prisoners escape to capture the train.  I was on a special train, if I remember correctly, without any guard.

Since the close of the war I have come to know Colonel Mosby personally, and somewhat intimately.  He is a different man entirely from what I had supposed.  He is slender, not tall, wiry, and looks as if he could endure any amount of physical exercise.  He is able, and thoroughly honest and truthful.  There were probably but few men in the South who could have commanded successfully a separate detachment in the rear of an opposing army, and so near the border of hostilities, as long as he did without losing his entire command.

On this same visit to Washington I had my last interview with the President before reaching the James River.  He had of course become acquainted with the fact that a general movement had been ordered all along the line, and seemed to think it a new feature in war.  I explained to him that it was necessary to have a great number of troops to guard and hold the territory we had captured, and to prevent incursions into the Northern States.  These troops could perform this service just as well by advancing as by remaining still; and by advancing they would compel the enemy to keep detachments to hold them back, or else lay his own territory open to invasion.  His answer was:  “Oh, yes!  I see that.  As we say out West, if a man can’t skin he must hold a leg while somebody else does.”

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There was a certain incident connected with the Wilderness campaign of which it may not be out of place to speak; and to avoid a digression further on I will mention it here.

A few days before my departure from Culpeper the Honorable E. B. Washburne visited me there, and remained with my headquarters for some distance south, through the battle in the Wilderness and, I think, to Spottsylvania.  He was accompanied by a Mr. Swinton, whom he presented as a literary gentleman who wished to accompany the army with a view of writing a history of the war when it was over.  He assured me—­and I have no doubt Swinton gave him the assurance—­that he was not present as a correspondent of the press.  I expressed an entire willingness to have him (Swinton) accompany the army, and would have allowed him to do so as a correspondent, restricted, however, in the character of the information he could give.  We received Richmond papers with about as much regularity as if there had been no war, and knew that our papers were received with equal regularity by the Confederates.  It was desirable, therefore, that correspondents should not be privileged spies of the enemy within our lines.

Probably Mr. Swinton expected to be an invited guest at my headquarters, and was disappointed that he was not asked to become so.  At all events he was not invited, and soon I found that he was corresponding with some paper (I have now forgotten which one), thus violating his word either expressed or implied.  He knew of the assurance Washburne had given as to the character of his mission.  I never saw the man from the day of our introduction to the present that I recollect.  He accompanied us, however, for a time at least.

The second night after crossing the Rapidan (the night of the 5th of May) Colonel W. R. Rowley, of my staff, was acting as night officer at my headquarters.  A short time before midnight I gave him verbal instructions for the night.  Three days later I read in a Richmond paper a verbatim report of these instructions.

A few nights still later (after the first, and possibly after the second, day’s fighting in the Wilderness) General Meade came to my tent for consultation, bringing with him some of his staff officers.  Both his staff and mine retired to the camp-fire some yards in front of the tent, thinking our conversation should be private.  There was a stump a little to one side, and between the front of the tent and camp-fire.  One of my staff, Colonel T. S. Bowers, saw what he took to be a man seated on the ground and leaning against the stump, listening to the conversation between Meade and myself.  He called the attention of Colonel Rowley to it.  The latter immediately took the man by the shoulder and asked him, in language more forcible than polite, what he was doing there.  The man proved to be Swinton, the “historian,” and his replies to the question were evasive and unsatisfactory, and he was warned against further eaves-dropping.

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The next I heard of Mr. Swinton was at Cold Harbor.  General Meade came to my headquarters saying that General Burnside had arrested Swinton, who at some previous time had given great offence, and had ordered him to be shot that afternoon.  I promptly ordered the prisoner to be released, but that he must be expelled from the lines of the army not to return again on pain of punishment.

CHAPTER XLVIII.

Commencement of the grand campaign—­general butler’s position —­Sheridan’s first raid.

The armies were now all ready to move for the accomplishment of a single object.  They were acting as a unit so far as such a thing was possible over such a vast field.  Lee, with the capital of the Confederacy, was the main end to which all were working.  Johnston, with Atlanta, was an important obstacle in the way of our accomplishing the result aimed at, and was therefore almost an independent objective.  It was of less importance only because the capture of Johnston and his army would not produce so immediate and decisive a result in closing the rebellion as would the possession of Richmond, Lee and his army.  All other troops were employed exclusively in support of these two movements.  This was the plan; and I will now endeavor to give, as concisely as I can, the method of its execution, outlining first the operations of minor detached but co-operative columns.

As stated before, Banks failed to accomplish what he had been sent to do on the Red River, and eliminated the use of forty thousand veterans whose cooperation in the grand campaign had been expected—­ten thousand with Sherman and thirty thousand against Mobile.

Sigel’s record is almost equally brief.  He moved out, it is true, according to programme; but just when I was hoping to hear of good work being done in the valley I received instead the following announcement from Halleck:  “Sigel is in full retreat on Strasburg.  He will do nothing but run; never did anything else.”  The enemy had intercepted him about New Market and handled him roughly, leaving him short six guns, and some nine hundred men out of his six thousand.

The plan had been for an advance of Sigel’s forces in two columns.  Though the one under his immediate command failed ingloriously the other proved more fortunate.  Under Crook and Averell his western column advanced from the Gauley in West Virginia at the appointed time, and with more happy results.  They reached the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad at Dublin and destroyed a depot of supplies, besides tearing up several miles of road and burning the bridge over New River.  Having accomplished this they recrossed the Alleghanies to Meadow Bluffs and there awaited further orders.

Butler embarked at Fort Monroe with all his command, except the cavalry and some artillery which moved up the south bank of the James River.  His steamers moved first up Chesapeake Bay and York River as if threatening the rear of Lee’s army.  At midnight they turned back, and Butler by daylight was far up the James River.  He seized City Point and Bermuda Hundred early in the day, without loss and, no doubt, very much to the surprise of the enemy.

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This was the accomplishment of the first step contemplated in my instructions to Butler.  He was to act from here, looking to Richmond as his objective point.  I had given him to understand that I should aim to fight Lee between the Rapidan and Richmond if he would stand; but should Lee fall back into Richmond I would follow up and make a junction of the armies of the Potomac and the James on the James River.  He was directed to secure a footing as far up the south side of the river as he could at as early a date as possible.

Butler was in position by the 6th of May and had begun intrenching, and on the 7th he sent out his cavalry from Suffolk to cut the Weldon Railroad.  He also sent out detachments to destroy the railroad between Petersburg and Richmond, but no great success attended these latter efforts.  He made no great effort to establish himself on that road and neglected to attack Petersburg, which was almost defenceless.  About the 11th he advanced slowly until he reached the works at Drury’s Bluff, about half way between Bermuda Hundred and Richmond.  In the mean time Beauregard had been gathering reinforcements.  On the 16th he attacked Butler with great vigor, and with such success as to limit very materially the further usefulness of the Army of the James as a distinct factor in the campaign.  I afterward ordered a portion of it to join the Army of the Potomac, leaving a sufficient force with Butler to man his works, hold securely the footing he had already gained and maintain a threatening front toward the rear of the Confederate capital.

The position which General Butler had chosen between the two rivers, the James and Appomattox, was one of great natural strength, one where a large area of ground might be thoroughly inclosed by means of a single intrenched line, and that a very short one in comparison with the extent of territory which it thoroughly protected.  His right was protected by the James River, his left by the Appomattox, and his rear by their junction—­the two streams uniting near by.  The bends of the two streams shortened the line that had been chosen for intrenchments, while it increased the area which the line inclosed.

Previous to ordering any troops from Butler I sent my chief engineer, General Barnard, from the Army of the Potomac to that of the James to inspect Butler’s position and ascertain whether I could again safely make an order for General Butler’s movement in co-operation with mine, now that I was getting so near Richmond; or, if I could not, whether his position was strong enough to justify me in withdrawing some of his troops and having them brought round by water to White House to join me and reinforce the Army of the Potomac.  General Barnard reported the position very strong for defensive purposes, and that I could do the latter with great security; but that General Butler could not move from where he was, in co-operation, to produce any effect.  He said that the general

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occupied a place between the James and Appomattox rivers which was of great strength, and where with an inferior force he could hold it for an indefinite length of time against a superior; but that he could do nothing offensively.  I then asked him why Butler could not move out from his lines and push across the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad to the rear and on the south side of Richmond.  He replied that it was impracticable, because the enemy had substantially the same line across the neck of land that General Butler had.  He then took out his pencil and drew a sketch of the locality, remarking that the position was like a bottle and that Butler’s line of intrenchments across the neck represented the cork; that the enemy had built an equally strong line immediately in front of him across the neck; and it was therefore as if Butler was in a bottle.  He was perfectly safe against an attack; but, as Barnard expressed it, the enemy had corked the bottle and with a small force could hold the cork in its place.  This struck me as being very expressive of his position, particularly when I saw the hasty sketch which General Barnard had drawn; and in making my subsequent report I used that expression without adding quotation marks, never thinking that anything had been said that would attract attention—­as this did, very much to the annoyance, no doubt, of General Butler and, I know, very much to my own.  I found afterwards that this was mentioned in the notes of General Badeau’s book, which, when they were shown to me, I asked to have stricken out; yet it was retained there, though against my wishes.

I make this statement here because, although I have often made it before, it has never been in my power until now to place it where it will correct history; and I desire to rectify all injustice that I may have done to individuals, particularly to officers who were gallantly serving their country during the trying period of the war for the preservation of the Union.  General Butler certainly gave his very earnest support to the war; and he gave his own best efforts personally to the suppression of the rebellion.

The further operations of the Army of the James can best be treated of in connection with those of the Army of the Potomac, the two being so intimately associated and connected as to be substantially one body in which the individuality of the supporting wing is merged.

Before giving the reader a summary of Sherman’s great Atlanta campaign, which must conclude my description of the various co-operative movements preparatory to proceeding with that of the operations of the centre, I will briefly mention Sheridan’s first raid upon Lee’s communications which, though an incident of the operations on the main line and not specifically marked out in the original plan, attained in its brilliant execution and results all the proportions of an independent campaign.  By thus anticipating, in point of time, I will be able to more perfectly observe the continuity of events occurring in my immediate front when I shall have undertaken to describe our advance from the Rapidan.

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On the 8th of May, just after the battle of the Wilderness and when we were moving on Spottsylvania I directed Sheridan verbally to cut loose from the Army of the Potomac, pass around the left of Lee’s army and attack his cavalry:  to cut the two roads—­one running west through Gordonsville, Charlottesville and Lynchburg, the other to Richmond, and, when compelled to do so for want of forage and rations, to move on to the James River and draw these from Butler’s supplies.  This move took him past the entire rear of Lee’s army.  These orders were also given in writing through Meade.

The object of this move was three-fold.  First, if successfully executed, and it was, he would annoy the enemy by cutting his line of supplies and telegraphic communications, and destroy or get for his own use supplies in store in the rear and coming up.  Second, he would draw the enemy’s cavalry after him, and thus better protect our flanks, rear and trains than by remaining with the army.  Third, his absence would save the trains drawing his forage and other supplies from Fredericksburg, which had now become our base.  He started at daylight the next morning, and accomplished more than was expected.  It was sixteen days before he got back to the Army of the Potomac.

The course Sheridan took was directly to Richmond.  Before night Stuart, commanding the Confederate cavalry, came on to the rear of his command.  But the advance kept on, crossed the North Anna, and at Beaver Dam, a station on the Virginia Central Railroad, recaptured four hundred Union prisoners on their way to Richmond, destroyed the road and used and destroyed a large amount of subsistence and medical stores.

Stuart, seeing that our cavalry was pushing towards Richmond, abandoned the pursuit on the morning of the 10th and, by a detour and an exhausting march, interposed between Sheridan and Richmond at Yellow Tavern, only about six miles north of the city.  Sheridan destroyed the railroad and more supplies at Ashland, and on the 11th arrived in Stuart’s front.  A severe engagement ensued in which the losses were heavy on both sides, but the rebels were beaten, their leader mortally wounded, and some guns and many prisoners were captured.

Sheridan passed through the outer defences of Richmond, and could, no doubt, have passed through the inner ones.  But having no supports near he could not have remained.  After caring for his wounded he struck for the James River below the city, to communicate with Butler and to rest his men and horses as well as to get food and forage for them.

He moved first between the Chickahominy and the James, but in the morning (the 12th) he was stopped by batteries at Mechanicsville.  He then turned to cross to the north side of the Chickahominy by Meadow Bridge.  He found this barred, and the defeated Confederate cavalry, reorganized, occupying the opposite side.  The panic created by his first entrance within the outer works of Richmond having subsided troops were sent out to attack his rear.

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He was now in a perilous position, one from which but few generals could have extricated themselves.  The defences of Richmond, manned, were to the right, the Chickahominy was to the left with no bridge remaining and the opposite bank guarded, to the rear was a force from Richmond.  This force was attacked and beaten by Wilson’s and Gregg’s divisions, while Sheridan turned to the left with the remaining division and hastily built a bridge over the Chickahominy under the fire of the enemy, forced a crossing and soon dispersed the Confederates he found there.  The enemy was held back from the stream by the fire of the troops not engaged in bridge building.

On the 13th Sheridan was at Bottom’s Bridge, over the Chickahominy.  On the 14th he crossed this stream and on that day went into camp on the James River at Haxall’s Landing.  He at once put himself into communication with General Butler, who directed all the supplies he wanted to be furnished.

Sheridan had left the Army of the Potomac at Spottsylvania, but did not know where either this or Lee’s army was now.  Great caution therefore had to be exercised in getting back.  On the 17th, after resting his command for three days, he started on his return.  He moved by the way of White House.  The bridge over the Pamunkey had been burned by the enemy, but a new one was speedily improvised and the cavalry crossed over it.  On the 22d he was at Aylett’s on the Matapony, where he learned the position of the two armies.  On the 24th he joined us on the march from North Anna to Cold Harbor, in the vicinity of Chesterfield.

Sheridan in this memorable raid passed entirely around Lee’s army:  encountered his cavalry in four engagements, and defeated them in all; recaptured four hundred Union prisoners and killed and captured many of the enemy; destroyed and used many supplies and munitions of war; destroyed miles of railroad and telegraph, and freed us from annoyance by the cavalry of the enemy for more than two weeks.

CHAPTER XLIX.

Sherman’s campaign in Georgia—­siege of Atlanta—­death of general MCPHERSON—­attempt to capture Andersonville—­capture of Atlanta.

After separating from Sherman in Cincinnati I went on to Washington, as already stated, while he returned to Nashville to assume the duties of his new command.  His military division was now composed of four departments and embraced all the territory west of the Alleghany Mountains and east of the Mississippi River, together with the State of Arkansas in the trans-Mississippi.  The most easterly of these was the Department of the Ohio, General Schofield commanding; the next was the Department of the Cumberland, General Thomas commanding; the third the Department of the Tennessee, General McPherson commanding; and General Steele still commanded the trans-Mississippi, or Department of Arkansas.  The last-named department was so far away that Sherman could not communicate with it very readily after starting on his spring campaign, and it was therefore soon transferred from his military division to that of the Gulf, where General Canby, who had relieved General Banks, was in command.

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The movements of the armies, as I have stated in a former chapter, were to be simultaneous, I fixing the day to start when the season should be far enough advanced, it was hoped, for the roads to be in a condition for the troops to march.

General Sherman at once set himself to work preparing for the task which was assigned him to accomplish in the spring campaign.  McPherson lay at Huntsville with about twenty-four thousand men, guarding those points of Tennessee which were regarded as most worth holding; Thomas, with over sixty thousand men of the Army of the Cumberland, was at Chattanooga; and Schofield, with about fourteen thousand men, was at Knoxville.  With these three armies, numbering about one hundred thousand men in all, Sherman was to move on the day fixed for the general advance, with a view of destroying Johnston’s army and capturing Atlanta.  He visited each of these commands to inform himself as to their condition, and it was found to be, speaking generally, good.

One of the first matters to turn his attention to was that of getting, before the time arrived for starting, an accumulation of supplies forward to Chattanooga, sufficiently large to warrant a movement.  He found, when he got to that place, that the trains over the single-track railroad, which was frequently interrupted for a day or two at a time, were only sufficient to meet the daily wants of the troops without bringing forward any surplus of any kind.  He found, however, that trains were being used to transport all the beef cattle, horses for the cavalry, and even teams that were being brought to the front.  He at once changed all this, and required beef cattle, teams, cavalry horses, and everything that could travel, even the troops, to be marched, and used the road exclusively for transporting supplies.  In this way he was able to accumulate an abundance before the time finally fixed upon for the move, the 4th of May.

As I have said already, Johnston was at Dalton, which was nearly one-fourth of the way between Chattanooga and Atlanta.  The country is mountainous all the way to Atlanta, abounding in mountain streams, some of them of considerable volume.  Dalton is on ground where water drains towards Atlanta and into one of the main streams rising north-east from there and flowing south-west—­this being the general direction which all the main streams of that section take, with smaller tributaries entering into them.  Johnston had been preparing himself for this campaign during the entire winter.  The best positions for defence had been selected all the way from Dalton back to Atlanta, and very strongly intrenched; so that, as he might be forced to fall back from one position, he would have another to fall into in his rear.  His position at Dalton was so very strongly intrenched that no doubt he expected, or at least hoped, to hold Sherman there and prevent him from getting any further.  With a less skilful general, and one disposed to take no risks, I have no doubt that he would have succeeded.

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Sherman’s plan was to start Schofield, who was farthest back, a few days in advance from Knoxville, having him move on the direct road to Dalton.  Thomas was to move out to Ringgold.  It had been Sherman’s intention to cross McPherson over the Tennessee River at Huntsville or Decatur, and move him south from there so as to have him come into the road running from Chattanooga to Atlanta a good distance to the rear of the point Johnston was occupying; but when that was contemplated it was hoped that McPherson alone would have troops enough to cope with Johnston, if the latter should move against him while unsupported by the balance of the army.  In this he was disappointed.  Two of McPherson’s veteran divisions had re-enlisted on the express provision that they were to have a furlough.  This furlough had not yet expired, and they were not back.

Then, again, Sherman had lent Banks two divisions under A. J. Smith, the winter before, to co-operate with the trans-Mississippi forces, and this with the express pledge that they should be back by a time specified, so as to be prepared for this very campaign.  It is hardly necessary to say they were not returned.  That department continued to absorb troops to no purpose to the end of the war.  This left McPherson so weak that the part of the plan above indicated had to be changed.  He was therefore brought up to Chattanooga and moved from there on a road to the right of Thomas—­the two coming together about Dalton.  The three armies were abreast, all ready to start promptly on time.

Sherman soon found that Dalton was so strongly fortified that it was useless to make any attempt to carry it by assault; and even to carry it by regular approaches was impracticable.  There was a narrowing up in the mountain, between the National and Confederate armies, through which a stream, a wagon road and a railroad ran.  Besides, the stream had been dammed so that the valley was a lake.  Through this gorge the troops would have to pass.  McPherson was therefore sent around by the right, to come out by the way of Snake Creek Gap into the rear of the enemy.  This was a surprise to Johnston, and about the 13th he decided to abandon his position at Dalton.

On the 15th there was very hard fighting about Resaca; but our cavalry having been sent around to the right got near the road in the enemy’s rear.  Again Johnston fell back, our army pursuing.  The pursuit was continued to Kingston, which was reached on the 19th with very little fighting, except that Newton’s division overtook the rear of Johnston’s army and engaged it.  Sherman was now obliged to halt for the purpose of bringing up his railroad trains.  He was depending upon the railroad for all of his supplies, and as of course the railroad was wholly destroyed as Johnston fell back, it had to be rebuilt.  This work was pushed forward night and day, and caused much less delay than most persons would naturally expect in a mountainous country where there were so many bridges to be rebuilt.

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The campaign to Atlanta was managed with the most consummate skill, the enemy being flanked out of one position after another all the way there.  It is true this was not accomplished without a good deal of fighting —­some of it very hard fighting, rising to the dignity of very important battles—­neither were single positions gained in a day.  On the contrary, weeks were spent at some; and about Atlanta more than a month was consumed.

It was the 23d of May before the road was finished up to the rear of Sherman’s army and the pursuit renewed.  This pursuit brought him up to the vicinity of Allatoona.  This place was very strongly intrenched, and naturally a very defensible position.  An assault upon it was not thought of, but preparations were made to flank the enemy out of it.  This was done by sending a large force around our right, by the way of Dallas, to reach the rear of the enemy.  Before reaching there, however, they found the enemy fortified in their way, and there resulted hard fighting for about a week at a place called New Hope Church.  On the left our troops also were fortified, and as close up to the enemy as they could get.  They kept working still farther around to the left toward the railroad.  This was the case more particularly with the cavalry.  By the 4th of June Johnston found that he was being hemmed in so rapidly that he drew off and Allatoona was left in our possession.

Allatoona, being an important place, was strongly intrenched for occupation by our troops before advancing farther, and made a secondary base of supplies.  The railroad was finished up to that point, the intrenchments completed, storehouses provided for food, and the army got in readiness for a further advance.  The rains, however, were falling in such torrents that it was impossible to move the army by the side roads which they would have to move upon in order to turn Johnston out of his new position.

While Sherman’s army lay here, General F. P. Blair returned to it, bringing with him the two divisions of veterans who had been on furlough.

Johnston had fallen back to Marietta and Kenesaw Mountain, where strong intrenchments awaited him.  At this latter place our troops made an assault upon the enemy’s lines after having got their own lines up close to him, and failed, sustaining considerable loss.  But during the progress of the battle Schofield was gaining ground to the left; and the cavalry on his left were gaining still more toward the enemy’s rear.  These operations were completed by the 3d of July, when it was found that Johnston had evacuated the place.  He was pursued at once.  Sherman had made every preparation to abandon the railroad, leaving a strong guard in his intrenchments.  He had intended, moving out with twenty days’ rations and plenty of ammunition, to come in on the railroad again at the Chattahoochee River.  Johnston frustrated this plan by himself starting back as above stated.  This time he fell back to the Chattahoochee.

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About the 5th of July he was besieged again, Sherman getting easy possession of the Chattahoochee River both above and below him.  The enemy was again flanked out of his position, or so frightened by flanking movements that on the night of the 9th he fell back across the river.

Here Johnston made a stand until the 17th, when Sherman’s old tactics prevailed again and the final movement toward Atlanta began.  Johnston was now relieved of the command, and Hood superseded him.

Johnston’s tactics in this campaign do not seem to have met with much favor, either in the eyes of the administration at Richmond, or of the people of that section of the South in which he was commanding.  The very fact of a change of commanders being ordered under such circumstances was an indication of a change of policy, and that now they would become the aggressors—­the very thing our troops wanted.

For my own part, I think that Johnston’s tactics were right.  Anything that could have prolonged the war a year beyond the time that it did finally close, would probably have exhausted the North to such an extent that they might then have abandoned the contest and agreed to a separation.

Atlanta was very strongly intrenched all the way around in a circle about a mile and a half outside of the city.  In addition to this, there were advanced intrenchments which had to be taken before a close siege could be commenced.

Sure enough, as indicated by the change of commanders, the enemy was about to assume the offensive.  On the 20th he came out and attacked the Army of the Cumberland most furiously.  Hooker’s corps, and Newton’s and Johnson’s divisions were the principal ones engaged in this contest, which lasted more than an hour; but the Confederates were then forced to fall back inside their main lines.  The losses were quite heavy on both sides.  On this day General Gresham, since our Postmaster-General, was very badly wounded.  During the night Hood abandoned his outer lines, and our troops were advanced.  The investment had not been relinquished for a moment during the day.

During the night of the 21st Hood moved out again, passing by our left flank, which was then in motion to get a position farther in rear of him, and a desperate battle ensued, which lasted most of the day of the 22d.  At first the battle went very much in favor of the Confederates, our troops being somewhat surprised.  While our troops were advancing they were struck in flank, and their flank was enveloped.  But they had become too thorough veterans to be thrown into irreparable confusion by an unexpected attack when off their guard, and soon they were in order and engaging the enemy, with the advantage now of knowing where their antagonist was.  The field of battle continued to expand until it embraced about seven miles of ground.  Finally, however, and before night, the enemy was driven back into the city (26).

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It was during this battle that McPherson, while passing from one column to another, was instantly killed.  In his death the army lost one of its ablest, purest and best generals.

Garrard had been sent out with his cavalry to get upon the railroad east of Atlanta and to cut it in the direction of Augusta.  He was successful in this, and returned about the time of the battle.  Rousseau had also come up from Tennessee with a small division of cavalry, having crossed the Tennessee River about Decatur and made a raid into Alabama.  Finally, when hard pressed, he had come in, striking the railroad in rear of Sherman, and reported to him about this time.

The battle of the 22d is usually known as the Battle of Atlanta, although the city did not fall into our hands until the 2d of September.  Preparations went on, as before, to flank the enemy out of his position.  The work was tedious, and the lines that had to be maintained were very long.  Our troops were gradually worked around to the east until they struck the road between Decatur and Atlanta.  These lines were strongly fortified, as were those to the north and west of the city—­all as close up to the enemy’s lines as practicable—­in order to hold them with the smallest possible number of men, the design being to detach an army to move by our right and try to get upon the railroad down south of Atlanta.

On the 27th the movement by the right flank commenced.  On the 28th the enemy struck our right flank, General Logan commanding, with great vigor.  Logan intrenched himself hastily, and by that means was enabled to resist all assaults and inflict a great deal of damage upon the enemy.  These assaults were continued to the middle of the afternoon, and resumed once or twice still later in the day.  The enemy’s losses in these unsuccessful assaults were fearful.

During that evening the enemy in Logan’s front withdrew into the town.  This now left Sherman’s army close up to the Confederate lines, extending from a point directly east of the city around by the north and west of it for a distance of fully ten miles; the whole of this line being intrenched, and made stronger every day they remained there.

In the latter part of July Sherman sent Stoneman to destroy the railroads to the south, about Macon.  He was then to go east and, if possible, release our prisoners about Andersonville.  There were painful stories current at the time about the great hardships these prisoners had to endure in the way of general bad treatment, in the way in which they were housed, and in the way in which they were fed.  Great sympathy was felt for them; and it was thought that even if they could be turned loose upon the country it would be a great relief to them.  But the attempt proved a failure.  McCook, who commanded a small brigade, was first reported to have been captured; but he got back, having inflicted a good deal of damage upon the enemy.  He had also taken some prisoners;

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but encountering afterwards a largely superior force of the enemy he was obliged to drop his prisoners and get back as best he could with what men he had left.  He had lost several hundred men out of his small command.  On the 4th of August Colonel Adams, commanding a little brigade of about a thousand men, returned reporting Stoneman and all but himself as lost.  I myself had heard around Richmond of the capture of Stoneman, and had sent Sherman word, which he received.  The rumor was confirmed there, also, from other sources.  A few days after Colonel Adams’s return Colonel Capron also got in with a small detachment and confirmed the report of the capture of Stoneman with something less than a thousand men.

It seems that Stoneman, finding the escape of all his force was impossible, had made arrangements for the escape of two divisions.  He covered the movement of these divisions to the rear with a force of about seven hundred men, and at length surrendered himself and this detachment to the commanding Confederate.  In this raid, however, much damage was inflicted upon the enemy by the destruction of cars, locomotives, army wagons, manufactories of military supplies, etc.

On the 4th and 5th Sherman endeavored to get upon the railroad to our right, where Schofield was in command, but these attempts failed utterly.  General Palmer was charged with being the cause of this failure, to a great extent, by both General Sherman and General Schofield; but I am not prepared to say this, although a question seems to have arisen with Palmer as to whether Schofield had any right to command him.  If he did raise this question while an action was going on, that act alone was exceedingly reprehensible.

About the same time Wheeler got upon our railroad north of Resaca and destroyed it nearly up to Dalton.  This cut Sherman off from communication with the North for several days.  Sherman responded to this attack on his lines of communication by directing one upon theirs.

Kilpatrick started on the night of the 18th of August to reach the Macon road about Jonesboro.  He succeeded in doing so, passed entirely around the Confederate lines of Atlanta, and was back again in his former position on our left by the 22d.  These little affairs, however, contributed but very little to the grand result.  They annoyed, it is true, but any damage thus done to a railroad by any cavalry expedition is soon repaired.

Sherman made preparations for a repetition of his tactics; that is, for a flank movement with as large a force as could be got together to some point in the enemy’s rear.  Sherman commenced this last movement on the 25th of August, and on the 1st of September was well up towards the railroad twenty miles south of Atlanta.  Here he found Hardee intrenched, ready to meet him.  A battle ensued, but he was unable to drive Hardee away before night set in.  Under cover of the night, however, Hardee left of his own accord.  That night Hood blew up his military works, such as he thought would be valuable in our hands, and decamped.

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The next morning at daylight General H. W. Slocum, who was commanding north of the city, moved in and took possession of Atlanta, and notified Sherman.  Sherman then moved deliberately back, taking three days to reach the city, and occupied a line extending from Decatur on the left to Atlanta in the centre, with his troops extending out of the city for some distance to the right.

The campaign had lasted about four months, and was one of the most memorable in history.  There was but little if anything in the whole campaign, now that it is over, to criticise at all, and nothing to criticise severely.  It was creditable alike to the general who commanded and the army which had executed it.  Sherman had on this campaign some bright, wide-awake division and brigade commanders whose alertness added a host to the efficiency of his command.

The troops now went to work to make themselves comfortable, and to enjoy a little rest after their arduous campaign.  The city of Atlanta was turned into a military base.  The citizens were all compelled to leave.  Sherman also very wisely prohibited the assembling of the army of sutlers and traders who always follow in the wake of an army in the field, if permitted to do so, from trading with the citizens and getting the money of the soldiers for articles of but little use to them, and for which they are made to pay most exorbitant prices.  He limited the number of these traders to one for each of his three armies.

The news of Sherman’s success reached the North instantaneously, and set the country all aglow.  This was the first great political campaign for the Republicans in their canvass of 1864.  It was followed later by Sheridan’s campaign in the Shenandoah Valley; and these two campaigns probably had more effect in settling the election of the following November than all the speeches, all the bonfires, and all the parading with banners and bands of music in the North.

CHAPTER L.

Grand movement of the army of the Potomac—­crossing the Rapidan —­entering the Wilderness—­battle of the Wilderness.

Soon after midnight, May 3d-4th, the Army of the Potomac moved out from its position north Rapidan, to start upon that memorable campaign, destined to result in the capture of the Confederate capital and the army defending it.  This was not to be accomplished, however, without as desperate fighting as the world has ever witnessed; not to be consummated in a day, a week, a month, single season.  The losses inflicted, and endured, were destined to be severe; but the armies now confronting each other had already been in deadly conflict for a period of three years, with immense losses in killed, by death from sickness, captured and wounded; and neither had made any real progress

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accomplishing the final end.  It is true the Confederates had, so far, held their capital, and they claimed this to be their sole object.  But previously they had boldly proclaimed their intention to capture Philadelphia, New York, and the National Capital, and had made several attempts to do so, and once or twice had come fearfully near making their boast good—­too near for complacent contemplation by the loyal North.  They had also come near losing their own capital on at least one occasion.  So here was a stand-off.  The campaign now begun was destined to result in heavier losses, to both armies, in a given time, than any previously suffered; but the carnage was to be limited to a single year, and to accomplish all that had been anticipated or desired at the beginning in that time.  We had to have hard fighting to achieve this.  The two armies had been confronting each other so long, without any decisive result, that they hardly knew which could whip.

Ten days’ rations, with a supply of forage and ammunition were taken in wagons.  Beef cattle were driven with the trains, and butchered as wanted.  Three days rations in addition, in haversacks, and fifty rounds of cartridges, were carried on the person of each soldier.

The country over which the army had to operate, from the Rapidan to the crossing of the James River, is rather flat, and is cut by numerous streams which make their way to the Chesapeake Bay.  The crossings of these streams by the army were generally made not far above tide-water, and where they formed a considerable obstacle to the rapid advance of troops even when the enemy did not appear in opposition.  The country roads were narrow and poor.  Most of the country is covered with a dense forest, in places, like the Wilderness and along the Chickahominy, almost impenetrable even for infantry except along the roads.  All bridges were naturally destroyed before the National troops came to them.

The Army of the Potomac was composed of three infantry and one cavalry corps, commanded respectively by Generals W. S. Hancock, G. K. Warren, (27) John Sedgwick and P. H. Sheridan.  The artillery was commanded by General Henry J. Hunt.  This arm was in such abundance that the fourth of it could not be used to advantage in such a country as we were destined to pass through.  The surplus was much in the way, taking up as it did so much of the narrow and bad roads, and consuming so much of the forage and other stores brought up by the trains.

The 5th corps, General Warren commanding, was in advance on the right, and marched directly for Germania Ford, preceded by one division of cavalry, under General J. H. Wilson.  General Sedgwick followed Warren with the 6th corps.  Germania Ford was nine or ten miles below the right of Lee’s line.  Hancock, with the 2d corps, moved by another road, farther east, directly upon Ely’s Ford, six miles below Germania, preceded by Gregg’s division

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of cavalry, and followed by the artillery.  Torbert’s division of cavalry was left north of the Rapidan, for the time, to picket the river and prevent the enemy from crossing and getting into our rear.  The cavalry seized the two crossings before daylight, drove the enemy’s pickets guarding them away, and by six o’clock A.M. had the pontoons laid ready for the crossing of the infantry and artillery.  This was undoubtedly a surprise to Lee.  The fact that the movement was unopposed proves this.

Burnside, with the 9th corps, was left back at Warrenton, guarding the railroad from Bull Run forward to preserve control of it in case our crossing the Rapidan should be long delayed.  He was instructed, however, to advance at once on receiving notice that the army had crossed; and a dispatch was sent to him a little after one P.M. giving the information that our crossing had been successful.

The country was heavily wooded at all the points of crossing, particularly on the south side of the river.  The battle-field from the crossing of the Rapidan until the final movement from the Wilderness toward Spottsylvania was of the same character.  There were some clearings and small farms within what might be termed the battle-field; but generally the country was covered with a dense forest.  The roads were narrow and bad.  All the conditions were favorable for defensive operations.

There are two roads, good for that part of Virginia, running from Orange Court House to the battle-field.  The most southerly of these roads is known as the Orange Court House Plank Road, the northern one as the Orange Turnpike.  There are also roads from east of the battle-field running to Spottsylvania Court House, one from Chancellorsville, branching at Aldrich’s; the western branch going by Piney Branch Church, Alsop’s, thence by the Brock Road to Spottsylvania; the east branch goes by Gates’s, thence to Spottsylvania.  The Brock Road runs from Germania Ford through the battle-field and on to the Court House.  As Spottsylvania is approached the country is cut up with numerous roads, some going to the town direct, and others crossing so as to connect the farms with roads going there.

Lee’s headquarters were at Orange Court House.  From there to Fredericksburg he had the use of the two roads above described running nearly parallel to the Wilderness.  This gave him unusual facilities, for that country, for concentrating his forces to his right.  These roads strike the road from Germania Ford in the Wilderness.

As soon as the crossing of the infantry was assured, the cavalry pushed forward, Wilson’s division by Wilderness Tavern to Parker’s store, on the Orange Plank Road; Gregg to the left towards Chancellorsville.  Warren followed Wilson and reached the Wilderness Tavern by noon, took position there and intrenched.  Sedgwick followed Warren.  He was across the river and in camp on the south bank, on the right of Warren, by sundown.  Hancock, with the 2d corps, moved parallel with Warren and camped about six miles east of him.  Before night all the troops, and by the evening of the 5th the trains of more than four thousand wagons, were safely on the south side of the river.

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There never was a corps better organized than was the quartermaster’s corps with the Army of the Potomac in 1864.  With a wagon-train that would have extended from the Rapidan to Richmond, stretched along in single file and separated as the teams necessarily would be when moving, we could still carry only three days’ forage and about ten to twelve days’ rations, besides a supply of ammunition.  To overcome all difficulties, the chief quartermaster, General Rufus Ingalls, had marked on each wagon the corps badge with the division color and the number of the brigade.  At a glance, the particular brigade to which any wagon belonged could be told.  The wagons were also marked to note the contents:  if ammunition, whether for artillery or infantry; if forage, whether grain or hay; if rations, whether, bread, pork, beans, rice, sugar, coffee or whatever it might be.  Empty wagons were never allowed to follow the army or stay in camp.  As soon as a wagon was empty it would return to the base of supply for a load of precisely the same article that had been taken from it.  Empty trains were obliged to leave the road free for loaded ones.  Arriving near the army they would be parked in fields nearest to the brigades they belonged to.  Issues, except of ammunition, were made at night in all cases.  By this system the hauling of forage for the supply train was almost wholly dispensed with.  They consumed theirs at the depots.

I left Culpeper Court House after all the troops had been put in motion, and passing rapidly to the front, crossed the Rapidan in advance of Sedgwick’s corps; and established headquarters for the afternoon and night in a deserted house near the river.

Orders had been given, long before this movement began, to cut down the baggage of officers and men to the lowest point possible.  Notwithstanding this I saw scattered along the road from Culpeper to Germania Ford wagon-loads of new blankets and overcoats, thrown away by the troops to lighten their knapsacks; an improvidence I had never witnessed before.

Lee, while his pickets and signal corps must have discovered at a very early hour on the morning of the 4th of May, that the Army of the Potomac was moving, evidently did not learn until about one o’clock in the afternoon by what route we would confront his army.  This I judge from the fact that at 1.15 P.M., an hour and a quarter after Warren had reached Old Wilderness Tavern, our officers took off rebel signals which, when translated, were seen to be an order to his troops to occupy their intrenchments at Mine Run.

Here at night dispatches were received announcing that Sherman, Butler and Crook had moved according to programme.

On discovering the advance of the Army of the Potomac, Lee ordered Hill, Ewell and Longstreet, each commanding corps, to move to the right to attack us, Hill on the Orange Plank Road, Longstreet to follow on the same road.  Longstreet was at this time—­middle of the afternoon—­at Gordonsville, twenty or more miles away.  Ewell was ordered by the Orange Pike.  He was near by and arrived some four miles east of Mine Run before bivouacking for the night.

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My orders were given through General Meade for an early advance on the morning of the 5th.  Warren was to move to Parker’s store, and Wilson’s cavalry—­then at Parker’s store—­to move on to Craig’s meeting-house.  Sedgwick followed Warren, closing in on his right.  The Army of the Potomac was facing to the west, though our advance was made to the south, except when facing the enemy.  Hancock was to move south-westward to join on the left of Warren, his left to reach to Shady Grove Church.

At six o’clock, before reaching Parker’s store, Warren discovered the enemy.  He sent word back to this effect, and was ordered to halt and prepare to meet and attack him.  Wright, with his division of Sedgwick’s corps, was ordered, by any road he could find, to join on to Warren’s right, and Getty with his division, also of Sedgwick’s corps, was ordered to move rapidly by Warren’s rear and get on his left.  This was the speediest way to reinforce Warren who was confronting the enemy on both the Orange plank and turnpike roads.

Burnside had moved promptly on the 4th, on receiving word that the Army of the Potomac had safely crossed the Rapidan.  By making a night march, although some of his troops had to march forty miles to reach the river, he was crossing with the head of his column early on the morning of the 5th.  Meade moved his headquarters on to Old Wilderness Tavern, four miles south of the river, as soon as it was light enough to see the road.  I remained to hasten Burnside’s crossing and to put him in position.  Burnside at this time was not under Meade’s command, and was his senior in rank.  Getting information of the proximity of the enemy, I informed Meade, and without waiting to see Burnside, at once moved forward my headquarters to where Meade was.

It was my plan then, as it was on all other occasions, to take the initiative whenever the enemy could be drawn from his intrenchments if we were not intrenched ourselves.  Warren had not yet reached the point where he was to halt, when he discovered the enemy near by.  Neither party had any advantage of position.  Warren was, therefore, ordered to attack as soon as he could prepare for it.  At nine o’clock Hancock was ordered to come up to the support of Getty.  He himself arrived at Getty’s front about noon, but his troops were yet far in the rear.  Getty was directed to hold his position at all hazards until relieved.  About this hour Warren was ready, and attacked with favorable though not decisive results.  Getty was somewhat isolated from Warren and was in a precarious condition for a time.  Wilson, with his division of cavalry, was farther south, and was cut off from the rest of the army.  At two o’clock Hancock’s troops began to arrive, and immediately he was ordered to join Getty and attack the enemy.  But the heavy timber and narrow roads prevented him from getting into position for attack as promptly as he generally did when receiving such orders.  At four o’clock he again received his orders to attack, and General Getty received orders from Meade a few minutes later to attack whether Hancock was ready or not.  He met the enemy under Heth within a few hundred yards.

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Hancock immediately sent two divisions, commanded by Birney and Mott, and later two brigades, Carroll’s and Owen’s, to the support of Getty.  This was timely and saved Getty.  During the battle Getty and Carroll were wounded, but remained on the field.  One of Birney’s most gallant brigade commanders—­Alexander Hays—­was killed.

I had been at West Point with Hays for three years, and had served with him through the Mexican war, a portion of the time in the same regiment.  He was a most gallant officer, ready to lead his command wherever ordered.  With him it was “Come, boys,” not “Go.”

Wadsworth’s division and Baxter’s brigade of the 2d division were sent to reinforce Hancock and Getty; but the density of the intervening forest was such that, there being no road to march upon, they did not get up with the head of column until night, and bivouacked where they were without getting into position.

During the afternoon Sheridan sent Gregg’s division of cavalry to Todd’s Tavern in search of Wilson.  This was fortunate.  He found Wilson engaged with a superior force under General Rosser, supported by infantry, and falling back before it.  Together they were strong enough to turn the tables upon the enemy and themselves become aggressive.  They soon drove the rebel cavalry back beyond Corbin’s Bridge.

Fighting between Hancock and Hill continued until night put a close to it.  Neither side made any special progress.

After the close of the battle of the 5th of May my orders were given for the following morning.  We knew Longstreet with 12,000 men was on his way to join Hill’s right, near the Brock Road, and might arrive during the night.  I was anxious that the rebels should not take the initiative in the morning, and therefore ordered Hancock to make an assault at 4.30 o’clock.  Meade asked to have the hour changed to six.  Deferring to his wishes as far as I was willing, the order was modified and five was fixed as the hour to move.

Hancock had now fully one-half of the Army of the Potomac.  Wadsworth with his division, which had arrived the night before, lay in a line perpendicular to that held by Hill, and to the right of Hancock.  He was directed to move at the same time, and to attack Hill’s left.

Burnside, who was coming up with two divisions, was directed to get in between Warren and Wadsworth, and attack as soon as he could get in position to do so.  Sedgwick and Warren were to make attacks in their front, to detain as many of the enemy as they could and to take advantage of any attempt to reinforce Hill from that quarter.  Burnside was ordered if he should succeed in breaking the enemy’s centre, to swing around to the left and envelop the right of Lee’s army.  Hancock was informed of all the movements ordered.

Burnside had three divisions, but one of them—­a colored division—­was sent to guard the wagon train, and he did not see it again until July.

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Lee was evidently very anxious that there should be no battle on his right until Longstreet got up.  This is evident from the fact that notwithstanding the early hour at which I had ordered the assault, both for the purpose of being the attacking party and to strike before Longstreet got up, Lee was ahead in his assault on our right.  His purpose was evident, but he failed.

Hancock was ready to advance by the hour named, but learning in time that Longstreet was moving a part of his corps by the Catharpin Road, thus threatening his left flank, sent a division of infantry, commanded by General Barlow, with all his artillery, to cover the approaches by which Longstreet was expected.  This disposition was made in time to attack as ordered.  Hancock moved by the left of the Orange Plank Road, and Wadsworth by the right of it.  The fighting was desperate for about an hour, when the enemy began to break up in great confusion.

I believed then, and see no reason to change that opinion now, that if the country had been such that Hancock and his command could have seen the confusion and panic in the lines of the enemy, it would have been taken advantage of so effectually that Lee would not have made another stand outside of his Richmond defences.

Gibbon commanded Hancock’s left, and was ordered to attack, but was not able to accomplish much.

On the morning of the 6th Sheridan was sent to connect with Hancock’s left and attack the enemy’s cavalry who were trying to get on our left and rear.  He met them at the intersection of the Furnace and Brock roads and at Todd’s Tavern, and defeated them at both places.  Later he was attacked, and again the enemy was repulsed.

Hancock heard the firing between Sheridan and Stuart, and thinking the enemy coming by that road, still further reinforced his position guarding the entrance to the Brock Road.  Another incident happened during the day to further induce Hancock to weaken his attacking column.  Word reached him that troops were seen moving towards him from the direction of Todd’s Tavern, and Brooke’s brigade was detached to meet this new enemy; but the troops approaching proved to be several hundred convalescents coming from Chancellorsville, by the road Hancock had advanced upon, to join their respective commands.  At 6.50 o’clock A.M., Burnside, who had passed Wilderness Tavern at six o’clock, was ordered to send a division to the support of Hancock, but to continue with the remainder of his command in the execution of his previous order.  The difficulty of making a way through the dense forests prevented Burnside from getting up in time to be of any service on the forenoon of the sixth.

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Hancock followed Hill’s retreating forces, in the morning, a mile or more.  He maintained this position until, along in the afternoon, Longstreet came upon him.  The retreating column of Hill meeting reinforcements that had not yet been engaged, became encouraged and returned with them.  They were enabled, from the density of the forest, to approach within a few hundred yards of our advance before being discovered.  Falling upon a brigade of Hancock’s corps thrown to the advance, they swept it away almost instantly.  The enemy followed up his advantage and soon came upon Mott’s division, which fell back in great confusion.  Hancock made dispositions to hold his advanced position, but after holding it for a time, fell back into the position that he had held in the morning, which was strongly intrenched.  In this engagement the intrepid Wadsworth while trying to rally his men was mortally wounded and fell into the hands of the enemy.  The enemy followed up, but made no immediate attack.

The Confederate General Jenkins was killed and Longstreet seriously wounded in this engagement.  Longstreet had to leave the field, not to resume command for many weeks.  His loss was a severe one to Lee, and compensated in a great measure for the mishap, or misapprehensions, which had fallen to our lot during the day.

After Longstreet’s removal from the field Lee took command of his right in person.  He was not able, however, to rally his men to attack Hancock’s position, and withdrew from our front for the purpose of reforming.  Hancock sent a brigade to clear his front of all remnants that might be left of Longstreet’s or Hill’s commands.  This brigade having been formed at right angles to the intrenchments held by Hancock’s command, swept down the whole length of them from left to right.  A brigade of the enemy was encountered in this move; but it broke and disappeared without a contest.

Firing was continued after this, but with less fury.  Burnside had not yet been able to get up to render any assistance.  But it was now only about nine in the morning, and he was getting into position on Hancock’s right.

At 4.15 in the afternoon Lee attacked our left.  His line moved up to within a hundred yards of ours and opened a heavy fire.  This status was maintained for about half an hour.  Then a part of Mott’s division and Ward’s brigade of Birney’s division gave way and retired in disorder.  The enemy under R. H. Anderson took advantage of this and pushed through our line, planting their flags on a part of the intrenchments not on fire.  But owing to the efforts of Hancock, their success was but temporary.  Carroll, of Gibbon’s division, moved at a double quick with his brigade and drove back the enemy, inflicting great loss.  Fighting had continued from five in the morning sometimes along the whole line, at other times only in places.  The ground fought over had varied in width, but averaged three-quarters

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of a mile.  The killed, and many of the severely wounded, of both armies, lay within this belt where it was impossible to reach them.  The woods were set on fire by the bursting shells, and the conflagration raged.  The wounded who had not strength to move themselves were either suffocated or burned to death.  Finally the fire communicated with our breastworks, in places.  Being constructed of wood, they burned with great fury.  But the battle still raged, our men firing through the flames until it became too hot to remain longer.

Lee was now in distress.  His men were in confusion, and his personal efforts failed to restore order.  These facts, however, were learned subsequently, or we would have taken advantage of his condition and no doubt gained a decisive success.  His troops were withdrawn now, but I revoked the order, which I had given previously to this assault, for Hancock to attack, because his troops had exhausted their ammunition and did not have time to replenish from the train, which was at some distance.

Burnside, Sedgwick, and Warren had all kept up an assault during all this time; but their efforts had no other effect than to prevent the enemy from reinforcing his right from the troops in their front.

I had, on the 5th, ordered all the bridges over the Rapidan to be taken up except one at Germania Ford.

The troops on Sedgwick’s right had been sent to enforce our left.  This left our right in danger of being turned, and us of being cut off from all present base of supplies.  Sedgwick had refused his right and intrenched it for protection against attack.  But late in the afternoon of the 6th Early came out from his lines in considerable force and got in upon Sedgwick’s right, notwithstanding the precautions taken, and created considerable confusion.  Early captured several hundred prisoners, among them two general officers.  The defence, however, was vigorous; and night coming on, the enemy was thrown into as much confusion as our troops, engaged, were.  Early says in his Memoirs that if we had discovered the confusion in his lines we might have brought fresh troops to his great discomfort.  Many officers, who had not been attacked by Early, continued coming to my headquarters even after Sedgwick had rectified his lines a little farther to the rear, with news of the disaster, fully impressed with the idea that the enemy was pushing on and would soon be upon me.

During the night all of Lee’s army withdrew within their intrenchments.  On the morning of the 7th General Custer drove the enemy’s cavalry from Catharpin Furnace to Todd’s Tavern.  Pickets and skirmishers were sent along our entire front to find the position of the enemy.  Some went as far as a mile and a half before finding him.  But Lee showed no disposition to come out of his Works.  There was no battle during the day, and but little firing except in Warren’s front; he being directed about noon to make a reconnoissance in force.  This drew some sharp firing, but there was no attempt on the part of Lee to drive him back.  This ended the Battle of the Wilderness.

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CHAPTER LI.

AFTER THE BATTLE—­TELEGRAPH AND SIGNAL SERVICE—­MOVEMENT BY THE LEFT FLANK.

More desperate fighting has not been witnessed on this continent than that of the 5th and 6th of May.  Our victory consisted in having successfully crossed a formidable stream, almost in the face of an enemy, and in getting the army together as a unit.  We gained an advantage on the morning of the 6th, which, if it had been followed up, must have proven very decisive.  In the evening the enemy gained an advantage; but was speedily repulsed.  As we stood at the close, the two armies were relatively in about the same condition to meet each other as when the river divided them.  But the fact of having safely crossed was a victory.

Our losses in the Wilderness were very severe.  Those of the Confederates must have been even more so; but I have no means of speaking with accuracy upon this point.  The Germania Ford bridge was transferred to Ely’s Ford to facilitate the transportation of the wounded to Washington.

It may be as well here as elsewhere to state two things connected with all movements of the Army of the Potomac:  first, in every change of position or halt for the night, whether confronting the enemy or not, the moment arms were stacked the men intrenched themselves.  For this purpose they would build up piles of logs or rails if they could be found in their front, and dig a ditch, throwing the dirt forward on the timber.  Thus the digging they did counted in making a depression to stand in, and increased the elevation in front of them.  It was wonderful how quickly they could in this way construct defences of considerable strength.  When a halt was made with the view of assaulting the enemy, or in his presence, these would be strengthened or their positions changed under the direction of engineer officers.  The second was, the use made of the telegraph and signal corps.  Nothing could be more complete than the organization and discipline of this body of brave and intelligent men.  Insulated wires—­insulated so that they would transmit messages in a storm, on the ground or under water—­were wound upon reels, making about two hundred pounds weight of wire to each reel.  Two men and one mule were detailed to each reel.  The pack-saddle on which this was carried was provided with a rack like a sawbuck placed crosswise of the saddle, and raised above it so that the reel, with its wire, would revolve freely.  There was a wagon, supplied with a telegraph operator, battery and telegraph instruments for each division, each corps, each army, and one for my headquarters.  There were wagons also loaded with light poles, about the size and length of a wall tent pole, supplied with an iron spike in one end, used to hold the wires up when laid, so that wagons and artillery would not run over them.  The mules thus loaded were assigned to brigades, and always kept with the command they were assigned to.  The operators were also assigned to particular headquarters, and never changed except by special orders.

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The moment the troops were put in position to go into camp all the men connected with this branch of service would proceed to put up their wires.  A mule loaded with a coil of wire would be led to the rear of the nearest flank of the brigade he belonged to, and would be led in a line parallel thereto, while one man would hold an end of the wire and uncoil it as the mule was led off.  When he had walked the length of the wire the whole of it would be on the ground.  This would be done in rear of every brigade at the same time.  The ends of all the wires would then be joined, making a continuous wire in the rear of the whole army.  The men, attached to brigades or divisions, would all commence at once raising the wires with their telegraph poles.  This was done by making a loop in the wire and putting it over the spike and raising the pole to a perpendicular position.  At intervals the wire would be attached to trees, or some other permanent object, so that one pole was sufficient at a place.  In the absence of such a support two poles would have to be used, at intervals, placed at an angle so as to hold the wire firm in its place.  While this was being done the telegraph wagons would take their positions near where the headquarters they belonged to were to be established, and would connect with the wire.  Thus, in a few minutes longer time than it took a mule to walk the length of its coil, telegraphic communication would be effected between all the headquarters of the army.  No orders ever had to be given to establish the telegraph.

The signal service was used on the march.  The men composing this corps were assigned to specified commands.  When movements were made, they would go in advance, or on the flanks, and seize upon high points of ground giving a commanding view of the country, if cleared, or would climb tall trees on the highest points if not cleared, and would denote, by signals, the positions of different parts of our own army, and often the movements of the enemy.  They would also take off the signals of the enemy and transmit them.  It would sometimes take too long a time to make translations of intercepted dispatches for us to receive any benefit from them.  But sometimes they gave useful information.

On the afternoon of the 7th I received news from Washington announcing that Sherman had probably attacked Johnston that day, and that Butler had reached City Point safely and taken it by surprise on the 5th.  I had given orders for a movement by the left flank, fearing that Lee might move rapidly to Richmond to crush Butler before I could get there.

My order for this movement was as follows: 

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE U. S., May 7, 1864, 6.30 A.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE, Commanding A. P.

Make all preparations during the day for a night march to take position at Spottsylvania C. H. with one army corps, at Todd’s Tavern with one, and another near the intersection of the Piney Branch and Spottsylvania road with the road from Alsop’s to Old Court House.  If this move is made the trains should be thrown forward early in the morning to the Ny River.

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I think it would be advisable in making the change to leave Hancock where he is until Warren passes him.  He could then follow and become the right of the new line.  Burnside will move to Piney Branch Church.  Sedgwick can move along the pike to Chancellorsville and on to his destination.  Burnside will move on the plank road to the intersection of it with the Orange and Fredericksburg plank road, then follow Sedgwick to his place of destination.

All vehicles should be got out of hearing of the enemy before the troops move, and then move off quietly.

It is more than probable that the enemy concentrate for a heavy attack on Hancock this afternoon.  In case they do we must be prepared to resist them, and follow up any success we may gain, with our whole force.  Such a result would necessarily modify these instructions.

All the hospitals should be moved to-day to Chancellorsville.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.

During the 7th Sheridan had a fight with the rebel cavalry at Todd’s Tavern, but routed them, thus opening the way for the troops that were to go by that route at night.  Soon after dark Warren withdrew from the front of the enemy, and was soon followed by Sedgwick.  Warren’s march carried him immediately behind the works where Hancock’s command lay on the Brock Road.  With my staff and a small escort of cavalry I preceded the troops.  Meade with his staff accompanied me.  The greatest enthusiasm was manifested by Hancock’s men as we passed by.  No doubt it was inspired by the fact that the movement was south.  It indicated to them that they had passed through the “beginning of the end” in the battle just fought.  The cheering was so lusty that the enemy must have taken it for a night attack.  At all events it drew from him a furious fusillade of artillery and musketry, plainly heard but not felt by us.

Meade and I rode in advance.  We had passed but a little way beyond our left when the road forked.  We looked to see, if we could, which road Sheridan had taken with his cavalry during the day.  It seemed to be the right-hand one, and accordingly we took it.  We had not gone far, however, when Colonel C. B. Comstock, of my staff, with the instinct of the engineer, suspecting that we were on a road that would lead us into the lines of the enemy, if he, too, should be moving, dashed by at a rapid gallop and all alone.  In a few minutes he returned and reported that Lee was moving, and that the road we were on would bring us into his lines in a short distance.  We returned to the forks of the road, left a man to indicate the right road to the head of Warren’s column when it should come up, and continued our journey to Todd’s Tavern, where we arrived after midnight.

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My object in moving to Spottsylvania was two-fold:  first, I did not want Lee to get back to Richmond in time to attempt to crush Butler before I could get there; second, I wanted to get between his army and Richmond if possible; and, if not, to draw him into the open field.  But Lee, by accident, beat us to Spottsylvania.  Our wagon trains had been ordered easterly of the roads the troops were to march upon before the movement commenced.  Lee interpreted this as a semi-retreat of the Army of the Potomac to Fredericksburg, and so informed his government.  Accordingly he ordered Longstreet’s corps—­now commanded by Anderson—­to move in the morning (the 8th) to Spottsylvania.  But the woods being still on fire, Anderson could not go into bivouac, and marched directly on to his destination that night.  By this accident Lee got possession of Spottsylvania.  It is impossible to say now what would have been the result if Lee’s orders had been obeyed as given; but it is certain that we would have been in Spottsylvania, and between him and his capital.  My belief is that there would have been a race between the two armies to see which could reach Richmond first, and the Army of the Potomac would have had the shorter line.  Thus, twice since crossing the Rapidan we came near closing the campaign, so far as battles were concerned, from the Rapidan to the James River or Richmond.  The first failure was caused by our not following up the success gained over Hill’s corps on the morning of the 6th, as before described:  the second, when fires caused by that battle drove Anderson to make a march during the night of the 7th-8th which he was ordered to commence on the morning of the 8th.  But accident often decides the fate of battle.

Sheridan’s cavalry had had considerable fighting during the afternoon of the 7th, lasting at Todd’s Tavern until after night, with the field his at the close.  He issued the necessary orders for seizing Spottsylvania and holding the bridge over the Po River, which Lee’s troops would have to cross to get to Spottsylvania.  But Meade changed Sheridan’s orders to Merritt—­who was holding the bridge—­on his arrival at Todd’s Tavern, and thereby left the road free for Anderson when he came up.  Wilson, who was ordered to seize the town, did so, with his division of cavalry; but he could not hold it against the Confederate corps which had not been detained at the crossing of the Po, as it would have been but for the unfortunate change in Merritt’s orders.  Had he been permitted to execute the orders Sheridan gave him, he would have been guarding with two brigades of cavalry the bridge over the Po River which Anderson had to cross, and must have detained him long enough to enable Warren to reinforce Wilson and hold the town.

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Anderson soon intrenched himself—­if indeed the intrenchments were not already made—­immediately across Warren’s front.  Warren was not aware of his presence, but probably supposed it was the cavalry which Merritt had engaged earlier in the day.  He assaulted at once, but was repulsed.  He soon organized his men, as they were not pursued by the enemy, and made a second attack, this time with his whole corps.  This time he succeeded in gaining a position immediately in the enemy’s front, where he intrenched.  His right and left divisions—­the former Crawford’s, the latter Wadsworth’s, now commanded by Cutler—­drove the enemy back some distance.

At this time my headquarters had been advanced to Piney Branch Church.  I was anxious to crush Anderson before Lee could get a force to his support.  To this end Sedgwick who was at Piney Branch Church, was ordered to Warren’s support.  Hancock, who was at Todd’s Tavern, was notified of Warren’s engagement, and was directed to be in readiness to come up.  Burnside, who was with the wagon trains at Aldrich’s on our extreme left, received the same instructions.  Sedgwick was slow in getting up for some reason—­probably unavoidable, because he was never at fault when serious work was to be done—­so that it was near night before the combined forces were ready to attack.  Even then all of Sedgwick’s command did not get into the engagement.  Warren led the last assault, one division at a time, and of course it failed.

Warren’s difficulty was twofold:  when he received an order to do anything, it would at once occur to his mind how all the balance of the army should be engaged so as properly to co-operate with him.  His ideas were generally good, but he would forget that the person giving him orders had thought of others at the time he had of him.  In like manner, when he did get ready to execute an order, after giving most intelligent instructions to division commanders, he would go in with one division, holding the others in reserve until he could superintend their movements in person also, forgetting that division commanders could execute an order without his presence.  His difficulty was constitutional and beyond his control.  He was an officer of superior ability, quick perceptions, and personal courage to accomplish anything that could be done with a small command.

Lee had ordered Hill’s corps—­now commanded by Early—­to move by the very road we had marched upon.  This shows that even early in the morning of the 8th Lee had not yet become acquainted with my move, but still thought that the Army of the Potomac had gone to Fredericksburg.  Indeed, he informed the authorities at Richmond he had possession of Spottsylvania and was on my flank.  Anderson was in possession of Spottsylvania, through no foresight of Lee, however.  Early only found that he had been following us when he ran against Hancock at Todd’s Tavern.  His coming detained Hancock from the battle-field of Spottsylvania for that day; but he, in like manner, kept Early back and forced him to move by another route.

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Had I ordered the movement for the night of the 7th by my left flank, it would have put Hancock in the lead.  It would also have given us an hour or earlier start.  It took all that time for Warren to get the head of his column to the left of Hancock after he had got his troops out of their line confronting the enemy.  This hour, and Hancock’s capacity to use his whole force when necessary, would, no doubt, have enabled him to crush Anderson before he could be reinforced.  But the movement made was tactical.  It kept the troops in mass against a possible assault by the enemy.  Our left occupied its intrenchments while the two corps to the right passed.  If an attack had been made by the enemy he would have found the 2d corps in position, fortified, and, practically, the 5th and 6th corps in position as reserves, until his entire front was passed.  By a left flank movement the army would have been scattered while still passing the front of the enemy, and before the extreme right had got by it would have been very much exposed.  Then, too, I had not yet learned the special qualifications of the different corps commanders.  At that time my judgment was that Warren was the man I would suggest to succeed Meade should anything happen to that gallant soldier to take him from the field.  As I have before said, Warren was a gallant soldier, an able man; and he was beside thoroughly imbued with the solemnity and importance of the duty he had to perform.