17-18).] Time is falsely assumed to have just as much reality for a living being as for an hour-glass.  But if Time does nothing, it is nothing.  It is, however, in Bergson’s view, vital to the whole of the universe.  He expressly denies that la duree is merely subjective; the universe “endures” as a whole.  In Time and Free Will it did not seem to matter whether we regarded our inner life as having duree or as actually being duree.  In the first instance, if we have duree it is then only an aspect of reality, but if our personality itself is duree, then Time is reality itself.  He develops this last point of view more explicitly in his later works, and la duree is identified not only with the reality of change, but with memory and with spirit. [Footnote:  La Perception du Changement, Lecture 2.] In it he finds the substance of a universe whose reality is change.  “God,” said Plato, “being unable to make the world eternal, gave it Time—­a moving image of reality.”  Bergson himself quotes this remark of Plato, and seems to have a vision like that of Rosetti’s “Blessed Damozel,” who
        ...... “saw
      Time like a pulse shake fierce
      Through all the worlds.”

The more we study Time, the more we may grasp this vision ourselves, and then we shall comprehend that la duree implies invention, the creation of new forms, the continual elaboration of the absolutely new—­in short, an evolution which is creative.

CHAPTER VII

FREEDOM OF THE WILL

Spirit of man revolts from physical and psychological determinism—­ Former examined and rejected—­The latter more subtle—­Vice of “associationism”—­Psychology without a self.  Condemnation of psychological determinism—­Room for freedom—­The self in action—­ Astronomical forecasts—­Foreseeableness of any human action impossible—­ Human wills centres of indetermination—­Not all our acts free—­True freedom, self-determination.

Before passing on to an examination of Bergson’s treatment of Evolution, we must consider his discussion of the problem of Freedom of the Will.  Few problems which have occupied the attention of philosophers have been more discussed or have given rise to more controversy than that of Freedom.  This is, of course, natural as the question at issue is one of very great importance, not merely as speculative, but also in the realm of action.  We ask ourselves:  “Are we really free?” Can we will either of two or more possibilities which are put before us, or, on the other hand, is everything fixed, predestined in such a way that an all-knowing consciousness could foretell from our past what course our future action would take?