Such parents would be regarded as lacking all public spirit, and as willing to endanger the community for their private pleasure.  But gradually it would appear that the state remained intact, and the crops were no worse than in former years.  Then, by a fiction, a child would be deemed to have been sacrificed if it was solemnly dedicated to agriculture or some other work of national importance chosen by the chief.  It would be many generations before the child would be allowed to choose its own occupation after it had grown old enough to know its own tastes and capacities.  And during all those generations, children would be reminded that only an act of grace had allowed them to live at all, and would exist under the shadow of a purely imaginary duty to the state.

The position of those parents who first disbelieved in the utility of infant sacrifice illustrates all the difficulties which arise in connection with the adjustment of individual freedom to public control.  The authorities, believing the sacrifice necessary for the good of the community, were bound to insist upon it; the parents, believing it useless, were equally bound to do everything in their power toward saving the child.  How ought both parties to act in such a case?

The duty of the skeptical parent is plain:  to save the child by any possible means, to preach the uselessness of the sacrifice in season and out of season, and to endure patiently whatever penalty the law may indict for evasion.  But the duty of the authorities is far less clear.  So long as they remain firmly persuaded that the universal sacrifice of the first-born is indispensable, they are bound to persecute those who seek to undermine this belief.  But they will, if they are conscientious, very carefully examine the arguments of opponents, and be willing in advance to admit that these arguments may be sound.  They will carefully search their own hearts to see whether hatred of children or pleasure in cruelty has anything to do with their belief.  They will remember that in the past history of Khai-muh there are innumerable instances of beliefs, now known to be false, on account of which those who disagreed with the prevalent view were put to death.  Finally they will reflect that, though errors which are traditional are often wide-spread, new beliefs seldom win acceptance unless they are nearer to the truth than what they replace; and they will conclude that a new belief is probably either an advance, or so unlikely to become common as to be innocuous.  All these considerations will make them hesitate before they resort to punishment.

II