On the contrary, a candid investigation of these subjects, accompanied with a perfect readiness to adopt any theory warranted by sound philosophy, may have a tendency to convince them that in forming improbable and unfounded hypotheses, so far from enlarging the bounds of human science, they are contracting it, so far from promoting the improvement of the human mind, they are obstructing it; they are throwing us back again almost into the infancy of knowledge and weakening the foundations of that mode of philosophising, under the auspices of which science has of late made such rapid advances.  The present rage for wide and unrestrained speculation seems to be a kind of mental intoxication, arising, perhaps, from the great and unexpected discoveries which have been made of late years, in various branches of science.  To men elate and giddy with such successes, every thing appeared to be within the grasp of human powers; and, under this illusion, they confounded subjects where no real progress could be proved with those where the progress had been marked, certain, and acknowledged.  Could they be persuaded to sober themselves with a little severe and chastised thinking, they would see, that the cause of truth, and of sound philosophy, cannot but suffer by substituting wild flights and unsupported assertions for patient investigation, and well authenticated proofs.

Mr Condorcet’s book may be considered not only as a sketch of the opinions of a celebrated individual, but of many of the literary men in France at the beginning of the Revolution.  As such, though merely a sketch, it seems worthy of attention.

CHAPTER 10

Mr Godwin’s system of equality—­Error of attributing all the vices of mankind to human institutions—­Mr Godwin’s first answer to the difficulty arising from population totally insufficient—­ Mr Godwin’s beautiful system of equality supposed to be realized —­Its utter destruction simply from the principle of population in so short a time as thirty years.

In reading Mr Godwin’s ingenious and able work on political justice, it is impossible not to be struck with the spirit and energy of his style, the force and precision of some of his reasonings, the ardent tone of his thoughts, and particularly with that impressive earnestness of manner which gives an air of truth to the whole.  At the same time, it must be confessed that he has not proceeded in his inquiries with the caution that sound philosophy seems to require.  His conclusions are often unwarranted by his premises.  He fails sometimes in removing the objections which he himself brings forward.  He relies too much on general and abstract propositions which will not admit of application.  And his conjectures certainly far outstrip the modesty of nature.