which would gratify his subjects and win their attachment to him.  By this alliance Napoleon wished to force Alexander not to withdraw the troops who were in the north of his Empire, but rather to augment their numbers in order to cover Finland and St. Petersburg.  It was thus that Napoleon endeavoured to draw the Prince Royal into his coalition.  It was of little consequence to Napoleon whether Bernadotte succeeded or not.  The Emperor Alexander would nevertheless have been obliged to increase his force in Finland; that was all that Napoleon wished.  In the gigantic struggle upon which France and Russia were about to enter the most trivial alliance was not to be neglected.  In January 1812 Davoust invaded Swedish Pomerania without any declaration of war, and without any apparent motive.  Was this inconceivable violation of territory likely to dispose the Prince Royal of Sweden to the proposed alliance, even had that alliance not been adverse to the interests of his country?  That was impossible; and Bernadotte took the part which was expected of him.  He rejected the offers of Napoleon, and prepared for coming events.

The Emperor Alexander wished to withdraw his force from Finland for the purpose of more effectively opposing the immense army which threatened his States.  Unwilling to expose Finland to an attack on the part of Sweden, he had an interview on the 28th of August 1812, at Abo, with the Prince-Royal, to come to an arrangement with him for uniting their interests.  I know that the Emperor of Russia pledged himself, whatever might happen, to protect Bernadotte against the fate of the new dynasties, to guarantee the possession of his throne, and promised that he should have Norway as a compensation for Finland.  He even went so far as to hint that Bernadotte might supersede Napoleon.  Bernadotte adopted all the propositions of Alexander, and from that moment Sweden made common cause against Napoleon.  The Prince Royal’s conduct has been much blamed, but the question resolved itself into one of mere political interest.  Could Bernadotte, a Swede by adoption, prefer the alliance of an ambitious sovereign whose vengeance he had to fear, and who had sanctioned the seizure of Finland to that of a powerful monarch, his formidable neighbour, his protector in Sweden, and where hostility might effectually support the hereditary claims of young Gustavus?  Sweden, in joining France, would thereby have declared herself the enemy of England.  Where, then, would have been her navy, her trade and even her existence?

CHAPTER XXVII.

1812.

Changeableness of Bonaparte’s plans and opinions—­Articles for the ‘Moniteur’ dictated by the First Consul—­The Protocol of the Congress of Chatillon—­Conversations with Davoust at Hamburg—­ Promise of the Viceroyalty of Poland—­Hope and disappointment of the Poles—­Influence of illusion on Bonaparte—­The French in Moscow—­