Correspondence of the ‘London Times’
Chicago, April 23, 1904

Now that the after developments of the Clayton case have run their course and reached a finish, I will sum them up.  Clayton’s romantic escape from a shameful death stepped all this region in an enchantment of wonder and joy—­during the proverbial nine days.  Then the sobering process followed, and men began to take thought, and to say:  ’But a man was killed, and Clayton killed him.’  Others replied:  ’That is true:  we have been overlooking that important detail; we have been led away by excitement.’

The telling soon became general that Clayton ought to be tried again.  Measures were taken accordingly, and the proper representations conveyed to Washington; for in America under the new paragraph added to the Constitution in 1889, second trials are not State affairs, but national, and must be tried by the most august body in the land—­the Supreme Court of the United States.  The justices were therefore summoned to sit in Chicago.  The session was held day before yesterday, and was opened with the usual impressive formalities, the nine judges appearing in their black robes, and the new chief justice (Lemaitre) presiding.  In opening the case the chief justice said: 

’It is my opinion that this matter is quite simple.  The prisoner at the bar was charged with murdering the man Szczepanik; he was tried for murdering the man Szczepanik; he was fairly tried and justly condemned and sentenced to death for murdering the man Szczepanik.  It turns out that the man Szczepanik was not murdered at all.  By the decision of the French courts in the Dreyfus matter, it is established beyond cavil or question that the decisions of courts and permanent and cannot be revised.  We are obliged to respect and adopt this precedent.  It is upon precedents that the enduring edifice of jurisprudence is reared.  The prisoner at the bar has been fairly and righteously condemned to death for the murder of the man Szczepanik, and, in my opinion, there is but one course to pursue in the matter:  he must be hanged.’

Mr. Justice Crawford said: 

‘But, your Excellency, he was pardoned on the scaffold for that.’

’The pardon is not valid, and cannot stand, because he was pardoned for killing Szczepanik, a man whom he had not killed.  A man cannot be pardoned for a crime which he has not committed; it would be an absurdity.’

‘But, your Excellency, he did kill a man.’

’That is an extraneous detail; we have nothing to do with it.  The court cannot take up this crime until the prisoner has expiated the other one.’

Mr. Justice Halleck said: 

’If we order his execution, your Excellency, we shall bring about a miscarriage of justice, for the governor will pardon him again.’

’He will not have the power.  He cannot pardon a man for a crime which he has not committed.  As I observed before, it would be an absurdity.’