fall into the enemy’s hands without striking a blow.  In such a season of complete good fortune, the conqueror need not hesitate about dividing his forces in order to draw into the vortex of destruction everything within reach of his Army, to cut off detachments, to take fortresses unprepared for defence, to occupy large towns, &c. &c.  He may do anything until a new state of things arises, and the more he ventures in this way the longer will it be before that change will take place.  There is no want of examples of brilliant results from grand decisive victories, and of great and vigorous pursuits in the wars of Buonaparte.  We need only quote Jena 1806, Ratisbonne 1809, Leipsic 1813, and Belle-Alliance 1815.

CHAPTER XIII.  RETREAT AFTER A LOST BATTLE

In a lost battle the power of an Army is broken, the moral to a greater degree than the physical.  A second battle unless fresh favourable circumstances come into play, would lead to a complete defeat, perhaps, to destruction.  This is a military axiom.  According to the usual course the retreat is continued up to that point where the equilibrium of forces is restored, either by reinforcements, or by the protection of strong fortresses, or by great defensive positions afforded by the country, or by a separation of the enemy’s force.  The magnitude of the losses sustained, the extent of the defeat, but still more the character of the enemy, will bring nearer or put off the instant of this equilibrium.  How many instances may be found of a beaten Army rallied again at a short distance, without its circumstances having altered in any way since the battle.  The cause of this may be traced to the moral weakness of the adversary, or to the preponderance gained in the battle not having been sufficient to make lasting impression.

To profit by this weakness or mistake of the enemy, not to yield one inch breadth more than the pressure of circumstances demands, but above all things, in order to keep up the moral forces to as advantageous a point as possible, a slow retreat, offering incessant resistance, and bold courageous counterstrokes, whenever the enemy seeks to gain any excessive advantages, are absolutely necessary.  Retreats of great Generals and of Armies inured to War have always resembled the retreat of a wounded lion, such is, undoubtedly, also the best theory.

It is true that at the moment of quitting a dangerous position we have often seen trifling formalities observed which caused a waste of time, and were, therefore, attended with danger, whilst in such cases everything depends on getting out of the place speedily.  Practised Generals reckon this maxim a very important one.  But such cases must not be confounded with a general retreat after a lost battle.  Whoever then thinks by a few rapid marches to gain a start, and more easily to recover a firm standing, commits a great error.  The first movements should be