true that its adoption is usually influenced less by a clear persuasion of its being the surest way of attaining the aim than by another inadmissible motive—­this motive is the dread of encountering the enemy.  Woe to the Commander who gives in to this!  However much the moral of his Army may have deteriorated, and however well founded may be his apprehensions of being at a disadvantage in any conflict with the enemy, the evil will only be made worse by too anxiously avoiding every possible risk of collision.  Buonaparte in 1813 would never have brought over the Rhine with him the 30,000 or 40,000 men who remained after the battle of Hanau,(*) if he had avoided that battle and tried to pass the Rhine at Mannheim or Coblenz.  It is just by means of small combats carefully prepared and executed, and in which the defeated army being on the defensive, has always the assistance of the ground—­it is just by these that the moral strength of the Army can first be resuscitated.

(*) At Hanau (October 30, 1813), the Bavarians some 50,000 strong threw themselves across the line of Napoleon’s retreat from Leipsic.  By a masterly use of its artillery the French tore the Bavarians asunder and marched on over their bodies.—­Editor.

The beneficial effect of the smallest successes is incredible; but with most Generals the adoption of this plan implies great self-command.  The other way, that of evading all encounter, appears at first so much easier, that there is a natural preference for its adoption.  It is therefore usually just this system of evasion which best, promotes the view of the pursuer, and often ends with the complete downfall of the pursued; we must, however, recollect here that we are speaking of a whole Army, not of a single Division, which, having been cut off, is seeking to join the main Army by making a de’tour; in such a case circumstances are different, and success is not uncommon.  But there is one condition requisite to the success of this race of two Corps for an object, which is that a Division of the pursuing army should follow by the same road which the pursued has taken, in order to pick up stragglers, and keep up the impression which the presence of the enemy never fails to make.  Bluecher neglected this in his, in other respects unexceptionable, pursuit after La Belle Alliance.

Such marches tell upon the pursuer as well as the pursued, and they are not advisable if the enemy’s Army rallies itself upon another considerable one; if it has a distinguished General at its head, and if its destruction is not already well prepared.  But when this means can be adopted, it acts also like a great mechanical power.  The losses of the beaten Army from sickness and fatigue are on such a disproportionate scale, the spirit of the Army is so weakened and lowered by the constant solicitude about impending ruin, that at last anything like a well organised stand is out of the question; every day thousands of prisoners