WILLIAM THOMAS SAMPSON

VICTORY IN SUPERIOR NUMBERS

     [Speech of Rear-Admiral William T. Sampson at a banquet given in
     his honor by citizens of Boston, Mass., February 6, 1899.  Hon.
     Richard Olney presided on the occasion.]

MR. PRESIDENT AND GENTLEMEN:—­I rise to thank you for your most generous greeting for myself, for my friends, and for all of the Navy that you have included in the various remarks which have been made.  I want you to understand that I do not take it all to myself, but that this is divided with all the men; and while with great hesitation I attempt to make a speech at all, I feel that this is an opportunity which should not be thrown away.  I do not propose to say anything, as you might expect, about the battle of Santiago, but I would like to say a few words about the lessons which we have learned, or should learn, from that battle.

First, I would say that neither that battle nor any other that I know of, was won by chance.  It requires an adequate means to accomplish such a result.  That battles are not won by chance, you have only to consider for a moment a few—­one or two—­of the principal battles of the world.  Not that I mean to class the battle of Santiago as one of the great battles of the world—­but just as an illustration.  You will see the result of adequate means in the case of the battle of Waterloo, for instance.  When we remember that Wellington fought that battle with 130,000 men opposed to Napoleon’s 80,000, we are not surprised that it was Wellington’s battle.  Take another decisive battle—­Sedan.  When the Germans had 125,000 men opposed to 84,000, it does not seem possible that the result could have been anything else.

So we might go over a long list.  The sea fights furnish many instances where it was found that the most powerful fleet was the one that was successful.  Nelson was always in favor of overwhelming fleets, though he did not have them always at his command.  Our own war of 1812 furnishes numerous instances where our victories depended upon the superior force.  It seems unnecessary that such self-evident truths should be stated before this assemblage of intelligent gentlemen, but we are apt to forget that a superior force is necessary to win a victory.  As I said before, victory is not due to chance.  Had superior force not been our own case at the battle of Santiago, had it been the reverse, or had it been materially modified, what turned out to be a victory might have been a disaster; and that we must not forget.