that she had a right to vote, and who testified on the trial that he had given her that advice.  The Act of Congress upon which the prosecution was founded uses the term “knowingly,”—­“shall knowingly vote or attempt to vote in the name of any other person, or more than once at the same election for any candidate for the same office, or vote at a place where he may not be lawfully entitled to vote, or without having a lawful right to vote.”  Here most manifestly the term “knowingly” does not apply to the mere act of voting.  It is hardly possible that a man should vote, and not know the fact that he is voting.  The statute will bear no possible construction but that which makes the term “knowingly” apply to the illegality of the act.  Thus, “shall knowingly vote without having a lawful right to vote,” can only mean, shall vote knowing that there is no lawful right to vote.  This being so, there was manifestly a most vital question beyond that of the fact of voting, and of the conclusion of the judge that the voting was illegal, viz., did Miss Anthony vote, knowing that she had no right to vote.

Now, many people will say that Miss Anthony ought to have known that she had no right to vote, and will perhaps regard it as an audacious attempt for mere effect, to assert a right that she might think she ought to have, but could not really have believed that she had.  But whatever degree of credit her claim to have acted honestly in the matter is entitled to, whether to much, or little, or none, it was entirely a question for the jury, and they alone could pass upon it.  The judge had no right even to express an opinion on the subject to the jury, much less to instruct them upon it, and least of all to order a verdict of guilty without consulting them.

There seems to have been an impression, as the writer infers from various notices of the matter in the public papers, that the case had resolved itself into a pure question of law.  Thus, a legal correspondent of one of our leading religious papers, in defending the course of Judge Hunt, says:  “There was nothing before the Court but a pure question of law.  Miss Anthony violated the law of the State intentionally and deliberately, as she openly avowed, and when brought to trial her only defence was that the law was unconstitutional.  Here was nothing whatever to go to the jury.”  And again he says:  “In jury trials all questions of law are decided by the judge.”  This writer is referred to only as expressing what are supposed to be the views of many others.

To show, however, how entirely incorrect is this assumption of fact, I insert here the written points submitted by Miss Anthony’s counsel to the Court, for its instruction to the jury.

First—­That if the defendant, at the time of voting, believed that she had a right to vote, and voted in good faith in that belief, she is not guilty of the offence charged.

Second—­In determining the question whether she did or did not believe that she had a right to vote, the jury may take into consideration, as bearing upon that question, the advice which she received from the counsel to whom she applied.