IV.

The last words of Vergniaud gave the people a tolerably clear prospect of an universal republic.  Nor were the constitutionalists less eager in directing the ideas of the nation towards war.  M. de Narbonne, on his return from his hasty journey, presented a most encouraging report to the Assembly, of the state of the fortified towns.—­He praised every one.  He presented to the country the young Mathieu de Montmorency, one of the most illustrious names of France, and whose character was even more noble than his name, as the representative of the aristocracy devoting itself to liberty.  He declared that the army, in its attachment to its country did not separate the King from the Assembly.  He praised the commanders of the troops, nominated Rochambeau general-in-chief of the army of the north, Berthier at Metz, Biron at Lisle, Luckner and La Fayette on the Rhine.  He spoke of plans for the campaign, concerted between the king and these officers; he enumerated the national guards, ready to serve as a second line to the active army, and solicited that they should be promptly armed; he described these volunteers, as giving the army the most imposing of all characters—­that of national feeling; he vouched for the officers, who had sworn fidelity to the constitution, and exonerated from the charge of treason those who had not done so; he encouraged the Assembly to mistrust those that hesitated.  “Mistrust,” said he, “is, in these stormy times, the most natural, but the most dangerous feeling; confidence wins men’s hearts, and it is important that the people should show they have friends only.”  He ended by announcing that the active force of the army was 110,000 foot, and 20,000 cavalry, ready to take the field.

This report, praised by Brissot in his journal, and by the Girondists in the Assembly, afforded no longer any pretext for delaying the war.  France felt that her strength was equal to her indignation, and she could be restrained no longer.  The increasing unpopularity of the king augmented the popular excitement.  Twice had he already arrested, by his royal veto, the energetic measures of the Assembly—­the decree against the emigres, and the decree against the priests who had not taken the oath.  These two vetos, the one dictated by his honour, the other by his conscience, were two terrible weapons, placed in his hand by the constitution, yet which he could not wield without wounding himself.  The Girondists revenged themselves for this resistance by compelling him to make war on the princes, who were his brothers, and the emperor, whom they believed to be his accomplice.

The pamphleteers and the Jacobin journalists constantly spoke of these two vetos as acts of treason.  The disturbances in Vendee were attributed to a secret understanding between the king and the rebellious clergy.  In vain did the department of Paris, composed of men who respected the conscience of others, such as M. de Talleyrand, M. de la Rochefoucauld, and M. de Beaumetz, present to the king a petition in which the true principles of liberty protested against the revolutionary inquisition:  counter-petitions poured in from the departments.