to will” are said to be voluntary, as stated above (A. 3).  And ignorance of this kind happens, either when one does not actually consider what one can and ought to consider; this is called “ignorance of evil choice,” and arises from some passion or habit:  or when one does not take the trouble to acquire the knowledge which one ought to have; in which sense, ignorance of the general principles of law, which one to know, is voluntary, as being due to negligence.  Accordingly, if in either of these ways, ignorance is voluntary, it cannot cause involuntariness simply.  Nevertheless it causes involuntariness in a certain respect, inasmuch as it precedes the movement of the will towards the act, which movement would not be, if there were knowledge.  Ignorance is “antecedent” to the act of the will, when it is not voluntary, and yet is the cause of man’s willing what he would not will otherwise.  Thus a man may be ignorant of some circumstance of his act, which he was not bound to know, the result being that he does that which he would not do, if he knew of that circumstance; for instance, a man, after taking proper precaution, may not know that someone is coming along the road, so that he shoots an arrow and slays a passer-by.  Such ignorance causes involuntariness simply.

From this may be gathered the solution of the objections.  For the first objection deals with ignorance of what a man is bound to know.  The second, with ignorance of choice, which is voluntary to a certain extent, as stated above.  The third, with that ignorance which is concomitant with the act of the will. ________________________

QUESTION 7

OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF HUMAN ACTS
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider the circumstances of human acts:  under which head there are four points of inquiry: 

(1) What is a circumstance?

(2) Whether a theologian should take note of the circumstances of human acts?

(3) How many circumstances are there?

(4) Which are the most important of them?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 7, Art. 1]

Whether a Circumstance Is an Accident of a Human Act?

Objection 1:  It would seem that a circumstance is not an accident of a human act.  For Tully says (De Invent.  Rhetor. i) that a circumstance is that from “which an orator adds authority and strength to his argument.”  But oratorical arguments are derived principally from things pertaining to the essence of a thing, such as the definition, the genus, the species, and the like, from which also Tully declares that an orator should draw his arguments.  Therefore a circumstance is not an accident of a human act.

Obj. 2:  Further, “to be in” is proper to an accident.  But that which surrounds (circumstat) is rather out than in.  Therefore the circumstances are not accidents of human acts.