Reply Obj. 5:  One can make bad use of a virtue objectively, for instance by having evil thoughts about a virtue, e.g. by hating it, or by being proud of it:  but one cannot make bad use of virtue as principle of action, so that an act of virtue be evil.

Reply Obj. 6:  Infused virtue is caused in us by God without any action on our part, but not without our consent.  This is the sense of the words, “which God works in us without us.”  As to those things which are done by us, God causes them in us, yet not without action on our part, for He works in every will and in every nature. ________________________

QUESTION 56

OF THE SUBJECT OF VIRTUE
(In Six Articles)

We now have to consider the subject of virtue, about which there are six points of inquiry: 

(1) Whether the subject of virtue is a power of the soul?

(2) Whether one virtue can be in several powers?

(3) Whether the intellect can be the subject of virtue?

(4) Whether the irascible and concupiscible faculties can be the subject of virtue?

(5) Whether the sensitive powers of apprehension can be the subject of virtue?

(6) Whether the will can be the subject of virtue?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 56, Art. 1]

Whether the Subject of Virtue Is a Power of the Soul?

Objection 1:  It would seem that the subject of virtue is not a power of the soul.  For Augustine says (De Lib.  Arb. ii, 19) that “virtue is that by which we live righteously.”  But we live by the essence of the soul, and not by a power of the soul.  Therefore virtue is not a power, but in the essence of the soul.

Obj. 2:  Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that “virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and his work good likewise.”  But as work is set up by power, so he that has a virtue is set up by the essence of the soul.  Therefore virtue does not belong to the power, any more than to the essence of the soul.

Obj. 3:  Further, power is in the second species of quality.  But virtue is a quality, as we have said above (Q. 55, A. 4):  and quality is not the subject of quality.  Therefore a power of the soul is not the subject of virtue.

On the contrary, “Virtue is the limit of power” (De Coelo ii).  But the limit is in that of which it is the limit.  Therefore virtue is in a power of the soul.

I answer that, It can be proved in three ways that virtue belongs to a power of the soul.  First, from the notion of the very essence of virtue, which implies perfection of a power; for perfection is in that which it perfects.  Secondly, from the fact that virtue is an operative habit, as we have said above (Q. 55, A. 2):  for all operation proceeds from the soul through a power.  Thirdly, from the fact that virtue disposes to that which is best:  for the best is the end, which is either a thing’s operation, or something acquired by an operation proceeding from the thing’s power.  Therefore a power of the soul is the subject of virtue.