have the jaundice, so that the Heraclitans start from a preconception common to all men, as do we also, and perhaps the other schools of philosophy likewise.  If, however, they had attributed the origin of the statement that contradictory predicates are present in the same thing to any of the Sceptical teachings, as, for example, to the formula “Every thing is incomprehensible,” or “I determine nothing,” or any of the other similar ones, it may be that which they say would follow; but since they start from that which is a common experience, not only to us, but to other philosophers, and in life, why should one say that our school is a path to the philosophy of Heraclitus more than any of the other schools of philosophy, or than life itself, as we all make use of the same subject matter?  On the other hand, the Sceptical School may not 212 only fail to help towards the knowledge of the philosophy of Heraclitus, but may even hinder it!  For the Sceptic attacks all the dogmas of Heraclitus as having been rashly given, and opposes on the one hand the doctrine of conflagration, and on the other, the doctrine that contradictory predicates in reality apply to the same thing, and in regard to every dogma of Heraclitus he scorns his dogmatic rashness, and then, in the manner that I have before referred to, adduces the formulae “I do not understand” and “I determine nothing,” which conflict with the Heraclitan doctrines.  It is absurd to say that this conflicting school is a path to the very sect with which it conflicts.  It is then absurd to say that the Sceptical School is a path to the philosophy of Heraclitus.

CHAPTER XXX.

In what does the Sceptical School differ from the Philosophy of Democritus?

The philosophy of Democritus is also said to have community 213 with Scepticism, because it seems to use the same matter that we do.  For, from the fact that honey seems sweet to some and bitter to others, Democritus reasons, it is said, that honey is neither sweet nor bitter, and therefore he accords with the formula “No more,” which is a formula of the Sceptics.  But the Sceptics and the Democritans use the formula “No more” differently from each other, for they emphasise the negation in the expression, but we, the not knowing whether both of the phenomena exist or neither one, and so we differ in this respect.  The distinction, however, becomes most evident when Democritus says that 214 atoms and empty space are real, for by real he means existing in reality.  Now, although he begins with the anomaly in phenomena, yet, since he says that atoms and empty space really exist, it is superfluous, I think, even to say that he differs from us.

CHAPTER XXXI.

In what does Scepticism differ from the Cyrenaic Philosophy?