Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 167 pages of information about Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism.

Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 167 pages of information about Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism.

CHAPTER XXVI.

The Formulae “I do not comprehend” and “I do not understand."

The formulae “I do not comprehend” and “I do not understand” 201 show a condition of mind in which the Sceptic stands aloof for the present from asserting or denying anything in regard to the unknown things under investigation, as is evident from what we said before about the other formulae.

CHAPTER XXVII.

The Formula “To place an equal Statement in opposition to every Statement."

Furthermore, when we say “Every statement may have an equal 202 statement placed in opposition to it,” by “every,” we mean all the statements that we have examined; we do not use the word “statement” simply, but for a statement which seeks to prove something dogmatically about things that are unknown, and not at all one that shows a process of reasoning from premises and conclusions, but something which is put together in any sort of way.  We use the word “equal” in reference to trustworthiness or untrustworthiness.  “Is placed in opposition” we use instead of the common expression “to conflict with,” and we supply “as it appears to me.”  When therefore one says, “It seems to me 203 that every statement which I have examined, which proves something dogmatically, may have another statement placed in opposition to it which also proves something dogmatically, and which is equal to it in trustworthiness and untrustworthiness,” this is not asserted dogmatically, but is an expression of human feeling as it appears to the one who feels it.  Some Sceptics 204 express the formula as follows:  “Every statement should have an equal one placed in opposition to it,” demanding it authoritatively thus:  “Let us place in opposition to every statement that proves something dogmatically another conflicting statement which also seeks to prove something dogmatically, and is equal to it in trustworthiness and untrustworthiness.”  Naturally this is directed to the Sceptics, but the infinitive should be used instead of the imperative, that is, “to oppose” instead of “let us oppose.”  This formula is recommended to the 205 Sceptic, lest he should be deceived by the Dogmatists and give up his investigations, and rashly fail of the [Greek:  ataraxia] which is thought to accompany [Greek:  epoche] in regard to everything, as we have explained above.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

General Observations on the Formulae of the Sceptics.

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Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.