Dogmatics themselves say, and the things that make themselves known to us are the phenomena, and the things that are made known to us by the phenomena are the hidden things, for according to the Dogmatics, the phenomena are the outward appearance of the unknown; then that which makes known, and that which is made known, are in relation to something; every thing, therefore, is in relation to something.  In 139 addition to this, some things are similar to each other, and others are dissimilar, some are equal, and others are unequal.  Now these things are in relation to something, therefore every thing is in relation to something, and whoever says that every thing is not in relation to something, himself establishes the fact that every thing is in relation to something, for even in saying that every thing is not in relation to something, he 140 proves it in reference to us, and not in general, by his objections to us.  In short, as we have shown that every thing is in relation to something, it is then evident that we shall not be able to say exactly what each object is by nature, but what it appears to be like in relation to something else.  It follows from this, that we must suspend our judgment regarding the nature of things.

THE NINTH TROPE.

In regard to the Trope based on the frequency and rarity of 141 events, which we call the ninth of the series, we give the following explanation:  The sun is certainly a much more astonishing thing than a comet, but because we see the sun continually and the comet rarely we are so much astonished at the comet that it even seems an omen, while we are not at all astonished at the sun.  If, however, we should imagine the sun appearing at rare intervals, and at rare intervals setting, in the first instance suddenly lighting up all things, and in the second casting everything into shade, we should see great astonishment at the sight.  An earthquake, too, does not trouble 142 those who experience it for the first time in the same manner as those who have become accustomed to it.  How great the astonishment of a man who beholds the sea for the first time!  And the beauty of the human body, seen suddenly for the first time, moves us more than if we are accustomed to seeing it.  That which is rare seems valuable, while things that are familiar 143 and easily obtained seem by no means so.  If, for example, we should imagine water as rare, of how much greater value would it seem than all other valuable things! or if we imagine gold as simply thrown about on the ground in large quantities like stones, to whom do we think it would be valuable, or by whom would it be hoarded, as it is now?  Since then the same things according to the frequency or rarity that they are met with seem to be now valuable and now not so, we conclude that it may be that we shall be able to say what kind of a thing each of 144 them appears to be according to the frequency or rarity with which it occurs, but we are not able to say what each external object is absolutely.  Therefore, according to this Trope also, we suspend our judgment regarding these things.