he falls into greater perturbation, because he is excited beyond reason and without measure from fear of a change, and he does everything in his power to retain the things that seem to him good.  But he who is undecided, on the contrary, regarding 28 things that are good and bad by nature, neither seeks nor avoids anything eagerly, and is therefore in a state of [Greek:  ataraxia].  For that which is related of Apelles the painter happened to the Sceptic.  It is said that as he was once painting a horse he wished to represent the foam of his mouth in the picture, but he could not succeed in doing so, and he gave it up and threw the sponge at the picture with which he had wiped the colors from the painting.  As soon, however, as it touched the picture it produced a good copy of the foam.  The Sceptics likewise hoped to gain [Greek:  ataraxia] by forming judgments 29 in regard to the anomaly between phenomena and the things of thought, but they were unable to do this, and so they suspended their judgment; and while their judgment was in suspension [Greek:  ataraxia] followed, as if by chance, as the shadow follows a body.  Nevertheless, we do not consider the Sceptic wholly undisturbed, but he is disturbed by some things that are inevitable.  We confess that sometimes he is cold and thirsty, and that he suffers in such ways.  But in these things even the ignorant are beset in two ways, from the feelings themselves, 30 and not less also from the fact that they think these conditions are bad by nature.  The Sceptic, however, escapes more easily, as he rejects the opinion that anything is in itself bad by nature.  Therefore we say that the aim of the Sceptic is [Greek:  ataraxia] in matters of opinion, and moderation of feeling in those things that are inevitable.  Some notable Sceptics have added also suspension of judgment in investigation.

CHAPTER XIII.

The General Method of Scepticism.

Since we have said that [Greek:  ataraxia] follows the suspension 31 of judgment in regard to everything, it behooves us to explain how the suspension of judgment takes place.  Speaking in general it takes place through placing things in opposition to each other.  We either place phenomena in opposition to phenomena, or the intellectual in opposition to the intellectual, or reciprocally.  For example, we place 32 phenomena in opposition to phenomena when we say that this tower appears round from a distance but square near by; the intellectual in opposition to the intellectual, when to the one who from the order of the heavens builds a tower of reasoning to prove that a providence exists, we oppose the fact that adversity often falls to the good and prosperity to the evil, and that therefore we draw the conclusion that there is no providence.  The intellectual is placed in opposition to 33 phenomena, as when Anaxagoras opposed the fact that snow is white,