they deny or affirm anything, but simply that they offset each other.  By equilibrium, we mean equality in regard to trustworthiness and untrustworthiness, so that of the reasons that are placed in opposition to each other, one should not excel another in trustworthiness. [Greek:  epoche] is a holding back of the opinion, in consequence of which we neither deny nor affirm anything. [Greek:  ataraxia] is repose and tranquillity of soul.  We shall explain how [Greek:  ataraxia] accompanies [Greek:  epoche] when we speak of the aim.

CHAPTER V.

The Sceptic.

What is meant by a Pyrrhonean philosopher can be understood from 11 the idea of the Sceptical School.  He is a Pyrrhonean, namely, who identifies himself with this system.

CHAPTER VI.

The Origin of Scepticism.

Scepticism arose in the beginning from the hope of attaining 12 [Greek:  ataraxia]; for men of the greatest talent were perplexed by the contradiction of things, and being at a loss what to believe, began to question what things are true, and what false, hoping to attain [Greek:  ataraxia] as a result of the decision.  The fundamental principle of the Sceptical system is especially this, namely, to oppose every argument by one of equal weight, for it seems to us that in this way we finally reach the position where we have no dogmas.

CHAPTER VII.

Does the Sceptic Dogmatise?

We say that the Sceptic does not dogmatise.  We do not say 13 this, meaning by the word dogma the popular assent to certain things rather than others (for the Sceptic does assent to feelings that are a necessary result of sensation, as for example, when he is warm or cold, he cannot say that he thinks he is not warm or cold), but we say this, meaning by dogma the acceptance of any opinion in regard to the unknown things investigated by science.  For the Pyrrhonean assents to nothing that is unknown.  Furthermore, he does not dogmatise even when 14 he utters the Sceptical formulae in regard to things that are unknown, such as “Nothing more,” or “I decide nothing,” or any of the others about which we shall speak later.  For the one who dogmatises regards the thing about which he is said to dogmatise, as existing in itself; the Sceptic does not however regard these formulae as having an absolute existence, for he assumes that the saying “All is false,” includes itself with other things as false, and likewise the saying “Nothing is true”; in the same way “Nothing more,” states that together with other things it itself is nothing more, and cancels itself therefore, as well as other things.  We say the same also in regard to the other Sceptical expressions.  In short, if he who 15 dogmatises, assumes as existing in itself that about which he dogmatises, the Sceptic, on the contrary, expresses his sayings in such a way that they are understood to be themselves included, and it cannot be said that he dogmatises in saying these things.  The principal thing in uttering these formulae is that he says what appears to him, and communicates his own feelings in an unprejudiced way, without asserting anything in regard to external objects.