estate?  Why say they not likewise, that all the world does them wrong, because they are not in possession of what belongs to the rest of mankind?  But they believe, with great reason, that it is better to live in society and to be ensured of a moderate estate than to have the sole possession of all that is their neighbours’, and to be exposed to the dangers that are inseparable from solitude.  Nevertheless, they are not of the same opinion as to the company of their brothers.  If they are rich they buy themselves slaves to serve them, they procure themselves friends to stand by them; but for their brothers they neglect them; as if a brother were not so fit to make a friend of as another person.  And yet it is of great efficacy towards the begetting and establishing of friendships to have been born of the same parents and brought up together, since even beasts, we see, retain some inclination for those who have come from the same dams, and have been bred up and nourished together.  Besides, a man who has a brother is the more regarded for it, and men are more cautious to offend him.”  Chaerecrates answered him thus:—­

“You are indeed in the right to say that a good brother is a great happiness; and, unless there be a very strong cause of dissension, I think that brothers ought a little to bear with one another, and not part on a slight occasion; but when a brother fails in all things, and is quite the reverse of what he ought to be, would you have a man do what is impossible and continue in good amity with such a person?” Socrates replied, “Does your brother give offence to all the world as well as to you?  Does nobody speak well of him?” “That,” said Chaerecrates, “is one of the chief causes of the hatred I bear him, for he is sly enough to please others; but whenever we two happen to meet you would think his sole design were to fall out with me.”  Socrates replied, “Does not this proceed from what I am going to say?  When any man would make use of a horse, and knows not how to govern him, he can expect nothing from him but trouble.  Thus, if we know not in what manner to behave ourselves toward our brother, do you think we can expect anything from him but uneasiness?” “Why do you imagine,” said Chaerecrates, “that I am ignorant in what manner I ought to carry myself to a brother, since I can show him as much love and respect, both in my words and actions, as he can show me in his?  But when I see a man endeavour to disoblige me all manner of ways, shall I express any goodwill for that man?  No; this is what I cannot do, and will not so much as endeavour it.”  “I am astonished to hear you talk after this manner,” said Socrates; “pray tell me, if you had a dog that were good to keep your flocks, who should fawn on your shepherds, and grin his teeth and snarl whenever you come in his way, whether, instead of being angry with him, you would not make much of him to bring him to know you?  Now, you say that a good brother is a great happiness; you confess that