On such a scheme we should have a Cabinet of nine or ten members, representing among them all the departments which are concerned with regulative or purely governmental work.  And I suggest that a rearrangement of this kind would not only restore efficiency to the Cabinet, but would lead to very great administrative reforms, better co-ordination between closely related departments, and in many respects economy.  But valuable as such changes may be, they would not in themselves be sufficient to restore complete health to our governmental system.  In the last resort this depends upon the organisation of an efficient and unresting system of criticism and control.

THE HOUSE OF COMMONS

In any modern State the control of the action of Government is largely wielded by organs not formally recognised by law—­by the general movement of public opinion; by the influence of what is vaguely called “the city”; by the resolutions of such powerful bodies as trade union congresses, federations of employers, religious organisations, and propagandist bodies of many kinds; and, above all, by the Press.  No review of our system would be complete without some discussion of these extremely powerful and in some cases dangerous influences.  We cannot, however, touch upon them here.  We must confine ourselves to the formal, constitutional machinery of national control over the actions of Government, that is, to Parliament, as the spokesman of the nation.

An essential part of any full discussion of this subject would be a treatment of the Second Chamber problem.  But that would demand a whole hour to itself; and I propose to pass it over for the present, and to ask you to consider the perturbing fact that the House of Commons, which is the very heart of our system, has largely lost the confidence and belief which it once commanded.

Why has the House of Commons lost the confidence of the nation?  There are two main reasons, which we must investigate in turn.  In the first place, in spite of the now completely democratic character of the electorate, the House is felt to be very imperfectly representative of the national mind.  And in the second place, it is believed to perform very inefficiently its primary function of criticising and controlling the action of Government.

First of all, why do men vaguely feel that the House of Commons is unrepresentative?  I think there are three main reasons.  The first is to be found in the method of election.  Since 1885 the House has been elected by equal electoral districts, each represented by a single member.  Now, if we suppose that every constituency was contested by two candidates only, about 45 per cent. of the voters must feel that they had not voted for anybody who sat at Westminster; while many of the remaining 55 per cent. must feel that they had been limited to a choice between two men, neither of whom truly represented them.  But if in many constituencies there are no contests, and in many others there are three or more candidates, the number of electors who feel that they have not voted for any member of the House may rise to 60 per cent. or even 70 per cent. of the total.