“John Brown’s effort was peculiar.  It was not a slave insurrection.  It was an attempt by white men to get up a revolt among slaves, in which the slaves refused to participate.  In fact, it was so absurd that the slaves with all their ignorance saw plainly enough that it could not succeed.  That affair in its philosophy corresponds with the many attempts related in history at the assassination of kings and emperors.  An enthusiast broods over the oppression of the people until he fancies himself commissioned by heaven to liberate them.  He ventures the attempt which ends in little else than his own execution.  Orsini’s attempt on Louis Napoleon, and John Brown’s attempt at Harper’s Ferry were, in their philosophy, precisely the same.  The eagerness to cast blame on old England in the one case and on New England in the other, does not disprove the sameness of the two things.”

The Cooper Union speech received extravagant praise from all the Republican newspapers.  Lincoln’s ardent partisans assert that it took New York “by storm.”  Rather too violent a way of putting it!  But there can be no doubt that the speech made a deep impression.  Thereafter, many of the Eastern managers were willing to consider Lincoln as a candidate, should factional jealousies prove uncompromising.  Any port in a storm, you know.  Obviously, there could be ports far more dangerous than this “favorite son” of Illinois.

Many national conventions in the United States have decided upon a compromise candidate, “a dark horse,” through just such reasoning.  The most noted instance is the Republican Convention of 1860.  When it assembled at Chicago in June, the most imposing candidate was the brilliant leader of the New York Republicans, Seward.  But no man in the country had more bitter enemies.  Horace Greeley whose paper The Tribune was by far the most influential Republican organ, went to Chicago obsessed by one purpose:  because of irreconcilable personal quarrels he would have revenge upon Seward.  Others who did not hate Seward were afraid of what Greeley symbolized.  And all of them knew that whatever else happened, the West must be secured.

The Lincoln managers played upon the Eastern jealousies and the Eastern fears with great skill.  There was little sleep among the delegates the night previous to the balloting.  At just the right moment, the Lincoln managers, though their chief had forbidden them to do so, offered promises with regard to Cabinet appointments.(6) And they succeeded in packing the galleries of the Convention Hall with a perfectly organized claque-"rooters,” the modern American would say.

The result on the third ballot was a rush to Lincoln of all the enemies of Seward, and Lincoln’s nomination amid a roaring frenzy of applause.

XI.  SECESSION