as in the days when we were neutrals.  The lofty ideals by which the Administration had professed to be guided should have still controlled its actions; the mere fact that we, as a belligerent, could obtain certain advantages would hardly have justified a great and high-minded nation in abandoning its principles.  Yet abandon them we did from the day that we declared war.  We became just as remorseless in disregarding the rights of small states as Great Britain—­according to our numerous blockade notes—­had been.  Possibly, therefore, Mr. Balfour’s mirth was not merely sympathetic or humorous; it perhaps echoed his discovery that our position for three years had really been nothing but a sham; that the State Department had been forcing points in which it did not really believe, or in which it did not believe when American interests were involved.  At any rate, this ending of our long argument with Great Britain was a splendid justification for Page; his contention had always been that the preservation of civilization was more important than the technicalities of the international lawyers.  And now the Wilson Administration, by throwing into the waste basket all the finespun theories with which it had been embarrassing the Allied cause since August 4, 1914, accepted—­and accepted joyously—­his point of view.

II

One of the first things which Mr. Balfour did, on his arrival in Washington, was personally to explain to President Wilson about the so-called “secret treaties.”  The “secret treaty” that especially preyed upon Mr. Wilson’s mind, and which led to a famous episode at the Versailles Conference, was that which had been made with Italy in 1915, as consideration for Italy’s participation in the war.  Mr. Balfour, in telling the President of these territorial arrangements with Italy, naturally did not criticise his ally, but it was evident that he regarded the matter as something about which the United States should be informed.

“This is the sort of thing you have to do when you are engaged in a war,” he explained, and then he gave Mr. Wilson the details.

Probably the most important information which Mr. Balfour and the French and Italian Commissions brought to Washington was the desperate situation of the Allied cause.  On that point not one of the visiting statesmen or military and naval advisers made the slightest attempt at concealment.  Mr. Balfour emphasized the seriousness of the crisis in one of his earliest talks with Mr. McAdoo, Secretary of the Treasury.  The British statesman was especially interested in the financial situation and he therefore took up this matter at an early date with the Treasury Department.

“Mr. Balfour,” said Mr. McAdoo, “before we make any plans of financial assistance it is absolutely necessary that we know precisely where we stand.  The all-important thing is the question as to how long the war is likely to last.  If it is only to last a few months, it is evident that we need to make very different arrangements than if it is to last several years.  Just what must we make provision for?  Let us assume that the United States goes in with all its men and resources—­that we dedicate all our money, our manufacturing plants, our army, our navy, everything we have got, to bringing the war to an end.  How long will it take?”