would seem to all Americans intolerable, and, indeed incredible; (4) all Americans who have had any experience in Governmental or educational administration recognize the fact, that German administration—­both in peace and in war—­is the most efficient in the world, and for that efficiency they feel nothing but respect and admiration, unless the efficiency requires an inexpedient suppression or restriction of individual liberty; (5) Americans sympathize with a unanimous popular sentiment in favor of a war which the people believe to be essential to the greatness, and even the safety, of their country—­a sentiment which prompts to family and property sacrifices very distressing at the moment, and irremediable in the future; and they believe that the German people today are inspired by just such an overwhelming sentiment.

How is it, then, that, with all these strong American feelings tending to make them sympathize with the German people in good times or bad, in peace or in war, the whole weight of American opinion is on the side of the Allies in the present war?  The reasons are to be found, of course, in the political and social history of the American people, and in its Governmental philosophy and practice today.  These reasons have come out of the past, and are intrenched in all the present ideals and practices of the American Commonwealth.  They inevitably lead Americans to object strongly and irrevocably to certain German national practices of great moment, practices which are outgrowths of Prussian theories, and experiences that have come to prevail in Germany during the past hundred years.  In the hope that American public opinion about the European war may be a little better understood abroad it seems worth while to enumerate those German practices which do not conform to American standards in the conduct of public affairs: 

(a) Americans object to the committal of a nation to grave measures of foreign policy by a permanent Executive—­Czar, Kaiser, or King—­advised in secret by professional diplomatists who consider themselves the personal representatives of their respective sovereigns.  The American people have no permanent Executive, and the profession of diplomacy hardly exists among them.  In the conduct of their national affairs they utterly distrust secrecy, and are accustomed to demand and secure the utmost publicity.

(b) They object to placing in any ruler’s hands the power to order mobilization or declare war in advance of deliberate consultation with a representative assembly, and of co-operative action thereby.  The fact that German mobilization was ordered three days in advance of the meeting of the Reichstag confounds all American ideas and practices about the rights of the people and the proper limits of Executive authority.

(c) The secrecy of European diplomatic intercourse and of international understandings and terms of alliance in Europe is in the view of ordinary Americans not only inexpedient, but dangerous and unjustifiable.  Under the Constitution of the United States no treaty negotiated by the President and his Cabinet is valid until it has been publicly discussed and ratified by the Senate.  During this discussion the people can make their voice heard through the press, the telegraph, and the telephone.