ship or the second as it might appear most eligible from her crippled state; and this mode pursued I see nothing to prevent the capture of the five or six ships of the enemy’s van.  The two or three ships of the enemy’s rear must either bear up or wear; and in either case, although they would be in a better plight probably than our two van ships (now the rear), yet they would be separated and at a distance to leeward, so as to give our ships time to refit.  And by that time I believe the battle would, from the judgment of the admiral and captains, be over with the rest of them.  Signals from these moments are useless when every man is disposed to do his duty.  The great object is for us to support each other, and to keep close to the enemy and to leeward of him.

If the enemy are running away, then the only signals necessary will be to engage the enemy on arriving up with them; and the other ships to pass on for the second, third, &c., giving if possible a close fire into the enemy on passing, taking care to give our ships engaged notice of your intention.

FOOTNOTES: 

[1] From the original in the St. Vincent Papers.  Also in Nicolas, Despatches and Letters, vi. 443.  Obvious mistakes in punctuation have been corrected in the text.

[2] Cf. the similar remark of De Chaves, supra, p. 5.

LORD NELSON, 1805.

[+Nicolas, Despatches and Letters, vii.+[1]]

Memorandum.

Secret.  Victory, off Cadiz, 9th October, 1805.

Thinking it almost impossible to bring a fleet of forty sail of the line into line of battle in variable winds, thick weather, and other circumstances which must occur, without such a loss of time that the opportunity would probably be lost of bringing the enemy to battle in such a manner as to make the business decisive; I have therefore made up my mind to keep the fleet in that position of sailing (with the exception of the first and second in command), that the order of sailing is to be the order of battle; placing the fleet in two lines of sixteen ships each, with an advance squadron of eight of the fastest sailing two-decked ships, which will always make, if wanted, a line of twenty-four sail on whichever line the commander-in-chief may direct.

The second in command will,[2] after my intentions are made known to him, have the entire direction of his line; to make the attack upon the enemy, and to follow up the blow until they are captured or destroyed.

If the enemy’s fleet should be seen to windward in line of battle, and that the two lines and the advanced squadron can fetch them,[3] they will probably be so extended that their van could not succour their rear.

I should therefore probably make the second in command’s[4] signal, to lead through about the twelfth ship from the rear (or wherever he[5] could fetch, if not able to get as far advanced).  My line would lead through about their centre; and the advanced squadron to cut two, three, or four ships ahead of their centre, so far as to ensure getting at their commander-in-chief on whom every effort must be made to capture.