acknowledged, when they boldly lay-to to accept action.  The confusion of their line was tactically no weakness:  it only resulted in a duplication which was so nicely adapted for meeting Howe’s manoeuvre that there was a widespread belief in the British fleet, which Collingwood himself shared, that Villeneuve had adopted it deliberately.[38] Seeing what the enemy’s accidental formation was, every ship that pierced it must be almost inevitably doubled or trebled on.  It was, we know, the old Dutch manner of meeting the English method of attack in the earliest days of the line.[39] Had he given Villeneuve time for forming his line properly the enemy’s battle order would have been only the weaker.  Had he taken time to form his own order the mass of the attack would have been delivered little later than it was, its impact would have been intensified, and the victory might well have been even more decisive than it was, while the sacrifice it cost would certainly have been less, incalculably less, if we think that the sacrifice included Nelson himself.

FOOTNOTES: 

[1] Nelson’s Letters and Despatches, p. 382.

[2] Nicolas, Nelson’s Despatches, v. 287, note.  It is also given in vol. vii. p. ccxvi, apparently from a captain’s copy which is undated.

[3] Ibid. v. 283.

[4] Professor Laughton pointed out (op. cit.) that the conditions will fit June to August 1804, but that it might have been ’earlier, certainly not later.’

[5] It is very doubtful whether this formation was ever intended for anything but tactical exercises.  Morogues has a similar signal and instruction (Tactique Navale, p. 294, ed. 1779), ’Partager l’armee en deux corps, ou mettre l’armee sur deux colonnes; et representation d’un combat.’  Anson certainly used it for manoeuvring one half of his fleet against the other during his tactical exercises in 1747.  Warren to Anson, Add.  MSS. 15957, p. 172.

[6] Mathieu-Dumas, Precis des Evenements Militaires, xiii. 193.

[7] Captain Boswall, in the preface to his translation of Hoste, says Grenier’s work was translated in 1790.  If this was so Nelson may well have read it, but I have not been able to find a copy of the translation either in the British Museum or elsewhere.

[8] Ross, Memoir of Saumarez, i. 212.

[9] Laughton, Nelson’s Letters and Despatches, 150.

[10] No. 182 as it stood in the signal book meant, Ships before in tow to proceed to port.  No. 183.  When at anchor to veer to twice the length of cable.  No. 16.  Secret instructions to be opened.

[11] It was in the handwriting, Nicolas says, of Edward Hawke Locker, Esq., the naval biographer and originator of the naval picture gallery at Greenwich.  He endorsed it, ’Copy of a paper communicated to me by Sir Richard Keats, and allowed by him to be transcribed by me, 1st October, 1829.’