In Europe, during the year 1781, the two leading questions which dominated the action of the belligerents were the protection, or destruction, of commerce, and the attack and defence of Gibraltar.  The British Channel Fleet was much inferior to the aggregate sea forces of France and Spain in the waters of Europe; and the Dutch navy also was now hostile.  The French government represented to its allies that by concentrating their squadrons near the entrance of the Channel they would control the situation in every point of view; but the Spaniards, intent upon Gibraltar, declined to withdraw their fleet from Cadiz until late in the summer, while the French persisted in keeping their own at Brest.  The Channel Fleet was decisively superior to the latter, and inferior to the Spaniards in numbers only.

No relief having been given Gibraltar since Rodney had left it in February, 1780, the question of supplying the fortress became pressing.  For this purpose, twenty-eight ships of the line, under Vice-Admiral George Darby, sailed from St. Helen’s on the 13th of March, 1781, with a large convoy.  Off Cork a number of victuallers joined, and the whole body then proceeded for Gibraltar, accompanied by five ships of the line which were destined for the East Indies, as well as by the West India and American “trade.”  These several attachments parted from time to time on the way, and on the 11th of April the main expedition sighted Cape Spartel, on the African coast.  No attempt to intercept it was made by the great Spanish fleet in Cadiz; and on the 12th of April, at noon, the convoy anchored in the Bay of Gibraltar.  That night thirteen sail of the transports, under charge of two frigates, slipped out and made their way to Minorca, then a British possession.  The British ships of war continued under way, cruising in the Bay and Gut of Gibraltar.

As the convoy entered, the besiegers opened a tremendous cannonade, which was ineffectual, however, to stop the landing of the stores.  More annoyance was caused by a flotilla of gunboats, specially built for this siege, the peculiar fighting power of which lay in one 26-pounder, whose great length gave a range superior to the batteries of ships of the line.  Being moved by oars as well as by sails, these little vessels could choose their distance in light airs and calms, and were used so actively to harass the transports at anchor that Darby was obliged to cover them with three ships of the line.  These proved powerless effectually to injure the gunboats; but, while the latter caused great annoyance and petty injury, they did not hinder the unlading nor even greatly delay it.  The experience illustrates again the unlikelihood that great results can be obtained by petty means, or that massed force, force concentrated, can be effectually counteracted either by cheap and ingenious expedients, or by the cooeperative exertions of many small independent units.  “They were only capable of producing