When the student meets such a tangle in the writings of any philosopher, I ask him to believe that it is not the human reason that is at fault—­at least, let him not assume that it is.  The fault probably lies with a human reason.

Section 26.  See Chapter XII, “The Berkeleian Doctrine of Space,” in my “System of Metaphysics.”  The argument ought not to be difficult to one who has mastered Chapter V of this volume.

CHAPTER VII, sections 27-29.  Compare Chapter XIII, “System of Metaphysics,” “Of Time.”

With the chapters on Space and Time it would be well for the student to read Chapter XIV, “The Real World in Space and Time,” where it is made clear why we have no hesitation in declaring space and time to be infinite, although we recognize that it seems to be an assumption of knowledge to declare the material world infinite.

CHAPTER VIII, sections 30-32.  Read, in the “System of Metaphysics,” Chapters V and XVII, “The Self or Knower” and “The Atomic Self.”

Section 33.  The suggestions, touching the attitude of the psychologist toward the mind, contained in the preface to Professor William James’s “Psychology” are very interesting and instructive.

CHAPTER IX, sections 35-36.  For a strong argument in favor of interactionism see James’s “Psychology,” Chapter V. I wish the student would, in reading it, bear in mind what is said in my chapter on “The Atomic Self,” above referred to.  The subject should be approached with an open mind, and one should suspend judgment until both sides have been heard from.

Section 37.  Descartes held that the lower animals are automata and that their actions are not indicative of consciousness; he regarded their bodies as machines lacking the soul in the “little pineal gland.”  Professor Huxley revived the doctrine of animal automatism and extended it so as to include man.  He regarded consciousness as a “collateral product” of the working of the body, related to it somewhat as is the steam-whistle of a locomotive engine to the working of the machine.  He made it an effect, but not a cause, of motions.  See “System of Metaphysics,” Chapter XVIII, “The Automaton Theory:  its Genesis.”

We owe the doctrine of parallelism, in its original form, to Spinoza.  It was elaborated by W. K. Clifford, and to him the modern interest in the subject is largely due.  The whole subject is discussed at length in my “System of Metaphysics,” Chapters XIX-XXI.  The titles are:  “The Automaton Theory:  Parallelism,” “What is Parallelism?” and “The Man and the Candlestick.”  Clifford’s doctrine is presented in a new form in Professor Strong’s recent brilliant work, “Why the Mind has a Body” N.Y., 1903.

Section 38.  See “System of Metaphysics,” Chapter XXIV, “The Time and Place of Sensations and Ideas.”

CHAPTER X, sections 40-42.  See “System of Metaphysics,” Chapters XXVII and XXVIII, “The Existence of Other Minds,” and “The Distribution of Minds.”