[Footnote 289:  So that from the instance of the potter and the jar we cannot conclude that the relation of clay and the jar is only that of nimitta and naimittika, not that of non-difference.]

[Footnote 290:  For instance, smoke extending in a long line whose base is connected with some object on the surface of the earth.]

[Footnote 291:  I.e. (as An.  Gi. explains) because we assume the relation of cause and effect not merely on the ground of the actual existence of one thing depending on that upon another, but on the additional ground of the mental existence, the consciousness of the one not being possible without the consciousness of the other.—­Tadbhavanuvidhayibhavatvam tadbhananuvidhayibhanatva/m/ ka karyasya kara/n/ananyatve hetur dhumavi/s/eshasya kagnibhavanuvidhayibhavatvesxpi na tadbhananuvidhayibhanatvam agnibhanasya dhumabhanadhinatvat.]

[Footnote 292:  For simplicity’s sake, asat will be translated henceforth by non-existing.]

[Footnote 293:  Samavaya, commonly translated by inherence or intimate relation, is, according to the Nyaya, the relation connecting a whole and its parts, substances, and qualities, &c.]

[Footnote 294:  Samavayasya svatantryapaksha/m/ dushayati anabhyupagamyamane/k/eti.  Samavayasya samavayibhi/h/ sambandho neshyate ki/m/ tu svatantryam evety atravayavavayavinor dravyagu/n/adina/m/ ka. viprakarsha/h/ syat sa/m/nidhayakabhavad ity artha/h/.  An.  Gi.]

[Footnote 295:  A conclusion which is in conflict with the Nyaya tenet that sa/m/yoga, conjunction, as, for instance, of the jar and the ground on which it stands, is a quality (gu/n/a) inherent in the two conjoined substances by means of the samavaya relation.]

[Footnote 296:  So that the whole can be apprehended by us as such if we apprehend a certain part only; analogously to our apprehending the whole thread on which a garland of flowers is strung as soon as we apprehend some few of the flowers.]

[Footnote 297:  Kalpantaram utthapayati atheti, tatha ka yathavayavai/h/ sutra/m/ kusumani vyapnuvat katipayakusumagraha/n/expi g/r/ihyate tatha katipayavayavagraha/n/expi bhavaty avayavino graha/n/am ity artha/h/.  Tatra kim arambhakavayavair eva teshv avayavi vartteta ki/m/ va tadatiriklavayavair iti vikalpyadyam pratyaha tadapiti.  Yatra yad varttate tat tadatiriktavayavair eva tatra vartamana/m/ drish/l/am iti d/ri/sh/t/antagarbha/m/ hetum a/k/ash/l/e ko/s/eti.  Dvitiyam dushayati anavastheti.  Kalpitanantavayavavyavahitataya prak/ri/tavayavino duraviprakarshat tantunish/th/atvam pa/t/asya na syad iti bhava/h/.  An.  Gi.]

[Footnote 298:  I.e. a something in which the action inheres; not a causal agent.]

[Footnote 299:  Every action, Sa@nkara says, requires an agent, i.e. a substrate in which the action takes place.  If we deny that the jar exists in the clay even before it is actually originated, we lose the substrate for the action of origination, i.e. entering into existence (for the non-existing jar cannot be the substratum of any action), and have to assume, for that action, other substrates, such as the operative causes of the jar.]