Adhik. IX (26-29) explains that, according to the express doctrine of Scripture, Brahman does not in its entirety pass over into the world, and, although emitting the world from itself, yet remains one and undivided. This is possible, according to Sa@nkara, because the world is unreal; according to Ramanuja, because the creation is merely the visible and tangible manifestation of what previously existed in Brahman in a subtle imperceptible condition.
Adhik. X (30, 31) teaches that Brahman, although destitute of instruments of action, is enabled to create the world by means of the manifold powers which it possesses.
Adhik. XI (32, 33) assigns the motive of the creation, or, more properly expressed, teaches that Brahman, in creating the world, has no motive in the strict sense of the word, but follows a mere sportive impulse.
Adhik. XII (34-36) justifies Brahman from the charges of partiality and cruelty which might be brought against it owing to the inequality of position and fate of the various animate beings, and the universal suffering of the world. Brahman, as a creator and dispenser, acts with a view to the merit and demerit of the individual souls, and has so acted from all eternity.
Adhik. XIII (37) sums up the preceding argumentation by declaring that all the qualities of Brahman—omniscience and so on—are such as to capacitate it for the creation of the world.
The task of the second pada is to refute, by arguments independent of Vedic passages, the more important philosophical theories concerning the origin of the world which are opposed to the Vedanta view.—The first adhikara/n/a (1-10) is directed against the Sa@nkhyas, whose doctrine had already been touched upon incidentally in several previous places, and aims at proving that a non-intelligent first cause, such as the pradhana of the Sa@nkhyas, is unable to create and dispose.—The second adhikara/n/a (11-17) refutes the Vai/s/eshika tenet that the world originates from atoms set in motion by the ad/ri/sh/t/a.—The third and fourth adhikara/n/as are directed against various schools of Bauddha philosophers. Adhik. III (18-27) impugns the view of the so-called sarvastitvavadins, or bahyarthavadins, who maintain the reality of an external as well as an internal world; Adhik. IV (28-32) is directed against the vij/n/anavadins, according to whom ideas are the only reality.—The last Sutra of this adhikara/n/a is treated by Ramanuja as a separate adhikara/n/a refuting the view of the Madhyamikas, who teach that everything is void, i.e. that nothing whatever is real.—Adhik. V (33-36) is directed against the doctrine of the Jainas; Adhik. VI (37-41) against those philosophical schools which teach that a highest Lord is not the material but only the operative cause of the world.